THE AMERICAN CHRISTIAN PRESS AND THE SINO-JAPANESE CRISIS OF 1931-1933: AN ASPECT OF PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE BREAKDOWN OF WORLD PEACE

by

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Date: July 9, 1968

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Duke University

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ABSTRACT

(History)

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ABSTRACT

During and after World War One the thinking of many Americans about international relations took on a decidedly moralistic tone with emphasis on morally acceptable means of preserving peace. When Japan challenged the effectiveness of the League of Nations and the various treaties guaranteeing peace by her seizure of Manchuria and parts of north China in 1931-33, the United States responded officially and unofficially with moral condemnation and righteous indignation. This reaction reflected a moralistic and idealistic approach to international relations which found strong expression in Christian circles. The Christian press clearly exhibited this idealistic aspect of American response to the first major breakdown of the institutions for maintaining peace.

On ethical and religious grounds Christian periodicals had contributed to the popular approval of the so-called peace machinery--particularly the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty, the Washington agreements of 1921-22, the Locarno pacts, and the Kellogg-Briand treaty for the renunciation of war. By 1931 many Christian journals firmly supported these steps toward world peace. The most prominent and most outspoken Christian periodical in regard to the peace structure and the Japanese

threat to it was the Christian Century, edited by Charles Clayton Morrison. In volume of moralistic comment it was closely followed by the World Tomorrow, published by the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Journals which were more concerned about the Sino-Japanese dispute than most other Christian periodicals included the Christian Advocate of New York (northern Methodist), the Missionary Voice (southern Methodist), America (Roman Catholic), the Watchman-Examiner (northern Baptist), the Churchman (Protestant Episcopal), the Presbyterian Advance (northern Presbyterian), the Christian Herald (nondenominational), and the Missionary Review of the World (interdenominational). This study analyzes the challenge to peace and the reactions of the editors of these journals as part of the public response of Americans to an international crisis which seemed to herald the collapse of international morality and peace. The editors were conscious of themselves as Christians struggling to think and react in a Christian way; many Americans shared their attitudes and responses.

Christian editors contributed to the public indignation at the Japanese seizure of Manchuria beginning in September 1931, condemned Japan as an aggressor, and supported Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson's nonrecognition policy. Japan's attack on Shanghai in January 1932 further aroused them, and they approved the League's creation of a commission to investigate the Manchurian dispute. The summer of 1932 saw a decline in interest in the Far Eastern crisis despite assassinations and a military

take-over of government in Japan; the Christian Century and the World Tomorrow supported Herbert Hoover for president largely on the basis of his policy toward the Sino-Japanese dispute. Christian editors joined the general approval of the Lytton commission's report and the League's adoption of the report's condemnation of Japan. The reaction to Japan's subsequent seizure of the Chinese province of Jehol and her aggressive action in north China culminating in the truce of May 1933 was much milder than the indignant response to the Manchurian incident.

Christian periodicals which commented on the Sino-Japanese controversy condemned Japan on moral grounds as a violator of treaties and an offender against international morality, applauded the nonrecognition doctrine and the judgment of the League of Nations against Japan, and optimistically believed that moral condemnation and financial troubles would force Japan to change her policy. Deeply concerned, the Christian Century and the World Tomorrow developed systematic analyses and recommendations based on moral and ethical principles. Other journals displayed less concern and more spasmodic reactions. This analysis suggests that the problem of applying ethical principles to international relations was more complex than idealists realized.

PREFACE

During and after World War One the thinking of many Americans about international relations took on a decidedly moralistic tone with marked emphasis on morally acceptable means of preserving peace and the status quo. When Japan challenged the effectiveness of the League of Nations and the various treaties guaranteeing peace by her seizure of Manchuria and parts of north China between 1931 and 1933, the United States responded both officially and unofficially with moral condemnation and righteous indignation. Much of this reaction reflected a moralistic and idealistic approach to international relations which found strong expression in Christian circles. Magazines and papers of the Christian press clearly exhibited this idealistic aspect of American response to the first major breakdown of the institutions for maintaining peace.

Christian periodicals which commented on Japan's actions condemned Japan on moral grounds as a violator of treaties and an offender against international morality, applauded the non-recognition doctrine and the judgment of the League of Nations against Japan, and optimistically believed that moral condemnation and financial troubles would force Japan to change her policy. Some periodicals, like the Christian Century and the

World Tomorrow, were deeply concerned and very outspoken, while others displayed lower levels of interest. In the varying intensity of concern as well as in the views presented, these Christian periodicals were probably typical of a large body of American opinion regarding the Far Eastern crisis. In addition to detailing the reactions of certain idealistic, moralistic commentators on American policy, this study also raises questions about the larger problem of the application of ethical principles to international relations.

The author's debts accrued in the preparation of this dissertation are numerous. A steady reading of the Christian Century during years of pastoral activity stimulated my interest in the problem of ethics and international relations and provided a strong motivation for entering graduate school. Two successive scholarships from the Graduate School of Duke University enabled me to remain at study, and the Duke-University of North Carolina Cooperative Program in the Humanities provided both a year of teaching experience and the funds necessary for the travel and concentrated study required to complete the dissertation. Special thanks go to the Inter-Library Loan Department of the Duke University Library and to the staffs of the following libraries and depositories: the Library of Congress, the Theological Library of Emory University, the Reynolds Library of Wake Forest University, the libraries of the University of North Carolina

at Greensboro and of Agnes Scott College, the Presbyterian Historical Foundation at Montreat, North Carolina, and the Methodist Publishing House Library and the Disciples of Christ Historical Society, both in Nashville, Tennessee.

I repeat here my gratitude to members of the faculty of the Department of History of Duke University for guidance and assistance on the original study in the form of a master's thesis--to Richard L. Watson, Jr., Alan K. Manchester, and Irving B. Holley, Jr.--and to Robert R. Wilson for instruction in the legal aspects of international relations. Donald G. Gillin created and stimulated what will probably be a life-long interest in the Far East and its problems. I am especially indebted to Calvin D. Davis for his continual encouragement, prodding, and friendship and for the countless hours of criticism and conversation which refined and shaped this essay.

A.B.P., Jr.

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THE AMERICAN CHRISTIAN PRESS AND THE SINO-JAPANESE CRISIS OF 1931-1933: AN ASPECT OF PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE BREAKDOWN OF WORLD PEACE

INTRODUCTION

The First World War demonstrated to many Americans the immense power of mobilized public opinion. The American people plunged into a moral crusade to make the world safe for democracy, for they hoped and expected a new era of peace to emerge after the war to end war. Even the churches enthusiastically blessed the war effort: the Allied cause was a righteous struggle against the militaristic Junkers and the power-mad German Kaiser. It was fought on behalf of all the world's people, who desired only that their leaders guide them in peace rather than down the violent path of imperialism. Priests and ministers preached that God blessed this noble cause. Most Americans accepted this interpretation of the war and willingly followed the political and religious leaders who espoused it. Their President, a deeply religious Presbyterian imbued with the rigorous Calvinist ethic, proclaimed national aims in moral terms of justice and democracy.

When the punitive peace settlement and the divisive demands of the victorious Allies demonstrated that the new era of peace and democracy had not yet dawned, many Americans felt frustrated and guilty. Disillusioned with moralistic appeals,

which now seemed to have been only clever manipulative techniques, some of them publicly repented of their support for the war effort. Others found scapegoats in businessmen who had grown rich and governmental leaders who had become powerful during the war. Many individuals, however, moved from repentance and recrimination to positive action. Consequently there emerged new movements to inform, inspire, mobilize, and channel public opinion in favor of a slowly developing structure of institutions, treaties, and agreements designed to safeguard peace--to adjust disputes, limit armaments, preserve the status quo, and prevent or forbid aggression. New organizations and committees advocating programs for peace contributed substantially to public support for these institutions. As had been true with wartime propaganda, moral and ethical arguments played a large role in this movement. Central to the thought of many people who worked to build the institutions of peace was the conviction that war was immoral, unethical, sinful.

One of the distinctive elements of this peace movement was a new emphasis on public opinion as a positive influence on government. Strong popular pressure, it was believed, could force politicians and statesmen to reject violent, militaristic solutions for international disputes in favor of peaceful means of settlement. The conviction grew that aroused public opinion, if vigorously expressed, could force public officials to substitute for the traditional forms of international relations, based on national interests and the balance of power, new practices,

founded on moral and ethical principles of peace, justice, and democracy. Here many theorists followed Woodrow Wilson's lead in distinguishing between the old diplomacy of secret agreements by diplomats who disregarded the common people and the new diplomacy of "open covenants openly arrived at" by statesmen who represented the popular will for justice and peace. During the postwar decade this public pressure for peace was never as fully mobilized nor as powerful as its ardent supporters wished. Nevertheless it aided the popular acceptance of those institutions and agreements which were often called the peace machinery--namely, the League of Nations, the Washington treaties of 1921-22, and the Kellogg-Briand pact for the renunciation of war.

Each of these contributions to peace found strong popular support on moral and ethical grounds. Cooperation among the nations in the League, for example, seemed a practical realization of brotherhood on the international level. Moralists applauded the Washington treaties, in which the participants pledged to keep peace in the Far East, to move toward disarmament by limiting naval construction, and to help China achieve her natural right of independence. To many members of the peace movement the Kellogg pact was the noblest moral achievement in the history of international relations because it bound nations never to resort to war--the ultimate international immorality.

Ethical arguments figured prominently in the discussions of these peace-keeping measures, and moralists were among their most ardent and vocal advocates. From pulpits priests and

preachers inveighed against war, church groups passed resolution after resolution condemning war, some college students announced their determination never to serve in the armed forces under any circumstances, and numerous persons--clergymen, teachers, politicians, lawyers, publicists, and others--contributed to a steady stream of books and articles advocating a multitude of proposals for peace. One of the prominent elements of this effort to mobilize public opinion in support of official action for peace was the religious press, which often contributed significantly to the ideas and attitudes of clergymen and laymen.

The hope for peace based on international morality, which found its highest expression in the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928, faced its first serious challenge--and the beginning of its decline--in Japan's seizure of Manchuria and the subsequent Japanese take-over of parts of north China starting in September 1931. Japan's action immediately assumed worldwide importance, for it threatened the whole system of peace machinery. Many moralists reacted indignantly to what they considered Japan's flouting of international morality and her indiscriminate breaking of promises guaranteed by treaties. In this regard the Christian press expressed the kinds of reactions which must have issued from many pulpits across the land. Or, negatively considered, the lack of reaction by some elements of the religious press may also indicate a preoccupation with other affairs or an absence of concern about international peace which typified certain religious attitudes. A study of reactions in the Christian press

to the Japanese ventures of 1931-33 illuminates the response of an important segment of American public opinion to the beginning of the collapse of world peace.

The Christian press was intimately involved in the development of the ideas and attitudes of the peace movement. In the minds of many people the moral and ethical principles of peace, justice, and democracy were rooted in the concepts of God, his relationship to man, and man's responsibility to him. Justice, peace, love for the neighbor were conceived in terms of God's moral and ethical demands on his people in regard to international as well as interpersonal relations. The nation's Christian press disseminated these ideas and often spelled them out in practical terms, supporting or condemning specific policies and reacting to events which affected the cause of peace. In varying degrees the Christian press both reflected and shaped the ideas of the peace movement, especially in relation to the moral, ethical, and religious foundations of the principles of the movement. Some Christian journals ardently championed the cause of peace on moralistic grounds, while others hardly mentioned the movement and still others displayed moderate interest. In this respect the Christian press probably reflected the extent to which these ideas were believed and advocated throughout the nation.

There is no way of knowing how many sermons were preached as result of stimuli received from religious journals nor how effective they were in shaping the attitudes of the hearers.

But the author can testify from personal experience that Christian periodicals frequently serve to awaken the pastor to issues beyond his local congregation's immediate interests. They can stimulate his thinking and inform him of facts which help bring to his preaching and his pastoral contacts a larger dimension, a wider application than the purely local and personal. This fact was probably even more pertinent for the pastor of the 1920's and 1930's before the weekly news magazine became a prominent feature of the journalistic scene. While the texts of sermons preached for peace have long since disappeared into ministerial wastebaskets, and while words uttered in the pulpits have vanished from the memories of the parishioners who heard them, many of the articles and editorials which helped inspire these sermons survive in bound volumes of Christian periodicals. These Christian journals constitute one of the few enduring sources for the views of many morally concerned Americans, and particularly for the ideas of some of the religious leaders who helped set the moral tone of American attitudes toward world peace. A study of selected Christian journals should, therefore, reveal the ideas of Christian moralists about the peace structures and the threat to them in the early 1930's. Such a study should also indicate the extent to which the Christian population was probably exposed to these ideas.

The editors of these journals were, of course, concerned about many more issues and ideas than the peace movement; in fact many of them conceived their task in terms of purely

"religious" interests or of predominantly denominational and organizational matters--terms which precluded their giving large amounts of time or space to affairs of peace and war. Yet there were some editors who saw the relevance of their Christian convictions and interests to the quest for peace and the campaign against war and who were intimately involved in the cause of peace. One finds in their journals comments and criticisms which offer insight into one aspect of the public response to the goals, methods, and problems of international relations during a time of world crisis. As these editors struggled to apply their Christian values and insights to the complex problems of war and peace, they often unconsciously raised questions which are still pertinent to the problem of morality and international affairs. Several more specific concerns appear in this study. Support, or lack of support, in Christian magazines and papers for the American government's diplomatic efforts for peace, and the specific solutions suggested by these journals were part of American response to the Far Eastern crisis. Analysis of this Christian reaction also sheds light on the broader problem of religious and moral values and insights in relation to foreign policy.

A few Christian publications took special interest in the Manchurian challenge to peace, while many others either concerned themselves only with its more violent and sensational aspects or gave it only cursory attention. The most interested editors tried to deal constructively with international tension

and fear. They struggled to apply religious insights to the problems of peace and war, hoping they could inform and stimulate public opinion and perhaps even influence decisions on which hung the fate of nations. These editors had often glibly called for mankind to apply religious principles to its difficulties. Now they suddenly faced the task of realistically appraising urgent, specific problems of international conflict. Would their Christian viewpoints enable them to contribute helpfully to discussion of international political, economic and military problems? Or, on the other hand, would their religious emphasis blind them to the secular realities of these affairs?

The most prominent and most outspoken of the Christian periodicals which gave special attention to the Manchurian crisis was the Christian Century, edited by Charles Clayton Morrison. Becoming deeply involved in the problem, the Christian Century not only recognized and pointed out the importance of the Japanese seizure of Manchuria but followed the situation week by week from its outbreak to its conclusion a year and a half later. It stands out among the Christian journals which commented on the Sino-Japanese dispute for the vitality of its concern and the vigor of its editorial expression as well as for the extent of its coverage. Morrison was an ardent advocate of peace and an enthusiastic but not uncritical supporter of the postwar peace machinery. His provocative editorials vigorously expressed the moralistic elements in American opinion on the Far Eastern crisis of 1931-33.

Other leading Christian journals also presented important views on these events and problems. Nine of them, representing a cross-section of the more articulate and concerned portion of the American Christian press, offer comparisons and contrasts with the Christian Century's interpretations. Together these ten journals present a picture of the reactions of concerned Christians to a disturbing international crisis. Included in the group are two official denominational voices, four unofficial but denominationally related ones, and four independent, non-denominational, or interdenominational periodicals.

The official publications represent the two main branches of American Methodism in this period. The Christian Advocate, published in New York City, spoke for the Methodist Episcopal Church (northern Methodist), while the Missionary Voice (changed to World Outlook in May 1932) presented the missionary causes of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, from its headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee. The unofficial but denominational journals range from America, edited by Jesuits and published in New York City for Roman Catholic readers throughout the nation, to the Watchman-Examiner, also of New York, which served the Northern Baptist Convention. Also included in this group are the Churchman of New York representing the non-Anglican elements of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and the Presbyterian Advance, which spoke from Nashville, Tennessee, to the largest Presbyterian body, the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, but circulated primarily in the south and southwest. Besides

the Christian Century, a former Disciples of Christ publication turned nondenominational and published in Chicago, the independent group includes the more conservative Christian Herald, a widely circulated family magazine with offices in New York City, and the World Tomorrow, the voice of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, edited in New York with an avowedly socialist viewpoint. A different perspective is provided by the last of the independent journals, the Missionary Review of the World, also a New York publication, dedicated to the worldwide missionary enterprises of several cooperating denominations.

This essay, then, analyzes the challenge to peace and the reactions of men of principle, the editors of these Christian journals, particularly the most concerned and outspoken of them, Charles Clayton Morrison of the Christian Century. It is not a study of the personalities, characters, and inner motivations of these editors but of the public expression of their opinions, primarily in their editorials. This study does not investigate the involvement of the editors in other issues, some of which seemed to some of them more important or more urgent than peace in the Far East. Rather the emphasis is on the reactions of these Christian editors to the initial collapse of the postwar system designed to preserve peace. No direct association among these editors appears to have existed; they held a variety of views on international peace and were united only in their profession of Christian faith. They were conscious of themselves as Christians struggling to think and react in a

Christian way. Many Americans probably shared their attitudes and ideas. Their opinions, as an aspect of American public opinion in a broader sense, constitute the focal point of this study.

This essay, therefore, aims not at a broad survey of the American Christian press in general but rather at an intensive description and analysis of a segment, which may or may not be representative of the whole in the opinions expressed, but which was more concerned about these issues than most of that press. Chronological limits correspond to the reactions of these journals to Far Eastern events from the opening of hostilities on September 18, 1931, to the signing of the truce of Tangku by China and Japan on May 31, 1933.

Chapter I

CHRISTIAN PERIODICALS AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT

To editors of Christian periodicals international conflict was only one concern among many which called for discussion in their journals. In fact numerous religious magazines and papers published in the United States in the early 1930's paid little or no attention to the Manchurian crisis. Some concentrated on scholarly matters of history, theology, and philosophy and made no effort to keep abreast of current events. Such quarterly journals as Church History, the Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and the Harvard Theological Review have, therefore, not been included in this study. A far larger number of religious publications, indeed, the great majority of them, eliminate themselves from this investigation because of their narrowly denominational, local, or "religious" interests. The journals of the various Baptist state conventions and of the several Lutheran bodies may be classed as almost exclusively "house organs" focusing their attention on the affairs of their own denominational organizations and congregations, their own geographical areas or subjects of a purely

religious nature. They rarely commented on international affairs, which they apparently considered beyond the scope of their religious concern. Their pages were filled with articles and editorials on Biblical interpretation, denominational affairs, sermons, Sunday school lessons, and program aids for congregational organizations like youth groups and women's societies. They frequently included devotional poems and stories, books on religion, and occasional comment on such questions as drinking, dancing, movies, and smoking. The Biblical Recorder, the organ of the Southern Baptists of North Carolina, the Religious Herald, serving a similar function in Virginia, the Lutheran, of the United Lutheran Church in America, and the Presbyterian Survey, the official magazine of the Presbyterian Church of the United States (Southern Presbyterian), are typical of a multitude of publications in this category.

In contrast, the periodicals selected for this study frequently demonstrated a lively concern for international affairs, particularly problems of war and peace, which were intimately connected with their primarily religious purposes. Most of them held that relations among the nations should be regulated by the same moral and ethical principles as those among individuals; international affairs were, therefore, within the normal scope of interests of these Christian editors and journals. Some of them manifested intense interest in international peace as an essential element in the Christian ideal to which they were dedicated. Before 1931 all had taken stands

on issues of war and peace. When the most serious threats to peace since 1918 arose in Manchuria in 1931, these editors reacted on the basis of traditional concerns for peace and for the peace machinery built up since the Armistice.

The positions taken by each journal on certain issues of peace and war demonstrate the development of these traditional concerns in the postwar years. Issues selected for this study include the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and its resulting agreements for naval limitations and for peace in the Far East, the Locarno treaties and agreements of 1925, and the Kellogg-Briand pact for renunciation of war of 1928. These are not the only important international issues of the period, but they are sufficiently representative of postwar peace efforts to indicate the concern for peace of these journals and their concepts of the role of the United States in maintaining it. The Kellogg pact was the crowning achievement of the postwar peace movement, the capstone of the structure of the peace-keeping agreements and institutions. Because it loomed so large in the theories and hopes of many Christian leaders and because it played a central role in the discussion of the Sino-Japanese dispute, the Kellogg treaty will receive more extended discussion than the other elements of the peace structure.

I

In the postwar years the Christian Century was already

in a position of leadership among the nation's religious journals. Robert M. Miller, in his comprehensive study of American Protestant sources of opinion in the interwar period, calls it "Protestantism's most influential periodical." In the opinion of Robert H. Ferrell it was "perhaps the foremost religious magazine in America" during the struggle for the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928 and played an important role in creating popular support for the pact. By 1947, when its editor, Charles Clayton Morrison, retired, even such popular magazines as Time and Newsweek were hailing it as "Protestantism's most vigorous voice" and "the most important organ of Protestant opinion in the world today."[1]

The Christian Century's readers evidently shared this evaluation of the journal, which, in turn, boasted of the quality of its subscribers more than of their number. Although the circulation in 1932 was only around thirty thousand,[2] the Christian Century claimed to influence many of the world's leaders. Among its subscribers were professors, ministers, judges, teachers,

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1. Robert Moats Miller, American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919-1939 (Chapel Hill, 1958), p. 39. Hereafter cited as Miller, American Protestantism. Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven, 1952), p. 32. Hereafter cited as Ferrell, Peace. Time, XLIX (June 23, 1947), 75-76; Newsweek, XXIX (June 23, 1947), 72; XXXII (Nov. 22, 1948), 94.

2. N. W. Ayer and Sons, Inc. (ed. and pub.), Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals, 1932 (Philadelphia, 1932), p. 1235. Hereafter cited as Ayer, Directory, [year].

Sunday school teachers, club leaders, and national leaders in all areas of the United States and many foreign countries. The number of religious denominations represented by its readers reflected the non-denominational character of the journal. In fact, the Christian Register, a Unitarian weekly, asserted in 1931 that many pastors were subscribing to the Christian Century instead of to their own denominational journals. The strength of its appeal appeared during the depression, when many religious and secular publications collapsed or curtailed their services. Two years after the crash the Christian Century reported the highest circulation in its history; frequently the editor received letters from readers who told how they had given up other things to renew their subscriptions.[1] Many libraries throughout the nation bound the journal for their permanent collections.[2] This wide respect and strong appeal may be explained in part by the journal's independence and the quality of its editorial leadership.

The Christian Century's staff was proud of its independent status; no religious organization had control over its

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1. Christian Century, XLVIII (Nov. 11, 1931), 1405; Christian Register, CX (Sept. 10, 1931), 696; Christian Century, Nov. 11, 1931, p. 1402.

2. A total of 227 libraries in 45 states and the District of Columbia and 4 libraries in Canada listed partial or complete holdings for 1931-33. Winfred Gregory, ed., Union List of Serials in Libraries in the United States and Canada, Third ed. (New York, 1965), p. 1031. Hereafter cited as Union List.

editors or its policies. But independence from denominational control did not mean separation from the Christian church. On the contrary, the editor considered the journal "a conscious and loyal organ of the Church." He frequently expressed his conviction that religion embraced "the whole of life."[1] These two dominant features of the Christian Century--editorial freedom from the organized institutions of the Christian religion and concern for the application of Christianity to all areas of human life and society--characterized the outlook and views of its builder and editor, Charles Clayton Morrison.

At bankruptcy proceedings in the Cook County Court House in Chicago in 1908, Morrison had paid fifteen hundred dollars for the Christian Century's name and a list of six hundred subscribers. The journal had been founded at the turn of the century by Morrison's church, the Disciples of Christ, a Protestant denomination with roots in the Reformed tradition; it now provided the young minister a wider pulpit. A minister for sixteen of his thirty-four years, Morrison heartily rejected a compartmentalized religion concerned only with "spiritual" matters in favor of a faith which involved him in the whole of human activity in both its individual and corporate aspects. His journal therefore "scrutinized every facet of American life" and boldly and courageously demanded "a society that would jibe with Christian morality." The Christian Century was one of the first

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1. Christian Century, Nov. 11, 1931, p. 1403.

religious magazines to urge the churches to take action on social and economic questions even when these problems involved politics.[1]

Morrison and his staff enjoyed editorial freedom from pressures of organizations or patrons through the financial independence which came from a steadily growing subscription list and a select group of advertisers. As the journal and its staff grew, Morrison wisely shared ownership with the editorial board. Such a spirit of unity and mutual understanding emerged among the editorial staff that there evolved a "highly developed collective mind" which guided all editorial decisions. Speaking of this unity as he retired from his editorial post, Morrison said, "Whosever hand writes the editorial, he is conscious that he is expressing the mind of the Christian Century itself as well as his own."[2] Although the Christian Century rarely published the names of the writers of its editorials, Morrison as editor accepted responsibility for the views expressed in them.

Whether written by Morrison or by another member of the staff, the journal's editorials usually displayed a characteristic style--scholarly, logical and hard-punching--which bespoke Morrison's influence. Pursuing an idea or advocating a policy in which he believed, Morrison called forth both his considerable

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1. Time, June 23, 1947, pp. 75-76; Miller, American Protestantism, p. 39; Newsweek, June 23, 1947, p. 72.

2. Christian Century, LXIV (June 18, 1947), 760.

intellectual power and his passionate spirit.[1] Liberal and modernist concerning religion and social problems, he was paradoxically fundamentalist and evangelist in manner. He could condemn the evils of war or praise the virtues of prohibition with all the zeal and certainty of a Billy Sunday describing the tortures of hell or the beauties of heaven. Professor John E. Stoner has succinctly described Morrison's attitude:

> Toward those with whom he disagreed he was direct and pointed. Truth was on his side, error on the other; those on the other side were misguided; they were to be defeated, shown up, not compromised with, for life was made up of all whites and blacks; there were no grays. Life was simple, the other side was lacking in keenness or had ulterior motives or was at any rate lost in a fog; the way out was easy when fundamentals were kept in mind.[2]

Willing to become deeply involved in efforts to remedy the world's ills, Morrison championed many causes. For example, he supported prohibition and the rights of labor, opposed corruption in government, and denounced organized crime. He called for clean and wholesome movies, church union, and reforms in missionary methods. Of all his causes, peace and disarmament lay closest to his heart. Wholly committed to the peace movement, he encouraged efforts to limit armaments and settle

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1. A graduate of Drake University, Morrison had taught philosophy at the University of Chicago for two years and was later to lecture at the Chicago Theological Seminary for almost two decades of his editorial career. A. N. Marquis, ed., Who's Who in America, XXXII (1962-1963) (Chicago, 1962), 2224. Hereafter cited as Who's Who, [vol.], [years].

2. John E. Stoner, S. O. Levinson and the Pact of Paris: A Study in the Techniques of Influence (Chicago, 1943), p. 117. Hereafter cited as Stoner, Levinson.

international problems peaceably.

Although the Christian Century supported the Allied cause in the Great War as the divine judgment on "a proud and brutal power which had no regard for human welfare," it called for redemptive justice for defeated Germany, not retributive vengeance. The aim of the peace should be to restore Germany to world brotherhood. Herein lay Morrison's objection to the Versailles Treaty. But to one part of that treaty, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Christian Century gave high but cautious praise. Despite several serious criticisms of the Covenant,[1] Morrison accepted that document because it provided a method for revision. The real difficulty lay with the peace terms which the League was designed to guarantee. The Treaty, the editor claimed, was

> a denial of the spirit and intent of the League. The League, taken by itself, is nothing less than a great achievement of Christianity in the field of statesmanship. The Treaty is nothing less than a betrayal not only of Christianity but of the honor of the Allied nations who explicitly agreed at the Armistice to a settlement on the basis of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points.

The conferees at Paris had designed an agency to make peace permanent but had written a treaty which created a world situation in which peace was impossible. The Christian Century,

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1. Christian Century, XXXV (Nov. 14, 1918), 3-4. The editors thought the Covenant did not go far enough toward making the League democratic and legislative in character. It should not be dominated by the great powers, and it should include both an international court with real power and an explicit provision for universal disarmament. Ibid., XXXVI (Sept. 25, 1919), 7-8.

therefore, found itself in "a hopeless dilemma"--it wanted the league but could not accept the treaty. There was nothing to do but "make the best of an insoluble situation and trust the future to overrule it for good." The United States should have no part in such an abominable settlement as that of Versailles.[1]

Even after the Senate rejected the treaty and the League, the Christian Century felt certain that the United States would join the League, as it should do. A few years later the journal congratulated the nation on its admirable refusal to sanction the treaty while calling for American participation in the League if it could be transformed from enforcer of the Versailles settlement to true keeper of world peace. Specifically, the journal stood unequivocally against use of military sanctions against an aggressor.[2] The Christian Century could never condone American membership in the League while the Covenant included Article XVI, which authorized the Council to recommend sanctions--including military action--against a member nation resorting to war in violation of its Covenant obligations. The offender was to be considered at war with all other members, who were pledged to support each other against the violator. Limitation of armaments seemed to Morrison to offer more promising prospects for peace than did threats of sanctions against an aggressor. Steps in that direction brought the editor's warm approval.

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1. Christian Century, XXXVI (Sept. 25, 1919), 7-8.

2. Ibid., XXXVII (Apr. 1, 1920), 17-18; XL (Mar. 15, 1923), 323.

The Washington Conference of 1921-22 seemed to many workers in the peace movement a vital contribution to world peace. In the Four-Power Treaty, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan guaranteed peace in the Far East and agreed to consult together if peace were threatened. These nations and others with interests in China jointly affirmed "the territorial and administrative integrity" of China in the Nine-Power agreement. Peace workers were especially gratified by the limitation on construction of capital ships embodied in the Five-Power Treaty. Morrison led the applause for these advances toward a lasting peace. His editorials supported the Four-Power Treaty because it was "an agreement of self-control," which caused the signers to give their word of honor but did not entangle them in complicated methods for enforcing peace. He cautiously applauded the limitation of naval armament, believing it a move in the right direction but regretting that it went no farther--to total disarmament. The affirmation of the open door policy in China earned his unqualified approval; it was a necessary step toward sovereignty and autonomy for China. "Emancipation of China from the clutches of alien exploitation" was essential for stable peace in the Far East.[1]

In Morrison's view the conference was, however, only a halting gesture toward peace; it could not achieve lasting peace

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1. Christian Century, XXXVIII (Dec. 15, 1921), 3; Dec. 29, 1921, pp. 3-4; Dec. 1, 1921, p. 3.

because it did not attack the root of the problem of war--the will of the people of the world. For that task only the Christian church was sufficient. The conference offered the church an opportunity and a challenge to assert its leadership in the moral life of mankind, for

> Wars will not be repressed by the mere reduction of the number of dreadnoughts. The problem of peace is the problem of Christianizing the public opinion of Christendom. For America it is the problem of Christianizing the public opinion of America. That is a deep-going project. That is the Christian Church's function.[1]

In the meantime, the Christian Century welcomed efforts to adjust international differences peaceably while it recognized the limited value of some of them. Such an attempt was the system of agreements adopted by the European powers at Locarno in October 1925.

To the Christian Century's editorial staff the Locarno pacts guaranteeing certain European boundaries were useful expedients for temporary adjustment of the international tensions generated by the Versailles Treaty. Locarno signified "the awakening realization of all Europe that the treaty of Versailles must be abandoned."[2] Morrison appreciated the "breathing space between wars" which these agreements offered; but he continued

> as a real solution of the problem of peace, I reject them all utterly. I am so sure that the great forces

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1. Christian Century, Nov. 24, 1921, p. 9.
2. Ibid., XLII (Oct. 29, 1925), 1329.

> of economic and racial and political self-interest and pride inevitably tend toward perennial clash between nations that I regard war as inevitable, so long as war is legally and righteously available . . . . The only hope of permanent peace in civilized society lies in the direction in which the nations would find themselves looking when once they had destroyed the legal status of the institution of war.[1]

By 1925, obviously, Morrison and the Christian Century were deeply committed to the struggle to "outlaw" war. In this cause Morrison conducted one of his greatest crusades, which will be described in the next chapter. Before discussing the treaty to outlaw war, it will be helpful to review the positions taken by the other journals in the postwar peace movement.

II

The Christian Advocate: An Official Organ of the Methodist Episcopal Church, published in New York City since 1826, shared its name with several regional Methodist publications throughout the country.[2] Only the New York edition is included in this study because of its more prominent position and its somewhat broader outlook.

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1. Christian Century, Dec. 31, 1925, p. 1638. Morrison's emphasis.

2. In October 1931 all the Christian Advocates were placed under one editorial board headed by James R. Joy, editor of the New York edition since 1915. Much of the material was syndicated from New York; but editorials, local news and personal pages remained under control of the individual editors. Christian Advocate (N.Y.), CVI (Oct. 1, 1931), 1188-89.

This broad outlook reflected the wide interests and the religious convictions of the editor, James R. Joy. A graduate of Yale University, he had published several books on Greek drama and history, and Roman and English history before joining the editorial staff of the Christian Advocate in 1904.[1] Joy, like other editors included in this study, believed that Christianity applied to all of life. Criticized for discussing politics in a religious paper, he replied that he was helping his readers to make up their own minds and that "practical people like the Methodists . . . have never cared much for any religion which could not be mixed with the day's work."[2] Joy discussed a wide variety of topics--international affairs, the depression, crime and prisons, labor-management relations, corruption in government, and prohibition as well as more strictly religious matters. In his study of Protestantism and social issues Robert M. Miller describes this journal as "mildly conservative" on economic matters but leaning toward liberal views on such questions as race relations. Although it had a circulation of only

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1. Alberta Lawrence, ed., Who's Who Among North American Authors, V, 1931-1932 (New York, 1931), 508.

2. He had no use for religious papers which refused to deal with such issues and which "might as well be published on the planet Mars, so far as they reflect the life around them on the Earth. They are timeless and other-worldly to a degree which isolates them from the business and bosoms of the earth-dwellers who read them." Christian Advocate, CVII (Nov. 10, 1932), 1197.

44,000 in 1932, the Christian Advocate was influential in Methodist circles and well-respected outside them. Joy's long tenure as editor ended with his retirement in 1936 at the age of seventy-two.[1]

The Christian Advocate approved the admittedly harsh peace terms of the Versailles Treaty as "the triumph of the principles of right." Joy assailed both President and Congress not only for defeating the will of the people to join the common effort for world peace but also for offending "the moral sense of the civilized States as expressed in the erection of this barrier against another world war."[2] Joy saw the Washington Conference of 1921-22 as this nation's reassertion of world leadership, the end of its isolation. An ardent advocate of disarmament, he saluted the "basically Christian" agreements as civilization's "longest step on the road to peace." He urged Christians to apply pressure on the Senate for their approval.[3] Joy was almost equally enthusiastic about the

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1. Miller, American Protestantism, pp. 43, 73, 139, 163, 172, 180, 213, 265, 269, 295, 307. Ayer, Directory, 1933, p. 643. See the hundredth anniversary comments in the New York Times, Sept. 10, 1926, pp. 7, 20. A total of 32 libraries in 17 states and the District of Columbia listed partial or complete holdings for 1931-33. Union List, p. 1030. New York Times, April 30, 1936, p. 15.

2. Christian Advocate, XCIV (May 15, 1919), 610; Dec. 4, 1919, p. 1434; XCV (Mar. 25, 1920), 410.

3. Ibid., XCVI (Jan. 6, 1921), 7; Jan. 13, p. 37; June 2, p. 708; Nov. 17, p. 1444; Dec. 22, 1921, pp. 1609-10; XCVII (Feb. 16, 1922), 185-86; March 16, p. 315; April 6, 1922, p. 415.

"advancement on the highway of peace" represented by the Locarno agreements. He had great hopes for them; but taking a longer-range view, he cautioned that only the expulsion of hatred and revenge from the hearts of people could guarantee peace.[1]

The Christian Advocate, officially representing northern Methodism, reflected that denomination's active concern with social issues. One of its strong interests was the peace movement, in which it enthusiastically participated. It supported international cooperation, arms limitation, treaties guaranteeing the status quo, and the attempt to outlaw war. Vitally concerned about peace, its editor would speak out when the peace structure was endangered.

The Missionary Voice, a monthly magazine of the Board of Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, began publication in 1910 when several smaller home and foreign missions and women's society journals merged. In May 1932 it took the name World Outlook, and in 1940 it became the general missionary periodical of the reunited Methodist Church.[2] With a

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1. Christian Advocate, C (Oct. 22, 1925), 1282, 1284-85; Nov. 5, 1925, pp. 1347-48.

2. Sara Estelle Haskin, "World Outlook Family Tree," World Outlook (Missionary Voice), XXX (Aug. 1940), 314-15, 324, see also p. 295; Sept. 1940, p. 331. In this study issues after April 1932 will be cited by the new title, World Outlook, with the old title enclosed in parentheses as above.

subscription list of more than 54,000 in 1931, this was one of the more popular of the ten journals under examination.[1]

From the standpoint of this study the most important of the editors were E. H. Rawlings (1927-38) and Sara Estelle Haskin (1928-40).[2] Educated at Randolph-Macon College and Vanderbilt University, Rawlings spent almost two decades as a pastor before entering educational and missionary work in which he became acquainted with all the denomination's mission fields. He was a logical choice for editor in 1927. Miss Haskin left a teaching career for church social work and moved into writing and editorial work under the Woman's Missionary Council. Widely loved and respected as a spiritual leader, she championed social justice, racial equality, world brotherhood, and Methodist unification.[3]

The editors were ambitious for their journal to become "the finest religious periodical in the world" and by 1931 thought they had virtually achieved that goal. In 1932 the

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1. Ayer, Directory, 1932, p. 902. Library holdings, however, hardly compared with those for the other missionary journal, the Missionary Review. Only 15 libraries in 13 states listed partial or complete holdings of the Missionary Voice for 1931-33. Union List, p. 4549.

2. It always had a man and a woman as co-editors.

3. Who's Who, XIX, 1936-1937 (Chicago, 1936), 2018. On Miss Haskin see commemorative articles in World Outlook (Missionary Voice), Nov. 1940, pp. 428-29, 446-47.

publication was expanded to increase circulation and attract more advertising. The new name, World Outlook, accurately described the enlarged scope of the magazine. Its interests now included "peace, race relations, moral reform, industrial problems, rural questions, international affairs, and the whole range of human moral relations" in the United States as well as in non-Christian lands.[1] The journal took clear stands on most issues of peace and international affairs.

Although the Missionary Voice confessed that war signified the church's failure in its missionary task of binding all men together in the spirit of love, the magazine upheld the justice of the Allied victory. The journal saw the League as a step toward international brotherhood and charged the peace conference to subordinate all other interests to world organization. Aware of the treaty's imperfections, the editors nevertheless pressed the churches to support that document in the Senate for the sake of the League; but they neglected to comment on the rejection of it.[2] The editors saw militarism as the greatest threat to peace and repeatedly implored their readers to write the nation's leaders in opposition to "execrable, pagan,

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1. The editors claimed that only the Christian Herald, "a very large monthly magazine of an interdenominational character and a nation-wide circulation," was in their class for quality, appearance and general attractiveness. Missionary Voice, XXI (June 1931), 311. See also XXII (April 1932), 159.

2. Ibid., VIII (Dec. 1918), 353-54; see also IX (Feb. 1919), 37-38; June 1919, p. 167.

war-breeding, militaristic policies." As the Washington Conference convened, this journal demanded that the nations disband armies, junk navies and destroy the whole militaristic system. Curiously, however, the editors neglected other aims of the conference and its results.[1] This apparent indifference to results of specific movements for peace appeared again in regard to the Locarno agreements of 1925, which the journal did not even mention.

With its worldwide missionary interests, its concern for peace and international brotherhood, and its strong opposition to militarism, the Missionary Voice often supported the peace movement. Although it sometimes failed to follow specific projects to their conclusions, it might be expected to speak out when peace faced serious threats.

America: A Catholic Review of the Week, sponsored by a group of Roman Catholic clergymen, began publication in 1909 under the editorship of the Reverend John J. Wynne, S.J., as "a review and conscientious criticism of the life and literature of the day, a discussion of actual questions and a study of vital problems from the Christian standpoint, . . . an authoritative statement of the position of the Church in the

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1. Missionary Voice, XI (Feb. 1921), 35. See also March, p. 73; May, p. 135; Oct., p. 306; Nov., 1921, p. 324.

thought and activity of modern life."[1] A succession of Jesuit editors followed Wynne, including the Reverend Richard H. Tierney (1914-25) and the Reverend Wilfrid Parsons (1925-36). Tierney crusaded vigorously for a variety of causes, and for editorial zeal and faithfulness to the teachings of his church received commendations from two popes--Benedict XV and Pius XI. Parsons maintained the same tradition and in turn was congratulated by Pius XI for distinguished service to the church. Parsons' ability and his application of religion to everyday life were aptly summarized when he retired from the editorial chair in 1936: "With sound learning and tolerance he has applied Catholic teachings to present-day social and economic problems, never restricting the periodical to purely religious matters, but always trying to show that religion plays its part in man's whole life."[2] Although America stood high in the esteem of church officials, its circulation was not large--only 24,300 in 1930. But by the mid-thirties it was claiming readers in every state and in a score of foreign countries. Over one hundred libraries in this country maintained files of it for 1931-33.[3]

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1. Original statement of purpose quoted in twenty-fourth anniversary editorial. America, XLIX (April 8, 1933), 1.

2. Ibid., XXXIII (June 20, 1925), 232-33; LV (May 9, 1936), 98. Newsweek, VII (May 9, 1936), 43.

3. America, May 9, 1936, p. 97. A total of 104 libraries in 30 states and the District of Columbia listed partial or complete holdings for 1931-33. Union List, p. 158. Ayer, Directory, 1931, p. 1267.

Tierney originally interpreted Allied victory as God's vindication of righteousness[1] and advocated severe but just terms for Germany; but he quickly became disillusioned with the egoism, selfishness, and "old diplomacy of every nation for itself" manifested at the peace conference. He said little about the League and rejected the Versailles Treaty, which was devoid of justice and therefore incapable of securing peace. The editor found hope only in the church, the mass, and prayer.[2] Encouraged by prospects for open diplomacy at the Washington Conference, yet skeptical of the willingness of governments, politicians and diplomats to respond to the peoples' will for disarmament, Tierney was relieved and happy when the conference achieved "striking success." The agreements laid a solid foundation for permanent peace by alleviating destructive conflicts.[3] Cautious optimism marked Wilfrid Parsons' evaluation of Locarno. He thought the agreements might lead to a new dawn of peace for the world if the people could force their governments to make supreme efforts "to soften ancient hatreds and to avoid new

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1. Hardly anyone could surpass its claim that God was on the American side: "More than any other nation at war we put our cause under His protection, more than any other nation we have been inspired by altruism and love of mankind. And God has blessed our efforts." America, XX (Nov. 16, 1918), 136.

2. Ibid., Nov. 30, 1918, p. 184; XXII (Apr. 3, 1920), 552; XXI (July 12, 1919), 356.

3. Ibid., XXVI (Nov. 19, 1921), 97-99; Nov. 26, pp. 134-35; Dec. 10, p. 183; Dec. 31, pp. 254-55; Jan. 21, 1922, p. 328; Feb. 11, 1922, pp. 386-87.

causes of dissension."[1]

Less hopeful than the Christian Century about the value of specific diplomatic, political, and legal attempts to secure peace, America was inclined to point immediately to the ultimate solution in terms of a call to the Roman Catholic religion as the answer even to international problems. This periodical might have been expected to view the beginning of the world debacle in the early 1930's with less passion and more equanimity than Morrison's journal.

The Watchman-Examiner: A National Baptist Paper, a product of the merger in 1913 of the Watchman, which began publication in Boston in 1819, and the Examiner, a New York paper begun in 1824, has maintained both its independence from official denominational ties and its basic affiliation with the Northern Baptist churches. Under Curtis Lee Laws, editor of the Examiner at the time of the merger, it became recognized as the "leading weekly" of the denomination and "the Baptists' best paper."[2]

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1. America, XXXIV (Oct. 31, 1925), 54-55. The editor emphasized his low opinion of governments in this statement: "From the very beginning of organized governments, the deepest problem has been to prevent them from harassing and misrepresenting the people." Dec. 12, 1925, p. 197.

2. Christian Advocate, CVIII (Jan. 19, 1933), 51. The liberal Unitarian Christian Register of Boston thought it best "not because it is doctrinally right, for we think it is wrong; it is best because it is filled with consecrated conviction and has a sense of religious mission to a slow and untoward generation. Wrong theology with spiritual purpose is better than right theology stuck on itself." Quoted in Watchman-Examiner, XIV (Jan. 28, 1926), 105.

Its circulation was respectable but not impressive--about 15,500 in 1931. A pastor of churches in Baltimore and Brooklyn before joining the editorial staff of the old Examiner, Laws became well-known as "a leading fundamentalist" in the evolution controversy of the 1920's and retained that reputation throughout his lifetime.[1]

The Watchman-Examiner was probably typical of most theologically conservative or fundamentalist papers in the limited range of its social concerns.[2] Its aim was "to promote the old fashioned Baptist faith, to deepen the spiritual life of its readers, to give vital news of the denomination, to give a brief resumé of news of other denominations, and to help forward all causes dear to the hearts of Baptists."[3] Apparently peace was not very "dear to the hearts of Baptists," for this journal probably ranks at the bottom of those under study in the extent of its support for that cause. Yet it is included in this

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1. Ayer, Directory, 1932, p. 683. Only 22 libraries in 12 states and the District of Columbia listed partial or complete holdings for 1931-33. Union List, p. 4457. Who's Who, XXII, 1942-1943 (Chicago, 1942), 1322. Miller, American Protestantism, pp. 142, 156-57. See also the report of Laws' death, his obituary notice, and the report of the eulogies at his funeral in the New York Times, July 8, 1946, p. 29; July 9, p. 22; July 11, 1946, p. 23.

2. Miller uses both terms in describing the journal. He also upholds the correlation between theological and social conservatism and shows evidences of both in the Watchman-Examiner. American Protestantism, pp. 74, 117, 157, 231, 348.

3. Watchman-Examiner, XX (Oct. 13, 1932), 1207.

survey because it commented on international affairs more extensively than any of the other Baptist periodicals examined.

Laws accepted the prevailing view of the justice of the Allied victory, supported the treaty in the belief that Germany deserved its severe terms and rejoiced in the thought that the League would force her to live up to them. Curiously, however, he did not speak for the treaty during the Senate debates; nor did he comment on its failure.[1] Laws mentioned the Washington Conference in only one editorial, which asked the churches to create a climate of good will to support the statesmen. He did, however, publish several articles explaining and applauding the conference and praising Hughes' "bold and noble policy" of naval limitation.[2] Laws virtually ignored Locarno. He described it briefly as an indication of the world's desire for peace and as a triumph over the strife and bitterness of the postwar era.[3]

With only a slight concern for peace and international affairs during the postwar years, Laws had given mild support and approval to efforts to prevent future wars. When these

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1. Watchman-Examiner, VI (Nov. 14, 1918), 1411; VII (July 17, 1919), 1067. In 1919-20 the journal gave large amounts of space to promotion of a denominational fund-raising campaign, a subscription drive, and prohibition; and 1920-21 saw a growing concern with the fundamentalist controversy.

2. Ibid., IX (Sept. 15, 1921), 1165. Authors of these articles included the president of the Northern Baptist Convention and a leader of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Ibid., Sept. 22, 1921, pp. 1204, 1206; Oct. 6, pp. 1267-68; Oct. 27, pp. 1361-62; Dec. 1, 1921, p. 1522.

3. Ibid., XIV (Jan. 7, 1926), 2, 5.

efforts began to appear futile in the early 1930's, how would he react? Would the urgent crises of war and peace claim more thought and attention and more space in the Watchman-Examiner, or would trouble in Manchuria seem too remote from the interests of his Baptist readers?

The Churchman: A National Journal of the Protestant Episcopal Church, published by Episcopalians but independent of the denominational organization, was "widely known as an outstanding liberal religious paper." Miller calls it "the leading liberal Episcopal journal in the country" between 1919 and 1939. The Literary Digest saluted the editorial independence and freedom from propaganda of this "small but dynamic and powerful church paper,"[1] which received a high journalism award for its "highly intelligent and uncompromising editorial freedom and independence."[2] Its editor defended both freedom and liberalism in answering charges of "destructive radicalism" made against him. He intended, he said, to maintain "frank disagreement with many who are accepted as leaders, [and]

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1. New York Times, Feb. 26, 1941, p. 8. Miller, American Protestantism, p. 39; see also pp. 83, 121, 239. Literary Digest, CXVII (Mar. 3, 1934), 33.

2. From the School of Journalism of the University of Missouri. The citation continued: "for alertness to important problems of social ethics; dynamic and powerful contributions to modern liberal outlook; for religious publication transcending denominational lines though allied with the Protestant Episcopal Church." New York Times, May 11, 1934, p. 23.

constant loyalty to what we believe to be the social Gospel of Jesus."[1]

This forthright editor, Guy Emery Shipler, an Episcopalian pastor and a former newspaperman, felt that religious and secular issues could not be sharply separated and, like Morrison, believed "that Christianity must touch life at its every point and that nothing human is alien to the mind of the Master." Nevertheless, while determined to speak out on world and social issues, Shipler saw the role of the Churchman as primarily church-centered, aimed at the education of the members to what the church was doing in order to mobilize and inspire united action within the denomination.[2] Consequently, the Churchman devoted many pages to reports of church affairs and comments on denominational issues, thereby limiting the space available for discussion of extra-ecclesiastical events. Its concerns were, however, broader than those of most of the religious journals rejected for this study.[3]

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1. The editor continued, "and little patience with pompous ignorance or inefficiency, cowardice, narrow ecclesiasticism, bureaucracy, the oppression of the weak or any species of religious 'bunk'." Churchman, CXLIV (Dec. 12, 1931), 9.

2. Shipler became editor in 1924 after seven years on the staff. New York Times, June 26, 1924, p. 21. Churchman, CXXXVIII (Nov. 3, 1928), 9; CXXXIX (Jan. 5, 1929), 8; Sept. 19, 1931, p. 9; Dec. 12, 1931, p. 9.

3. Circulation figures for the Churchman are not available, but the library holdings indicate that the journal was read in all sections of the country with heaviest coverage in the East, Midwest and Southwest. A total of 43 libraries in 17 states and the District of Columbia listed partial or complete holdings for 1931-33. Union List, p. 1051.

Shipler castigated Germany for crimes "too cruel, too disgustingly sordid and vicious" for adequate punishment, but he held that the Versailles Treaty did not solve the postwar problems. Nevertheless, for the sake of the League of Nations, he ardently advocated the treaty and lashed out bitterly at Wilson for killing it by refusing to accept the reservations necessary for approval. Abandoned by the United States to the "old diplomacy," the world was "likely within another generation to be at the mercy of a united German nation."[1] In Shipler's eyes the revival of open diplomacy, the greatest achievement of the Washington Conference, demonstrated the power of public opinion and presented the churches with the challenge and the obligation of stimulating additional popular pressure on the statesmen in order to push them "forward to the only real preventive of war--complete disarmament!" He did not discuss the specific treaties.[2] Shipler's only editorial discussion of Locarno claimed that "the ceaseless propaganda against war and in behalf of world friendship [had] at last borne fruit." Without commenting on the specific agreements, Shipler gave the peace movement credit for the spirit behind them. They indicated

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1. Churchman, CXIX (Jan. 4, 1919), 5-6; Dec. 6, 1919, pp. 9-10; CXXI (Mar. 27, 1920), 9.

2. Ibid., CXXV (Feb. 11, 1922), 7; Feb. 18, 1922, p. 8.

a return of sanity and a renewal of hope for peace through the League.[1]

Liberal and socially concerned in outlook but cautious and circumspect about specific actions, Shipler's Churchman stood for peace and amity in international relations, but usually with a somewhat softer voice than did Morrison's Christian Century. Shipler spoke clearly if infrequently for the peace movement and applauded its achievements. His reaction to trouble in Manchuria would probably be more restrained than Morrison's.

The Presbyterian Advance: Unity-Liberty-Charity was born in a crisis following the union of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America and the Cumberland Presbyterian Church in 1906. Some opponents of the union appealed to the civil courts, which in February 1910 removed unionists from control of the old Cumberland Presbyterian magazine. Pro-union leaders from both branches of the reunited church immediately began publishing an independent paper, the Presbyterian Advance, which would speak for union to the many confused Presbyterians. The Reverend James E. Clarke, who had edited the Cumberland Presbyterian from 1904 to 1910, edited the new publication until its death from financial complications in 1934.[2]

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1. Churchman, CXXXII (Nov. 7, 1925), 8.

2. James E. Clarke, "The Story of 'The Advance'," Presbyterian Advance, XLIV (Jan. 28, 1932), 13; XXI (Mar. 4, 1920), 2-5. On Clarke's career see Who's Who, XX, 1938-1939 (Chicago, 1938), 569. The Advance was absorbed by a new publication, the Presbyterian Tribune of New York. New York Times, Oct. 4, 1934, p. 17. The independent tradition of the Advance and the Tribune has been carried on by the Presbyterian Outlook of Richmond.

Although the Presbyterian Advance never had a large circulation--only 14,000 in 1931--supporters valued the magazine enough to contribute extra funds to keep it going on several occasions.[1] Clarke cherished his independence from denominational control and advocated a progressive, liberal Presbyterianism. Following the editor's interests, the journal was both less involved in the working of the denominational wheels and more concerned with international affairs than the other Presbyterian periodicals examined in the preliminary stage of this study.[2] Clarke actively supported prohibition, industrial peace, economic justice, and relief measures as well as peace and disarmament; he opposed gangsterism, corruption in politics, lynching, racial segregation, child labor, and excessive profits as well as the arms industry, attempts to collect reparations and war debts, and the rise of Hitler. Our interest centers on his comments on peace and the postwar attempts to preserve and strengthen it.

Like other journals of this study the Presbyterian

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1. Ayer, Directory, 1932, p. 902. Only 18 libraries in 10 states and the District of Columbia listed partial or complete holdings for 1931-33. Union List, p. 3429. Clarke, "Story," Presbyterian Advance, Jan. 28, 1932, p. 13.

2. Ibid., Mar. 4, 1920, pp. 4-5; Dec. 10, 1931, p. 17. Miller rates the Presbyterian Advance--along with the Continent (absorbed by the Advance in 1926) and the Presbyterian Tribune--as an exception to the conservative label attached to the Presbyterian press in general. American Protestantism, pp. 39, 77, 163, 177, 180, 193, 310.

Advance portrayed the Great War as a struggle of right against wrong, of freedom against tyranny and oppression. It called for justice to Germany--not in hatred but in full punishment for her crimes against the accepted laws of humanity. Hoping for "the greatest and most beneficent influence" from the Versailles Treaty, Clarke suffered "profound regret" and "something closely akin to indignation" when it was rejected. He blamed both the President and the irreconcilables for failing to agree on active and useful participation in the League, the world's hope for peace.[1]

If America had failed her leadership responsibilities in regard to the League, the Washington Conference and Hughes' "bold stroke" at its opening signified for Clarke her return to her proper place at the head of the nations. While regretting the necessity for compromise of the highest ideals, Clarke rejoiced that the conference "left a record of the application of Christian principles to international problems such as was never before accomplished by the human race." He claimed that this "notable triumph for Christian idealism" owed much to the prayers and public support of Christians, and he rejoiced when the Senate approved the treaties.[2] Much less enthusiastic about Locarno,

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1. Presbyterian Advance, XVIII (Nov. 14, 1918), 1, 4-5; Nov. 7, pp. 3-4; Nov. 21, 1918, pp. 3-4; XIX (July 3, 1919), 5; Mar. 25, 1920, p. 5; Apr. 1, 1920, p. 4.

2. Ibid., XXIV (Nov. 17, 1921), 4; Feb. 16, 1922, pp. 3-4; Mar. 30, p. 5; Apr. 6, 1922, p. 5.

Clarke merely noted the optimistic expectations of European statesmen for its contribution to peace and called it "a good omen" of the will to peace in Europe.[1]

James Clarke had been vitally involved in supporting the postwar peace movement from a liberal Presbyterian standpoint. Peace, he believed, could come only as Christian principles were applied to international problems. In the League, the Washington treaties, and the Locarno accords he thought he saw the world beginning to realize the fact. How would he react when the world began to turn its back on the institutions of peace?

The Missionary Review of the World: An Interdenominational Review of World-wide Christian Progress, founded in 1878 by a missionary who had just retired after thirty years in India, was edited from 1911 until it ceased publication in 1939 by Delavan L. Pierson, the son of the founder's successor.[2] Financial difficulties during the First World War led to reorganization under an interdenominational but independent board of

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1. Presbyterian Advance, XXXII (Oct. 22, 1925), 4; Dec. 31, 1925, p. 3.

2. Robert P. Wilder, "The Early Days of the 'Review'," Missionary Review, L (Dec. 1927), 895. By the son of the founder. Pierson joined the staff in 1891 while still a student at Princeton Theological Seminary. At his father's death he became editor. Ibid., LXII (Dec. 1939), 351-53. See also Who's Who, XVIII, 1934-1935 (Chicago, 1934), 1898.

mission workers. The magazine never became self-supporting, and depletion of funds forced its demise in 1939. Despite its small circulation of only 6,436 in 1931, the journal was highly respected in church and missionary circles.[1] The magazine stimulated support for foreign missions by its wide coverage of the work of many denominations throughout the world and by the high quality of its contributions from missionary leaders. Primarily concerned with missionary activity, the editor tended to view questions of war and peace in terms of two basic considerations: the effects on missionary work and the impossibility of lasting peace except as a result of worldwide acceptance of the Christian faith. The journal nevertheless recognized the importance of specific peace movements and frequently commented on them.

Pierson participated in the general rejoicing over the end of militarism, arbitrary power, and autocracy in 1918. In one of his few references to the Versailles Treaty he cautioned that, although the treaty was "good so far as it goes," it could not bring stability because it could not uproot the national and individual selfishness which made mutual confidence, peace, and security impossible. Only God could produce such a change in human nature and bring true peace, he concluded.[2] In support

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1. Missionary Review, Dec. 1939, pp. 351-53. Ayer, Directory, 1932, p. 668. World Outlook, XXX (Feb. 1940), 78. A surprising total of 147 libraries in 40 states and the District of Columbia and 5 libraries in Canada listed partial or complete holdings for 1931-33. Union List, p. 2692.

2. Missionary Review, XLI (Dec. 1918), 881-82; XLII (June 1919), 401-03.

of disarmament Pierson called attention to the high costs of the armaments race and the futility of arms as preventives of war, then advocated popular pressure on the Washington Conference. Pleased by the results, he optimistically predicted the probable effect on mission work in the Far East: in Japan he foresaw "greater sympathy with Christian missionaries" and in China, "unselfish patriotism and a desire for unity" as well as hope for the progress of Christianity.[1] Since the Locarno agreements had little direct relation to Christian mission work, Pierson discussed them in only one editorial. He called the conference "a great step toward permanent peace in Europe" but concluded that even more important would be a program to remove causes of friction and to promote international good will. He did not specify details of such a program.[2]

Concerned primarily with missionary work in an effort to inform and inspire his readers for the sake of that great cause, Pierson occasionally commented on the struggle for peace, if only to point out effects on missionary interests or to insist on the world's need for the Christian gospel. Conflict in Manchuria might be expected to elicit similar responses.

The Christian Herald, a nondenominational family

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1. Missionary Review, XLIV (Nov. 1921), 825-27; XLV (March 1922), 167-69.

2. Ibid., XLVIII (Nov. 1925), 844.

magazine[1] founded in 1878, expanded rapidly in the 1890's, reached 100,000 subscribers in 1892 and claimed 220,000 in 1931.[2] Ranked by Miller with the Christian Century as a "powerful undenominational paper," the Christian Herald reached a larger audience than any other journal of this study.[3]

Among the editors-in-chief of the Christian Herald, of the most interest for the present study were Charles M. Sheldon (1920-25) and Daniel A. Poling (1927-present). A Congregational pastor and author famous for his best-selling book, In His Steps,[4] Sheldon displayed a vital interest in the application of Christian ideals to practical life. Poling was a leader of

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1. Besides the usual features expected of a religious magazine, it regularly included comments on current events, articles on child care and home-making, advice on investments and home and church building, uplifting pictures, poetry, and fiction, and children's games and stories.

2. George H. Sandison, "The Story of the Christian Herald," Christian Herald, LI (Oct. 27, 1928), 1119-20. Ayer, Directory, 1932, p. 654. Only 26 libraries in 16 states and the District of Columbia listed partial or complete holdings for 1931-33. Union List, p. 1033.

3. Miller, American Protestantism, p. 58. Unlike the others it conducted its own charitable and relief program ranging from Russian famine and Chinese flood relief to continuing support of a children's home and a Bowery mission in New York City. In its first fifty years it raised and distributed over $8,000,000 in this work. Sandison, "Story," Christian Herald, Oct. 27, 1928, p. 1120.

4. Chicago, 1897. It is a fictional account of a pastor and his congregation who tried to make every decision on the basis of the answer to the question, "What would Jesus do?" For sixty years it was the nation's best-selling novel. John K. Hutchens, "One Thing and Another," Saturday Review, Feb. 10, 1968, p. 29.

important interdenominational movements[1] and had been pastor of an outstanding Reformed church in New York City before joining the Christian Herald staff in 1925.[2] In 1928, Poling selected as his principal assistant Stanley High, who had risen rapidly through the Methodist Episcopal youth and foreign missions activities. Widely traveled in his mission work and as a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor (in Europe in 1922 and in Russia in 1924), High became a well-known author and lecturer on international affairs.[3] During his varied service to the Christian Herald as associate editor, editor, and contributing editor, High wrote the current events pages and most of the editorials dealing with international affairs.

While not quite as outspoken on social issues as the Christian Century, the Christian Herald contended for such concerns as labor reforms, racial justice, and civil liberties.

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1. Specifically, Christian Endeavor, an organization for youth, and the temperance-prohibition movement. In 1912 he was the unsuccessful Prohibition Party candidate for governor of Ohio, and by the mid-twenties was a leader of the Anti-Saloon League. The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Current Volume E, 1937-38 (New York, 1938), 106-07.

2. Under Poling the journal expanded in size and in variety of its content, became a monthly instead of a weekly (in February 1931), and became one of the first religious periodicals to reach out to the general public through newsstand sales. Christian Herald, LIV (Jan. 10, 1931), 10.

3. Ibid., LI (Sept. 8, 1928), 930. Who's Who, XVII, 1932-1933, p. 1119. High was a current events lecturer for the National Broadcasting Company from 1932 to 1935 and became a roving editor of Reader's Digest in 1940. Ibid., XXII, 1942-1943 (Chicago, 1942), 1068.

In 1931, the editors proclaimed a crusade for prohibition, church unity, and "World Peace: that it may be world-wide and lasting," as well as for all forces which would lead to "a Christ-like world."[1] With crusading zeal the journal had already been active in the peace movement.

For the Christian Herald Allied victory climaxed "a crusade of the spirit of truth and justice against brute force and frightfulness." The peace settlement was fair, just and equitable; and the League was "the world's greatest hope for averting future wars." All three--victory, a just peace and the League--were God's answers to the prayers of his people. When the United States refused its patriotic and moral obligations by rejecting the League, the editor sadly blamed both Wilson and the Senate for shirking their moral duty to lead the world into a new era free from war.[2]

In Sheldon's optimistic estimation the Washington Conference demonstrated this nation's "new position of world leadership" for peace and showed that public opinion was working effectively against war, "beginning to pull its teeth and pare its claws, preparatory to cutting off its head." The conference

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1. Miller, American Protestantism, pp. 39, 110, 139, 195, 219, 247, 312. Christian Herald, Jan. 3, 1931, p. 9.

2. Ibid., XLI (Nov. 13, 1918), 1270; XLII (July 19, 1919), 784; July 5, p. 740; June 28, 1919, p. 718; XLIII (April 10, 1920), 432.

took "one of the greatest steps towards abolishing war ever taken by the world" by the unprecedented practice of open diplomacy.[1] Less concerned with Locarno than with Washington, the Christian Herald followed the conference in its news columns and called the result a victory in the "warfare against war" and "a notable demonstration of the new spirit of friendliness and hope" that had already been evident at Washington.[2]

The Christian Herald's editors took seriously their crusade for peace and tried to work constructively toward that desirable goal. Outspoken against war as a denial of Christianity and appealing to a large number of readers in the Protestant denominations, this journal might be expected to react strongly when peace began to break down in the early 'thirties.

The World Tomorrow: A Journal Looking Toward a Social Order Based on the Religion of Jesus was the voice of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a group of pacifist Christians organized during the Great War. Its first editor was Norman

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1. Christian Herald, XLIV (July 30, 1921), 534. In 1921 the Christian Herald frequently asserted that the world's people were clamoring for disarmament and an end to the old diplomacy of intrigue and secrecy. The conference and its achievements seemed the result of this popular pressure. Ibid., April 16, 1921, p. 288; Aug. 6, p. 550; Aug. 27, p. 598; Sept. 24, p. 660; Oct. 15, p. 754; Nov. 12, p. 824; Dec. 3, 1921, pp. 877-78; XLV (Apr. 8, 1922), 256; Feb. 25, 1922, p. 146.

2. Almost every issue in October, November and December of 1925 carried sympathetic reports of the conference and of the progress of the treaties in the legislative bodies of the respective parties, especially in the German Reichstag. Ibid., XLVIII (Oct. 31, 1925), 6.

Thomas, but the journal had a fairly rapid succession of editors until Kirby Page assumed the editorship in 1926. Page stayed through 1934, when financial difficulties, intensified by a split in the Fellowship, proved insurmountable, and the journal was absorbed by the Christian Century.[1] Page, "an itinerant social evangelist for peace," was a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Drake University and a minister in the Disciples of Christ Church; he joined the Fellowship of Reconciliation in 1916. After YMCA work in France and England during the war, he became an associate of famed evangelist Sherwood Eddy and early in the 1920's embarked on a career of speaking and writing. He was a contributing editor of the World Tomorrow in 1922, and during part of the interwar period served the Christian Century in the same way.[2] Originally pacifist and Christian, the Fellowship of Reconciliation soon embraced Christian socialism as the

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1. World Tomorrow, XVI (Mar. 29, 1933), 291. For a brief discussion of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the World Tomorrow, see Miller, American Protestantism, pp. 38-39, 90-91, 96-97. In 1933-34, when a faction insisted on advocating the use of violence in the class struggle, the Fellowship began to split. The coming of war in the late 1930's proved even more divisive as some members rejected pacifism for collective security in the face of fascist tyranny. Miller, American Protestantism, pp. 334, 342.

2. The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XLVII (New York, 1965), 607-08; New York Times, Dec. 18, 1957, p. 35. During most of his editorship of the World Tomorrow Page shared editorial duties with one or more others, including theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, economist Paul H. Douglas, and the pacifist editor and writer Devere Allen. World Tomorrow, V (Jan. 1922), 2; XI (Apr. 1928), 149-50; June 1932, p. 163.

only alternative to the poverty, injustice and exploitation which it saw inextricably bound up with the capitalist system. Concurrently with this growing emphasis on socialism, especially as prosperity gave way to depression, the World Tomorrow ardently advocated peace. Probably because of the journal's radical nature it had a small circulation of only 12,880 in 1931.[1]

The World Tomorrow was one of the few Christian voices which rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations in 1919 and 1920.[2] Consistent with its pacifist opposition to the war itself, it condemned this openly imperialistic "new declaration of war" based not on justice but on "self-righteousness, vengeance and covetousness." Although favoring a league of nations, the editor opposed this one:

> Half a loaf is not better than no bread if the half loaf is poisoned; and the League as now proposed is poisoned by hypocrisy and imperialism. It is an alliance entirely dominated by five powers; an alliance of governments, not peoples, meant to bolster up an iniquitous peace. It does not provide for the fundamentals of peace--the abolition of conscription, the renewal of economic barriers, the reduction of armaments and the end of colonial exploitation. . . .

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1. Ayer, Directory, 1932, p. 684. Its library circulation, however, was surprising, with 167 libraries in 45 states and the District of Columbia listing partial or complete holdings for 1931-33. Union List, p. 4552. In 1933 it claimed that it was being received by 2,000 libraries in 30 countries. This total probably included many municipal libraries not appearing in the Union List. World Tomorrow, Mar. 29, 1933, p. 291.

2. With the Christian Century and America. Miller points out that such denunciation became respectable and popular by the end of the decade. American Protestantism, p. 318.

> It is simply an imperialistic alliance rendered the more dangerous (should it survive internal jealousies) by its deceptive cloak of idealism.

This "new Holy Alliance" deserved rejection by the Senate.[1]

Charging that a naval holiday was "a sad substitute for real disarmament" and that the Four-Power Treaty actually reinforced the unjust privileges of the large powers, Norman Thomas found little value in the Washington Conference agreements. If those agreements could help postpone the impending revolutionary holocaust, perhaps peaceable efforts to convert society could achieve the only real basis for enduring peace--abolition of capitalism with its inherent imperialistic attitude toward backward peoples.[2] Similarly the journal condemned Locarno. If, at best, it were a step forward, it was still a step within the old war system. As might be expected of "such

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1. World Tomorrow, II (Oct. 1919), 263-66; June, pp. 145-48; July 1919, p. 177; III (Feb. 1920), 40; May 1920, pp. 135-36. By 1927, however, the editorial position on the League had changed. Kirby Page called for the United States to join the League in order to purge and strengthen it from within, for the League was the only permanent international political agency likely to become strong enough to deal with the world's pressing problems. He still opposed use of force and thought the provisions for armed sanctions "futile and utterly dangerous." Ibid., X (Nov. 1927), 434.

2. Norman Thomas, "War, Politics and Economics," ibid., V (Jan. 1922), 10-12. The journal did not mention the Washington Conference again in 1922, and these remarks were only part of a more general discussion by Thomas. In 1921-22 the paper did not have regular editorials; each issue centered on a particular topic on which one or more editors contributed articles. Only the January issue on "Peace and Disarmament" discussed the conference at all.

devotees of realpolitik" as Briand, Chamberlain and Mussolini, it probably constituted nothing but a new balance of power setting Germany against Russia and benefitting "imperialistic England."[1]

Advocating socialism as well as pacifism and Christianity, the World Tomorrow looked critically at efforts to obtain peace without radical reorganization of society to eliminate "imperialistic capitalism." Neither the League, the Washington treaties nor the Locarno agreements offered hope for peace. Within a few short years editor Page's doubts about the postwar efforts to prevent war would be strikingly confirmed. How would he react? Would he simply say, "I told you so," or would he offer more constructive analysis and positive suggestions?

In the postwar era the journals under study demonstrated varying degrees of concern with peace and its problems. All the editors would probably have agreed that their religious convictions impelled them to support efforts for international peace and that methods of achieving peace must be consistent with the ethical and moral principles of Christianity. Within this broad area of agreement, however, there appeared considerable variations in the extent of editorial involvement in the cause of peace as well as in the evaluation of specific measures. With a few exceptions there was general support for the Allied cause

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1. World Tomorrow, VIII (Nov. 1925), 346; IX (April 1926), 123.

during the war and for just treatment of the defeated enemy. Dissatisfaction with the Versailles Treaty accompanied a favorable attitude toward the League as a step toward international brotherhood. General enthusiasm for the Washington Conference centered on its achievement of arms limitation. American editors were not greatly interested in Locarno, but some approved the steps taken there to guarantee peace. One might, then expect to find similar variations in the reactions to the beginning of the collapse of the frail peace structure of the postwar era. Before moving to the collapse of peace, however, it will be helpful to look more closely at the crowning achievement of the peace movement--the Pact for the Renunciation of War--and editorial attitudes toward this treaty.

Chapter II

THE KELLOGG PACT AND SINO-JAPANESE TENSION

To many workers in the peace movement the Treaty for the Renunciation of War seemed the climax of their efforts, the great achievement of their lifetimes. The signatory nations, almost all the civilized states of the world, solemnly renounced the use of war "as an instrument of national policy" and pledged to settle all their disputes by peaceable means. The pact contained no provisions for enforcement nor for action to prevent a threatened war; it was widely interpreted as a moral commitment only. While the original official move toward the treaty came from the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, in the form of a bilateral agreement with the United States, the public response to the idea and the interests of American diplomacy forced a broadening of the proposal to include all nations which wished to join. Although Briand's proposal reflected France's search for security in Europe, the idea embodied in it had roots in the movement to "outlaw" war. The disillusionment and revulsion against war which set in after 1918 in Europe and the United States stirred up a drive to provide a means for

condemning war as a crime. In this campaign many Christian leaders found a logical and morally commendable means to attack the problem of war; the Christian press was often outspoken on behalf of the crusade and its splendid achievement--the Pact of Paris of August 1928.[1] But enthusiasm was often tempered by realization of the complexities of international relations.

I

In 1922, Charles Clayton Morrison joined the movement to outlaw war; and thereafter he worked closely with its founder and major financier, the Chicago lawyer, Salmon O. Levinson, who devoted himself and his fortune to the struggle.[2] Morrison not only opened the pages of the Christian Century to the cause of outlawry,[3] but even, with Levinson's personal and financial

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1. Robert H. Ferrell gives the story of the peace pact in Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven, 1952). Cited as Ferrell, Peace.

2. Ferrell, Peace, pp. 32, 272; Stoner, Levinson, pp. 116-17. Other leaders were John Dewey, the famous philosopher, John Haynes Holmes, the pacifist minister of New York's Community Unitarian Church, Raymond Robins, the wartime head of the American Red Cross in Russia, Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University and head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, James T. Shotwell, professor of history at Columbia and director of the Endowment's Division of Economics and History, and Senator William E. Borah, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Ferrell, Peace, pp. 21-23; Merle Curti, Peace or War; The American Struggle, 1636-1936 (New York, 1936), p. 294.

3. Even a cursory study of the Christian Century's semi-annual indices or a casual leafing through its pages for the years 1923-29 reveals the extensive coverage given to outlawry. The Christmas issue of Dec. 23, 1926 (XLIII), for example, was devoted to peace in terms of outlawing war. It featured a resolution to be offered in the Senate by Borah, Levinson's draft

assistance, produced the first book-length argument for it. The book summed up the views expressed during the preceding few years in the Christian Century and was hailed by advocates of outlawry as a significant contribution.[1] The outlawrists viewed war as an institution legally sanctioned by prevailing international law; they wanted to replace it with "an institution of peace conceived not under political but under juridical categories" by means of a general treaty renouncing the use of war to settle international disagreements. After this initial step the nations should proceed immediately to codify international law and establish a truly workable world court having affirmative jurisdiction over disputes among nations. Initiated by the United States in its role of moral leader of the world, this simple system would assure continued peace because it would be based on the will of the peoples of the earth instead of on political and diplomatic considerations.[2]

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of a treaty to outlaw war, and comments by leading American and European advocates of peace including John Dewey, Gilbert Murray, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. Levinson helped assemble and promote it and arranged for prominent persons in Europe and the United States to receive copies, investing over $5,000 in this one issue. Stoner, Levinson, pp. 179-81.

1. Charles C. Morrison, The Outlawry of War: A Constructive Policy for World Peace, foreword by John Dewey (Chicago, 1927). For Levinson's role, see Stoner, Levinson, pp. 181-83. Borah, an outspoken champion of outlawry, heartily endorsed the book. Christian Century, XLIV (Aug. 4, 1927), 914; Stoner, Levinson, pp. 244-45. Harrison Brown, Levinson's representative in Europe, distributed copies to every influential person from whom he could obtain a promise to read it. Ibid., pp. 255-56.

2. Morrison, The Outlawry of War, pp. viii, 109-74. Morrison's emphasis.

When the nations took the first step in the outlawrists' scheme for permanent peace, Morrison made a special trip to Paris to witness the signing of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War. From Paris he cabled: "Today international war was banished from civilization." If his hopes for the pact were exaggerated, so were his fears about the effects of its possible failure to achieve the desired pacification of the world. His editorial continued,

> If this pact does not avoid war it would be better for humanity had it never been signed. The moral chaos that would ensue upon a major violation of this treaty would be worse than the devastation of war itself. . . . If it does not mean a new world, a world of permanent peace on the basis of justice, it will mean nothing less than a new epic of the fall of man.[1]

He could not have realized then that the pact and the rest of the world's peace machinery would meet and fail their first major test just three short years from that hopeful autumn of 1928.

When the Senate of the United States consented to the Kellogg treaty by a vote of eighty-five to one on January 25, 1929,[2] Morrison was again an exultant witness. Watching from the gallery late that winter afternoon as the senators' "yeas" rang out, he saw "the dawn of a new day"--a day of hard work

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1. Christian Century, XLV (Sept. 6, 1928), 1070.

2. For an account of the struggle in the Senate and the ratification and proclamation of the pact, see Ferrell, Peace, pp. 221-62.

to organize the world for peace:

> The solemn treaty just ratified must become the omnipresent presupposition of all international relationships, of all international law, of all our national policies, of all our patriotism, of all our public opinion, of all our education. . . . Henceforth peace and patriotism are identical. The peace-maker now becomes the patriot. No longer may the peace-maker be treated as the enemy of his government, while the militarist struts as its friend. The militarist is now his country's foe and the peace-maker the loyal patriot. Law, which has ever been on the side of the militarist, is now on the side of the peace-maker.[1]

But of what avail was law against bayonets and marching boots and exploding bombs?

Morrison, this "fiery, forceful man" who had crusaded so hard for the Kellogg-Briand pact, reacted sharply when Japan challenged the treaty in 1931. To the struggle to uphold the peace pact he brought the same energy, zeal, and intellectual force with which he had fought for its adoption. To the battle he also brought his most powerful weapon, the Christian Century--"one of the few publications of its time, lay or religious, which combined high intellectual standards, humanitarian crusading and a basically Christian orientation."[2]

II

One of the strongest voices raised on behalf of outlawry

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1. Christian Century, XLVI (Jan. 24, 1929), 99.

2. Newsweek, June 23, 1947, p. 72; Time, June 23, 1947, p. 76.

in the Christian press was that of James Joy in the Christian Advocate. The Methodist editor repeatedly encouraged efforts to make the proposed pact world-wide and called for the American people to apply pressure on Congress and the President to achieve a universal outlawry treaty.[1] Signing of the pact marked "the birth of a new psychology among the nations" as a result of the overwhelming demands of the people. Joy was realistic enough to warn, however, that the churches had to educate and arouse the conscience of the public so that enough moral force could be created to make the pact effective:

> The signing of the Pact of Paris does not usher in the millenium. Much patient work in removing or at least controlling the causes of international friction, in training people to think of other nations as composed of persons very much like themselves, in establishing habits of co-operation that span seas and scale mountains, remains to be done. Let us get at it without delay.[2]

The Methodist journal expressed the conviction of many observers who realized that the Kellogg pact was only a beginning, but few specific proposals for action appeared either in that publication or elsewhere.

Other Christian publications spoke out clearly in favor

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1. Christian Advocate, CII (June 30, 1927), 807; Oct. 27, p. 1291; Nov. 3, pp. 1323-24; Nov. 10, 1927, p. 1356; CIII (Jan. 5, 1928), 7.

2. Ibid., Sept. 20, 1928, p. 1135; Dec. 13, 1928, p. 1527; CIV (Feb. 14, 1929), 199.

of outlawing war by universal treaty but tempered their initial enthusiasm with warnings similar to Joy's--that the pact alone would not guarantee peace. The Christian Herald, for example, joined the movement in the summer of 1927 and heartily approved Kellogg's proposal to include other nations besides the United States and France.[1] Dan Poling later feared that the interpretations and exemptions advanced by the signatories almost negated the treaty, but he supported the pact as a beginning, "a gesture in the right direction." He urged the Senate to approve the treaty and "align the government of the United States with those forces that [were] at work to make peace permanent."[2] Poling hated war and advanced a comprehensive program for peace beginning with the peace pact and including a conference for naval disarmament, American membership in the World Court, greater participation in the League's activities, and an interdenominational, nationwide study program in the churches on the cost and futility of war and the role of the churches in achieving world peace.[3]

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1. Christian Herald, L (June 18, 1927), 534; LI (May 5, 1928), 487.

2. Ibid., Aug. 11, 1928, p. 830. News editor Stanley High went a little further; he thought the pact created a new moral atmosphere conducive to peace and to concrete achievements. "War--An Outlaw!" Ibid., Sept. 8, 1928, pp. 933, 945. See also ibid., LII (Jan. 5, 1929), 8; Jan. 12, p. 34; Jan. 26, 1929, p. 85.

3. Ibid., Jan. 5, 1929, p. 8.

Similarly, Kirby Page enthusiastically hailed the movement to outlaw war as "the most significant next step toward permanent peace" and called for an eruption of public opinion to "shower the President, the Secretary of State and the various Senators with telegrams, letters, petitions, and resolutions. Let the voice of the nation be heard."[1] Soon, however, Page was warning against the detrimental effects of reservations and interpretations: "AS LONG AS EACH NATION RESERVES THE RIGHT TO USE ARMED FORCE IN SELF DEFENSE AND TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHEN IT IS ACTING IN SELF DEFENSE, OUTLAWRY WILL BE INEFFECTIVE." Disappointed by the equivocations of the signatories, the editor of the World Tomorrow sadly concluded that there was only one slight gleam of hope that the treaty might be effective: "If people of goodwill in every nation will try to bring the actions of their respective governments into conformity with the exact meaning of the covenant, it may yet become the basis of a new era. Meanwhile any sentimental over-evaluation of the present achievement will make such a consummation impossible."[2] Page hoped that public pressure would someday push governments to act peaceably, but he had no real hope for lasting peace as long as the imperialist-capitalist system endured.

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1. World Tomorrow, June 1927, p. 246; July 1927, p. 292; XI (Jan. 1928), 4.

2. Ibid., May 1928, pp. 198-202, Page's emphasis; XII (March 1929), 101-02.

Guy Shipler also feared that the reservations and explanations advanced by the diplomats destroyed the plain and obvious meaning of the outlawry treaty. He displayed toward the pact none of the enthusiasm with which he had greeted the Washington Conference treaties a few years earlier. Cautiously admitting that the agreement made opposition to war respectable and discouraged nations from resorting to war, the editor of the Churchman hoped the movement might lead to "substantial disarmament."[1] The proposal to outlaw war also received the endorsement of the Presbyterian Advance, whose editor approved its practicality and its idealism as a first step to persuade nations to stop thinking of war as a means of settling their disputes. James Clarke's ideal guarantee of peace was complete disarmament, and he called for a vast program of education to supplement the peace pact and lead the world in that direction.[2] Nevertheless, he thought the pact created a new atmosphere for international relations and hoped that the world's passion for peace, which the pact expressed, would make war more difficult than ever before.[3]

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1. Churchman, CXXXVIII (Aug. 4, 1928), 9; Nov. 17, 1928, p. 8; CXXXIX (Jan. 26, 1929), 8.

2. Presbyterian Advance, XXXVII (Apr. 5, 1928), 4; Apr. 26, p. 5; July 5, p. 5; Aug. 2, pp. 4-5; XXXVIII (Sept. 6, 1928), 5.

3. Ibid., Dec. 13, 1928, pp. 4-5; Dec. 27, 1928, p. 4; Jan. 3, 1929, p. 5; Jan. 24, 1929, pp. 4-5.

In America Wilfrid Parsons expressed similar hope that the peace pact might make war "somewhat more remote." Parsons was consistently skeptical of the value and effectiveness of the pact's only sanctions--the good will of governments and the force of enlightened public opinion. He did not expect the treaty to be a significant influence on international affairs. His editorials on the treaty frequently pleaded for nations to practice Christian principles as the popes had been urging for years. Religion and morality were the only sure guides toward justice, love, and peace for nations as well as individuals.[1]

The outlawry movement evoked little comment from Baptist editor Curtis Laws; his remarks about the pact were unenthusiastic but favorable. Welcoming inclusion of other countries besides the United States and France, he hoped these nations would not reject the treaty in retaliation for American refusal to join the League.[2] The Watchman-Examiner did not discuss the merits of the peace pact or advocate public support of it. Delavan Pierson seemed even less interested in the Kellogg pact than Laws; he neither analyzed nor supported the treaty editorially and mentioned it only twice. An article in the women's work section of the Missionary Review quoted the pact, called for

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1. America, XXXIX (Sept. 8, 1928), 510-11; Sept. 15, 1928, p. 534; XL (Jan. 19, 1929), 349-50; Jan. 26, pp. 373-74; Feb. 23, 1929, p. 470.

2. Watchman-Examiner, XVI (July 12, 1928), 868; Aug. 9, p. 1001; Aug. 16, 1928, p. 1033.

signatures to a petition endorsing it, urged letters to senators, and suggested appropriate study resources for church groups. An editorial simply listed the outlawry treaty among some "encouraging signs of progress toward international peace and goodwill" in the ten years since the armistice.[1]

In contrast to the mild support of Laws and Pierson and the cautious endorsements of Page, Shipler, Parsons, and Clarke, the editor of the Missionary Voice almost went into ecstasy over the Kellogg treaty. For E. H. Rawlings the main point was the presence of "a real out-and-out antiwar spirit." Details of treaties and covenants would take care of themselves if the spirit of peace prevailed over the nations:

> The supreme value of the Pact of Paris is its moral implication. It is the organic international expression of a courageous, true, fine moral ideal, such as was never before made in human history. . . . Its light can never be quenched. It will shine as a summons to future generations and will point the way to other and yet higher moral achievements.

Since Rawlings thought the treaty the result of the action of the spirit of Christ, he was convinced that the world could never be the same again.[2]

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1. Jeannette W. Emrich, "The Churches and World Peace," Missionary Review, LI (Dec. 1928), 967-69. Other signs of progress included Locarno, the League, the world court, and the Washington conference. Ibid., pp. 994-95.

2. Missionary Voice, XVIII (May 1928), 166-67; Dec. 1928, pp. 446-47, see also pp. 443, 450-52, 458-59, 476-77; XIX (Feb. 1929), 43-44.

In the widespread public discussion of the movement to outlaw war and the treaty which climaxed it, all the editors included in this study commented favorably but with varying amounts of enthusiasm. Probably reflecting the wide range of opinion throughout the nation, they displayed different degrees of hope for the effectiveness of the pact. While some were skeptical of the practicality of this simple renunciation of war, all were at least sympathetic to the goal of peace. Some, notably Morrison in the Christian Century and Rawlings in the Missionary Voice, were loud in their praise and outspoken in their zeal for the moral accomplishment of outlawing war. To many people, as to these editors, the institutions of peace crowned by the Kellogg-Briand pact seemed to offer at least some hope that the world was moving away from the reliance on force which had led to the disaster of the Great War. But the worldwide passion for peace which some claimed to see was to be overshadowed by more violent passions, the great educational campaign for peace which some advocated was never mounted, and the world was soon to know war again. No one could foresee how quickly the frailty of these institutions and the fragility of these hopes would be demonstrated in the Far East.

Halfway around the world from the safety and security of the editorial offices of these journals in the autumn of 1931 tension between Japan and China was growing. The peace machinery was about to face the most severe test it had yet encountered. A brief look at the Far Eastern and world background of these

shattering events is now in order.

III

Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria in 1931 were complex and confused.[1] Officially ruled by General Chang Hsueh-liang, the "Young Marshal," Manchuria was nominally under the sovereignty of the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanking. Japan, however, dominated the province economically as a result of concessions gained by dislodging Russia from both Manchuria and Korea in 1904-05. In the following two and a half decades Japan strengthened and extended her privileges in Manchuria. By the autumn of 1931 she was in an advantageous position to seize complete control of the province. She held a lease on Dairen and Port Arthur at the tip of the Liaotung peninsula, controlled the South Manchurian Railway, maintained guards at

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1. Most standard works on twentieth century Japanese or Chinese history or American Far Eastern policy discuss the Manchurian crisis and its background. The following brief description of the context of the outbreak of hostilities at Mukden in September 1931 is based on the sources cited in the bibliography. For a detailed and perceptive analysis of the Chinese and Japanese background during the four years leading up to the Mukden incident see Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (New Haven and London, 1963). Hereafter cited as Yoshihashi, Conspiracy. Owen Lattimore presents the background of Manchurian history in the context of Chinese, Japanese and Russian relations in Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict (rev. ed.; N. Y., 1935). See also League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Enquiry, LN Pub. No. C. 663. M. 330, 1932. Vol. VII Political (Geneva, 1932), chapters I-III, pp. 13-66. Hereafter cited as Lytton Report.

strategic points along the railroad, enjoyed special investment and commercial privileges, and influenced the provincial government by supplying political, economic and military advisers. For the protection of Japanese subjects and their property Japan stationed in Manchuria three distinct kinds of armed forces--the railway guards, the regular garrison of the Kwantung Army and consular guards. To the Japanese, therefore, Manchuria seemed almost their own colony although only a few of them had emigrated from the home islands to the mainland. On the other hand, Chinese had settled in Manchuria in large numbers since the presence of Japanese armed forces had brought a reasonable degree of order and freedom from bandits. In fact, Chinese outnumbered Japanese in Manchuria by about ten to one. As a further complication, many Chinese had emigrated to Korea and many Koreans to Manchuria, producing a potentially explosive mixture of national passions and animosities.

The summer of 1931 saw a gradual build-up of tension between China and Japan in Manchuria. With rocks and clubs Chinese and Korean farmers in Manchuria staged a pitched battle over water rights, and in Korea the natives promptly rioted and massacred a number of Chinese immigrants in retaliation for their countrymen's troubles in Manchuria. China accused the Japanese, who controlled Korea, of making no effort to stop the massacre;[1] in reprisal the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce brought into operation an old Chinese weapon--the boycott. The boycott of

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1. Lytton Report, pp. 61-63.

Japanese products spread rapidly throughout China.[1] Japan therefore faced the loss of her principal foreign market, which was also the source of many of her raw materials and the site of extensive Japanese financial investments.

China, too, had her problems, mostly internal. Both her government and the dominant Nationalist party (Kuomintang) were divided by quarreling factions. The Nationalist general Chiang Kai-shek, the most powerful man in China, held precarious control of the government over the opposition of Wang Ching-wei, leader of the "left wing" of the party. Furthermore, neither the Kuomintang nor the government exercised authority over the large areas of inland China held by the Communists. Internally weak, China was in no position to defend an outlying province like Manchuria against a strong military threat.

Within Japan also there existed a split which posed a serious threat to China's insecure hold on Manchuria. Fortunately for China, the "moderate" party of the major industrialists, inclined to pursue a peaceful policy toward China, still controlled the cabinet and the Foreign Office. The armed forces, however, were constitutionally responsible only to the Emperor, not to the civilian cabinet. And army leaders, with growing popular support, favored a more forceful policy toward China and Manchuria than did the industrialists. The army would welcome

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1. Lytton Report, Chapter VII, pp. 112-21.

an excuse for action in Manchuria.

The militarists in Japan almost had their opportunity in the summer of 1931 when Chinese soldiers arrested and shot as a spy a Japanese Army captain, Nakamura Shintaro.[1] Although Captain Nakamura's presence in civilian clothing in a region of western Manchuria outside the bounds of Japanese authority raised questions about the legality of his mission, desire for retaliation spread quickly throughout Japan, especially among young military officers. The crisis, however, produced no hostile outbreak because Chinese officials investigated the incident and began negotiations for a peaceful settlement.[2] But Japanese military action was only delayed, not prevented.

Japan could hardly have chosen a more opportune time to precipitate a crisis in Manchuria. So serious was China's internal strife that Chiang Kai-shek could give the "Young Marshal" no military aid whatsoever. The dominant fact of life in the fall of 1931, however, was the depression.

The economic crisis virtually paralyzed the great powers. In England, the strongest major power besides Japan with considerable interests in the Far East, the pound sterling was rapidly losing value. The British were forced to abandon the gold standard on September 21, 1931. In the United States banks

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1. Oriental names are given in the text in the oriental fashion, family names first.

2. Lytton Report, pp. 63-66.

were closing at an average rate of ten per day, and unemployment was rising. President Herbert Hoover and his cabinet were concentrating on domestic and international financial problems; trouble in the Far East came as an unwelcome distraction from other pressing matters. In Geneva economic problems absorbed the attention of delegates to the League of Nations. In September of 1931, then, neither of the two greatest powers, England and the United States, nor the League of Nations was prepared to act with the vigor and swiftness needed to halt Japan's expansion in Manchuria. The western nations' extremity proved to be Japan's opportunity.[1]

In the midst of the difficulty, confusion, and governmental paralysis of the depression, Japanese militarists were preparing for a forceful solution of their disagreements with their closest mainland neighbor. In doing so, they were fatally undermining the flimsy peace structures erected by the civilized world since the Great War. The men and women who had placed their faith in the effectiveness of those structures reacted in fear and indignation. For many who had worked hard to build the peace machinery its collapse threatened not only their

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1. For brief summaries of world conditions in relation to international affairs see Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History (N. Y., 1962), pp. 489-91, and Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (New Haven and London, 1957), pp. 120-23, 135-37. Hereafter cited as Ferrell, Diplomacy.

peace and security but also their respect for their own work; they saw that principles as well as practical considerations were involved. For a few the principles became of overriding importance.

Chapter III

AGGRESSION AND NONRECOGNITION

The challenge to peace came suddenly in the darkness of an autumn night a few miles north of Mukden, capital of Manchuria.[1] Soon after 10:00 p.m. on September 18, 1931, an explosion shattered the rural stillness--and the world's peace. Accusing the Chinese of trying to destroy the railroad tracks, Japanese troops, who had been on maneuvers nearby, immediately attacked Chinese soldiers in their barracks. Within a few hours key officers of the Kwantung Army, who had been at their posts

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1. While important, the Mukden incident should not be over emphasized; Robert H. Ferrell is probably correct in concluding that Japanese expansion into Manchuria and later into China would soon have occurred even had there been no incident at Mukden. "The Mukden Incident: September 18-19, 1931," Journal of Modern History, XXVII (March 1955), 66-72. See also Nathaniel Peffer, The Far East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1958), pp. 352-54. After the incident Japanese statesmen, nevertheless, justified their action on the grounds that they had to defend Japanese lives and property. See Ben Dorfman, "The Manchurian 'Incident' of 1931," Harper's Magazine, CLXIX (Sept. 1934), 449-62. Yoshihashi gives the most detailed treatment of the incident, basing his account on Japanese sources and the records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 1-10, 151-85. Masao Maruyama explores the intellectual and cultural background of Japanese expansion in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, Ivan Morris, ed. (London, New York, and Toronto, 1963), pp. 1-156.

before the explosion, mobilized their troops in Manchuria according to emergency plans and quickly took control of strategic centers in the southern part of the province. Accused of plotting against the railroad authorities and the Japanese armed forces, the Chinese protested innocence but offered little resistance. The "Young Marshal," Chang Hsueh-liang, realized that even with numerical superiority of approximately thirteen to one his loosely organized troops were no match for the better trained, disciplined, and equipped Japanese. He ordered them to submit quietly.[1]

Following a policy of military nonresistance in Manchuria, China concentrated her defensive efforts on the diplomatic front by appealing to the League of Nations. Her delegate at Geneva, Sao-ke Alfred Sze,[2] on September 21 filed a formal appeal under Article XI[3] of the League Covenant. He urged immediate action. Calling for prompt cessation of hostilities and demanding that Japan pay China an indemnity, he exhorted the League to restore Manchuria to her former

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1. Yoshihashi, Conspiracy, p. 164; Ferrell, Diplomacy, pp. 127-28.

2. Known by this anglicized rendering of his name rather than by the Chinese, Shih Chao-chi. H.G.W. Woodhead, ed., The China Year Book, 1932 (Shanghai, 1932), p. 739.

3. Article XI declared that any war or threat of war concerned the whole League, which should take action to safeguard peace. In case of such an emergency the Secretary-General was to call a meeting of the Council at the request of any League member. It further declared that any member had a right to bring to the attention of the Council or the Assembly any threat to international peace.

status.[1] The Council of the League listened patiently to the charges and counter-charges of the Chinese and Japanese delegates. Finally, on September 30, the League acted. The Council passed a resolution expressing hope that the disputants would settle their differences by October 14. Feeling that it had discharged its responsibility with this innocuous resolution, the Council adjourned until that date.[2]

In Washington Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson was immersed in problems arising from the world-wide depression; the sudden crisis in the Far East added one more disturbing element to an already unstable situation. Stimson recalled:

> On September 18th, the very day--almost the very hour--of the outbreak in Manchuria, I was receiving word from the British charge that Great Britain could no longer maintain the gold standard. It seemed as though from the Occident to the Orient, politically and economically, the world was rocking.

Yet Stimson immediately turned his attention to the Far East.[3] With the President's approval he followed a cautious policy designed to demonstrate American good will for both parties. In this way he hoped to strengthen Japan's civilian leaders

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1. Westel W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations (Baltimore, 1935), pp. 31-32. Hereafter cited as Willoughby, Controversy.

2. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

3. Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis: Recollections and Observations (New York, 1936), p. 5. Hereafter cited as Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis.

in their struggle with the militarists for control of the nation's policy.[1] Less than a week after the incident at Mukden he appealed to both nations to settle their differences peaceably. His note read:

> The American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, and will refrain from activities which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjustment of their differences.[2]

Newspapers in the United States expressed sorrow over Japan's aggressive actions and commended both the League Council and the State Department for prompt, impartial responses. The Baltimore Sun's characterization of the League and its proper role in the crisis was typical of many initial reactions. The League, according to the Sun, was

> the instrument through which reason may be brought to bear upon the disputants.
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> The more the League can become the instrument of reason and the less it is set up as a means of coercion, the stronger and more permanent will be its power.[3]

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1. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 34-37.

2. United States Congress, Senate, Conditions in Manchuria, Sen. Doc. 55, 72nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1932), pp. 8-11. Hereafter cited as Conditions. See also United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, 3 vols. (Washington, 1946), III, The Far East, p. 58; and Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 46-48.

3. Quoted in Literary Digest, CXI (Oct. 10, 1931), 11.

Numerous observers expected the League to settle the dispute; for many people, including some editors of Christian publications, had high hopes for the international organization even though the United States had refused to join it.

I

Facing this sudden, unexpected outbreak of violence, Charles Clayton Morrison was as confused as the League Council or Secretary Stimson. He tried first to analyze the complex situation and to interpret it for his readers, to bring into perspective the underlying conditions and possible effects of the Mukden incident. Distrusting the conflicting reports reaching the western world, Morrison counseled "extreme caution" in evaluating the situation. In his deep concern for peace he firmly believed that China and Japan would settle this minor incident peacefully. He recognized, however, that more serious trouble could arise, that political conflicts, nationalistic ambitions, and economic rivalries might make Manchuria "the Balkans of the orient."[1]

The "Manchurian muddle" was no clearer to Morrison by early October. Manchuria still seemed "a twilight zone of international politics," where conditions were more confused than in

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1. Christian Century, XLVIII (Sept. 30, 1931), 1196-97.

any other important area of the earth. But through the confusion Morrison saw a gleam of hope--China's choice of a peaceful weapon, the boycott, instead of military resistance. By refusing to buy from Japan, the Chinese might aggravate Japan's already acute domestic troubles, causing new suffering for her people. Morrison believed the militarists would then lose prestige and Japanese civilian leaders might be able to bring them under control, and hostilities and restore the status quo ante.[1] In his eagerness to see the bright side of the situation Morrison apparently did not realize that the Chinese boycott was one reason for Japan's antagonism toward China. At no time did he indicate awareness of this fact. Similarly, the possibility that continuing the boycott might produce the opposite effect in Japan by increasing popular support for a more aggressive policy seems to have escaped him. Confusion, oversimplification, and hope characterized the Christian Century's initial appraisal of the Manchurian crisis.

Like Morrison, James E. Clarke of the Presbyterian Advance reacted quickly to this "most significant news of the past week" and distrusted the confusing reports from China and Japan. Encouraged by China's apparent reluctance to fight and her desire for intervention by the League, he briefly hoped that the international organization would "not prove impotent."[2]

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 7, 1931, pp. 1230-31.
2. Presbyterian Advance, XLIV (Oct.1, 1931), 4-5.

Withholding comment while the situation developed, Clarke did not mention Manchuria again for a month.

The news columns of the Christian Advocate portrayed the conflict as a "major test of [the League's] ability to preserve the peace of the world" and reported the Council's desire for peace and for American cooperation. A week later editor James R. Joy regretted that Japan's ignoring the Council's admonitions had damaged the League's prestige but found reason for hope. Even Manchuria, he declared, had its brighter side:

> Such action as Japan's, had it occurred twenty years ago, would have resulted in an instant declaration of hostilities. But things have changed. Geneva holds up a warning hand. Even Washington, not accustomed to the role of "brother's keeper," except in Pan-America, lets the two hot-bloods know that this government is not indifferent to the way they behave. This is not the way events developed in the last days of July 1914. The mind of nations moves slowly, but it does move, and, despite wars and rumors of wars, the signs of a coming era of peace are even more convincing.[1]

Joy's attitude reflected the optimism of many ardent activists in the peace movement.

Perhaps even more unrealistic was the first hopeful reaction of Delavan L. Pierson, editor of the Missionary Review of the World. Although he blamed the Manchurian hostilities on "mutual suspicion and ill will, a lack of patience and wise statesmanship and the temper of the Japanese militarists," he

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1. Christian Advocate, CVI (Oct. 1, 1931), 1195; Oct. 8, 1931, pp. 1218, 1222.

still could be optimistic: "If foes without will not take advantage of China's misfortunes and if the Chinese will withstand communist propaganda from Soviet Russia, and student agitation in favor of war with Japan is ended, there is hope that peace will come to China at last."[1] It is difficult to understand how Pierson could have so easily assumed that these very unlikely conditions might arise.

Kirby Page of the World Tomorrow believed that peace could come to China only if the international picture changed drastically. In her inexcusable action Japan was simply following all the great powers in "the ancient policy of armed intervention and aggression." Not content with a mere analysis, Page recommended a solution. First, the League, vigorously supported by the United States, must "demand the cessation of armed fighting and set in operation the processes of pacific settlement"--unspecified processes, presumably those outlined in the Covenant of the League. The second step would be even stronger: "The policy of armed intervention by one nation in the affairs of another country must be abandoned, and the insistence upon special interests under the guise of a Monroe Doctrine (American, Japanese, or British) must be relinquished." Page neglected to

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1. Missionary Review, LIV (Nov. 1931), 847-48. Two months passed before the journal again discussed the Manchurian conflict.

explain how the League could enforce its "demand" that the fighting stop, but he urged that his own government take the lead in abandoning armed intervention by announcing "its intention to withdraw all troops from foreign soil and to confine its protective efforts abroad to pacific processes." If the nations did not act quickly in these ways, the World Tomorrow's editor believed, chaos, anarchy, and incalculable damage would come to China, Japan, and the rest of the world.[1] Page did not discuss how unlikely these actions were.

The other journals under discussion did not react so quickly nor so strongly to the outbreak of hostilities in Manchuria as the publications just described. The Roman Catholic weekly, America, briefly and without comment reviewed events in Manchuria in the news columns of every issue but made no editorial comment until December. The other two weeklies, the Episcopalian Churchman and the Baptist Watchman-Examiner, did not mention the conflict until late October and mid-November respectively, while the southern Methodist Missionary Voice said nothing about it until February 1932. Perhaps these editors needed more time to weigh events before commenting on them.[2]

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1. World Tomorrow, XIV (Nov. 1931), 340.

2. Perhaps editor E. H. Rawlings of the Missionary Voice was waiting for his readers to forget the article published in September and written by the Methodist bishop responsible for mission work in the Orient. The bishop did not mention militarism among Japan's chief social problems and even asserted: "Probably no country in the world wants peace more than Japan. . . . With the exception of a small and increasingly uninfluential military party, Japan wants peace, and she wants it bad." Bishop Paul B. Kern, "Questions I Have Been Asked about the Orient," Missionary Voice, XXI (Sept. 1931), 424.

While Morrison and the other editors pondered the situation, Secretary Stimson wrote another note; and the Japanese Army continued to advance in Manchuria. Stimson on October 5 cabled the League Council praising its resolution of September 30 and encouraging it to maintain vigilance. The secretary was already hinting at the invocation of the Kellogg pact and the Nine-Power treaty, the agreements on which he would later base his condemnation of Japan. Regarding his own government's action, he said,

> On its part the American government acting independently through its diplomatic representatives will endeavor to reinforce what the League does and will make clear that it has a keen interest in the matter and is not oblivious to the obligations which the disputants have assumed to their fellow signatories in the Pact of Paris as well as in the Nine Power Pact should a time arise when it would seem advisable to bring forward those obligations. By this course we avoid any danger of embarrassing the League in the course to which it is now committed.[1]

To put it more bluntly, the United States would sit back and give moral support while the League tried to restore peace and order.

The Japanese had other ideas. Disregarding promises of troop withdrawals by the Foreign Office and by Japanese diplomats in Geneva, the Kwantung Army consolidated control of areas outside the railway zones in Manchuria and moved closer to China proper. Fifty miles from the railway zone lay the unfortified city of Chinchow, where Chang Hsueh-liang was attempting to

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1. Conditions, p. 14; Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 51-52.

establish a provisional government. Japanese army planes bombed the city on October 8, further embarrassing the civilian government in Tokyo by revealing its inability to restrain its armed forces. The League and the United States again protested.[1] In China the anti-Japanese boycott spread rapidly while Chinese delegates in Geneva called for stronger action by the League against the Japanese aggressors.[2] To American observers these events brought no comfort.

Morrison's lead editorial on October 21 revealed his discouragement. Under the title "Manchuria's War Clouds Grow Blacker" he discussed the depressing developments and concluded that "almost everything in the situation [lent] itself to the making of trouble." James Joy of the Christian Advocate also felt that the Manchurian crisis was growing steadily worse. In what might be "the most colossal bluff in all history" Japan steadfastly rejected foreign interference in her Manchurian interests while the League hesitated to challenge her lest she might not be bluffing.[3]

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1. Yoshihashi, Conspiracy, pp. 190-94; Conditions, p. 16; Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, p. 53; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 79-81.

2. Sara R. Smith, The Manchurian Crisis, 1931-32: A Tragedy in International Relations (New York, 1948), pp. 82-92; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 81-88.

3. Christian Century, Oct. 21, 1931, p. 1300; Christian Advocate, Oct. 22, 1931, p. 1291.

Yet, at the same time both editors saw signs of hope. Morrison's second editorial of October 21 stressed the "forces working aggressively to keep the peace." Specifically, world opinion was "not to be despised" and was rapidly building up against Japan's military leaders. Additional pressure on Japan was being applied by the most powerful individuals on the League Council and by Secretary Stimson, who, in his note of October 5, had promised, in Morrison's words, to "cooperate in any pacific measures designed to bring Japan to her senses." If full-scale war could be averted long enough for these pressures to help the "peace-inclined elements in Japan," Morrison asserted, peace would be restored. In a similarly hopeful vein, Joy in the Christian Advocate for October 22 commended President Hoover for trying to prevent war by peaceful means--upholding the Kellogg pact, cooperating with the League and "building up a public opinion which [would] stop the nations of the Orient from military aggression."[1] Joy did not explain how he expected public opinion to function so effectively.

In the struggle for the Kellogg-Briand treaty several years earlier both Morrison and Joy had acclaimed the power of world opinion; both apparently believed it was really strong enough to prevent war. Its effectiveness, however, had not yet

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 21, 1931, pp. 1300-01; Christian Advocate, Oct. 22, 1931, p. 1292.

been tested. If Japan's leaders would heed the voice of the public and bow to the pressure of the great powers, all would yet be well.

Events soon seemed to give substance to Morrison's view that the United States was unequivocally committed to the League's support. At the suggestion of its president, French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, the League Council on October 16 invited the United States to send a representative to sit with the Council to discuss application of the Pact of Paris to the Sino-Japanese controversy. Stimson accepted immediately and designated Prentiss Gilbert, American consul at Geneva, as his representative.[1] The United States also joined other great powers in sending notes to China and Japan reminding them of their obligations under the Pact. In reply each denied violating the peace pact while accusing the other of breaking it.[2] This first cooperative effort to use the peace pact to settle the dispute probably had a negligible effect; but the effort itself brought joy to the pact's old supporter, Morrison.

The editor of the Christian Century praised the League and the State Department for cooperating in the use of the peace pact. They had reduced international tension and created an

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1. Conditions, pp. 17-19; Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 60-66; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 89-111.

2. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 65-66; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 108-11.

"atmosphere where peaceful negotiation [seemed] certain to succeed." Solution of the crisis seemed near. "Thus," Morrison exulted, "another precedent will have been set in the bulwark of mankind's defences against war." He was so convinced of the power of the pact that he could speak of the Sino-Japanese struggle in the past tense and of its solution as a present reality. Because "this crisis was unusually dangerous in its threat to world peace," he declared, "the peace machinery's triumph is the more notable."[1]

More restrained than Morrison's unbounded enthusiasm were approvals of American cooperation with the League expressed in the Christian Advocate, the Churchman, the Presbyterian Advance, and the Christian Herald. Without hazarding a prediction of total success, James Joy thought full collaboration with the League "clearly necessary" in the face of Japan's defiance. The "infinitely stronger front" now presented to Japan already seemed to be forcing her to modify her demands.[2] In his first reference to the Manchurian troubles Guy Shipler defended the policy of cooperation against the fulminations of isolationist Senator Hiram Johnson of California, who, Shipler said, "foams at the mouth" regarding this subject. Passing briefly over the

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 28, 1931, p. 1331. Emphasis added. For a similar view see an editorial entitled "Agreement in Sight," New York Times, Oct. 21, 1931, p. 22.

2. Christian Advocate, Oct. 29, 1931, p. 1314.

Sino-Japanese conflict, Shipler discussed in general terms the necessity for such cooperation in times of international crisis and hoped the United States would soon join the League, "where action and influence [could] be combined with real purpose."[1] A regular contributor to the Presbyterian Advance saw no immediate likelihood of America's joining the League but commended the nation's forward movement into world affairs by consulting with other nations on the Kellogg pact. By recognizing the League as "the logical instrument for preserving the peace of the world," the United States had strengthened the organization and had helped mobilize world opinion against war.[2] For Stanley High, news editor of the Christian Herald, American support of the League was perhaps the most significant development of the Manchurian crisis. This cooperation, he claimed, recognized that peace should be preserved, that the League was the best agency for preserving it, and that the League was more likely to succeed with American help than without it. High hopefully predicted that Japan, facing possible economic sanctions by the League and the United States, would agree to a compromise solution.[3] Less inclined than Morrison to emphasize the Kellogg pact, these four editors at least saw cooperation with the League as a

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1. Churchman, CXLIV (Oct. 31, 1931), 8-9.

2. Presbyterian Advance, Nov. 12, 1931, p. 6.

3. Christian Herald, LIV (Dec. 1931), 26-27. This first reference to the Manchurian dispute covered more than half of the two-page news section.

fruitful policy.

Morrison and the others were not alone, however, in approving the policy of cooperation for peace in Manchuria. Although several newspapers, particularly the Hearst chain, derided this action, the Literary Digest reported that a majority applauded it. Editors with isolationist sympathies feared that cooperation would mean membership in the League. They castigated Hoover for acting contrary to the expressed wishes of the people. A greater number, like the Baltimore Sun and the New York Times, declared that American sentiment had changed since the early 1920's and commended the government's reasonable and wise policy. New York Herald Tribune columnist Walter Lippmann expressed popular sentiments when he commended American alignment with the League, "the only permanent and tested machinery that [existed] for investigating, conciliating, or arbitrating international disputes."[1]

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1. New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 13, 1931, p. 23; Literary Digest, Oct. 24, 1931, p. 6. See also ibid., Oct. 31, 1931, pp. 3-4; and Eleanor Tupper and George E. McReynolds, Japan in American Public Opinion (New York, 1937), pp. 298-303. Hereafter cited as Tupper and McReynolds, Public Opinion. Perhaps neither critics nor supporters would have been so vociferous regarding the seating of Gilbert with the Council if they had realized that "at the meetings of the Council at which Mr. Gilbert was present, not once did the discussions deal directly with any contemplated action by the League in cooperation with the United States and based upon the Paris Pact." Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 106-107. Except for his purely formal statements Gilbert did not speak at all in the Council meetings because his instructions strictly limited him to discussion of joint American-League action under the Kellogg pact. Conditions, p. 18; New York Times, Oct. 17, 1931, p. 1. Willoughby concludes that regarding the settlement of the Manchurian dispute "the sending of Mr. Gilbert to the Council table was without any appreciable effect." Controversy, pp. 106-07.

The League Council tried to put into action its machinery for conciliating the dispute by passing another resolution. Japan's representative, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, repeatedly refused to agree to the resolution in both informal and formal discussions of it. His negative vote technically killed the resolution because of the Covenant's requirement for unanimity in the Council. President Briand, undaunted, declared the resolution "adopted unanimously except for one vote" and praised the Council for successfully preventing the conflict from "degenerating into war."[1]

The resolution of October 24, which Briand so enthusiastically praised, actually achieved nothing. It called upon Japan to withdraw her troops into the Manchurian railway zones by November 16, the date of the next Council meeting. Mr. Yoshizawa, however, had already indicated that his government would not commit itself to a specific date for completing the evacuation. It would continue to guard Japanese lives and property wherever necessary and as long as necessary. The other provisions and recommendations of the resolution, depending on this one, became inoperative. Two days later Japan officially informed the Council that she regarded the resolution as having no force because it was not adopted unanimously. Briand's reply must have warmed the hearts of many moralists in the peace movement. Because of the unanimous approval of the other Council

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1. Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 112-43.

members, Briand declared, the resolution retained its "full moral force."[1] Japan, however, gave no indication that she respected this kind of force.

Overlooking the obvious weakness of the resolution, Morrison saw it as a momentous gain for peace. He eagerly seized upon a casual reference to the Pact of Paris in the preamble. In his view the resolution successfully combined the two most important of the world's instruments for peace--the League and the peace pact. By seating a representative with the Council to discuss the pact, the United States had "for all time" demonstrated that it regarded the Pact of Paris as "a treaty in whose faithful observance we had a responsible stake." The results were astounding:

> When the council of the league, with the collaboration of the United States, invoked the peace pact against Japan's resisting vote, and when the league served notice on Japan to evacuate its military frontier by November 16, a precedent was set whose implications are beyond calculation. Japan may not heed. She may defy the league. But we dare to prophesy that in this interim some formula will be found by which Japan will give what the league demands without being unduly humiliated by her surrender.[2]

Morrison here demonstrated one of the most puzzling characteristics of his discussion of the Sino-Japanese dispute, a trait which would reappear frequently in his editorials. He attributed far more power to diplomatic phrases than they

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1. Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 132-35.

2. Christian Century, Nov. 4, 1931, pp. 1369-70.

deserved. Japan's negative vote had already indicated her reaction. His facile assumption that the United States had completely committed itself to the Kellogg pact on this particular occasion, even "for all time," was amazing. In fact, the resolution, like the Kellogg pact, had no teeth; it was no more a notice served on Japan than had been the resolution of September 30, which Japan had disregarded with impunity. It was merely a "call" which Japan had already rejected, as the other council members knew. None of the other editors in this study commented immediately, explicitly, or enthusiastically on the resolution of October 24 as Morrison did.[1] Actually his burgeoning hopes hung by a slender thread--the possibility that Japan would let the Council's resolutions change her course in Manchuria and China.

The thread soon broke. Realizing that additional complications were arising, Morrison began to lose hope for a peaceful settlement. Japan had rejected the October 24 resolution and had even pressed new demands on China. Instead of withdrawing her troops, she was extending military operations into northern and eastern Manchuria, where she risked drawing Russia into the conflict. And rumors were afloat that Japan was about to establish in Manchuria a puppet government under her strict control.

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1. America reported the resolution in its new columns along with the expectation that the supporting nations plus the United States would "give it sanction by exerting their full moral weight towards making it effective." XLVI (Nov. 7, 1931), 100.

Morrison's hopes collapsed. He sadly conceded that in view of these difficulties any form of negotiated settlement--just or unjust--which did not bring the whole East into war would be "a triumph for peace of unparalleled importance."[1]

Morrison was not alone in his pessimism. In his first reference to the Manchurian dispute Curtis Lee Laws of the Baptist Watchman-Examiner trembled as he thought of the war cloud hanging over the Far East. He bemoaned two evil effects of war --the loss of life and the growth of hatred which would "greatly militate against the work of Christian missionaries." Laws' only recommendation was a call for world-wide prayer for peace. Less discouraged, Presbyterian James E. Clarke thought the League could "do much to prevent actual war by the power of world sentiment" but probably could not prevent Japan from gaining control of Manchuria by political or other means apart from war. Similarly, Episcopalian Guy Shipler saw small chance of the League's being able to make Japan behave but hoped that the nations could agree to invoke a boycott of Japan if she continued to try to dominate the East. This, he declared, "would be a quick remedy and compel a prompt surrender to the will of the world." Shipler alone among the editors under study recommended such vigorous measures so early in the course of the dispute. On the other hand, the Christian Advocate's James Joy doubted that an international embargo on Japanese trade would

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1. Christian Century, Nov. 11, 1931, pp. 1408-09.

be effective without American participation, and he warned that strenuous objections to that policy would arise. Without commenting editorially, Wilfrid Parsons merely noted in his news section the "increasing gravity" of the situation.[1]

These varied but essentially pessimistic opinions expressed in religious journals probably reflected the perplexity of much of the nation in November 1931. The Literary Digest reported growing awareness in the nation's press of the difficulties of the Manchurian conflict. After a careful analysis of the problem George Sokolsky, former editor of the Far Eastern Review of Shanghai, concluded: "There seems to be no basis for compromise."[2]

In the first few weeks of the Manchurian crisis Morrison's editorials in the Christian Century reflected the general confusion and uncertainty as Americans tried to understand complex events occurring against a background of exotic places and unfamiliar names. The distractions of the depression made it still more difficult to understand Manchuria. For Morrison initial confusion gave way to exuberant optimism, which was in turn replaced by a pessimistic awareness of the complexity of the

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1. Watchman-Examiner, XIX (Nov. 19, 1931), 1481; Presbyterian Advance, Nov. 5, 1931, p. 5; Churchman, Nov. 14, 1931, p. 7; Christian Advocate, Nov. 19, 1931, p. 1419; America, Nov. 14, 1931, p. 122.

2. Literary Digest, Nov. 7, 1931, pp. 8-9.

crisis. In this process certain elements in Morrison's deep concern over the threat to world peace appeared; they were to become important characteristics of his editorial policy. He had begun to emphasize the Kellogg pact as the most relevant expression of international law and the League as the agent to apply it. World public opinion and the cooperation of the United States bolstered the League. Morrison was beginning to apply to the threat to peace the measures which he had endorsed in theory for many years.

No consistent pattern of response had yet emerged in the other journals under study. By mid-November none of the monthly magazines had yet had an opportunity to develop a systematic approach, and the weeklies had not given the crisis much editorial attention. Both America and the Christian Advocate reported Far Eastern events almost every week in their news columns with the latter offering a larger measure of interpretation. Even Joy, who had commented on the dispute more than any of the other editors except Morrison, had not yet presented a comprehensive analysis. Among these editors there was substantial agreement that Japan's militarism and aggression should be condemned and that they should support the League's peace efforts and American cooperation with the world organization. None of them, however, had yet begun to assign to the Kellogg pact the central role which Morrison was beginning to give it. Besides Morrison only a few of these editors had ventured suggestions for solving the problems of China and Japan. Guy

Shipler thought an economic boycott would be effective against Japan, and Kirby Page advocated vigorous demands by the League and worldwide abandonment of the policy of armed intervention, while Curtis Laws appealed for worldwide prayers for peace.

II

During the early winter of 1931-32 Japan, disregarding repeated diplomatic maneuvers by the League and the United States, largely completed and consolidated her occupation of Manchuria. Morrison strongly supported all attempts to persuade Japan to stop. He now turned more directly to the Kellogg pact as the key to a solution and emphasized legal and moral means to uphold it.

When the League Council reconvened in Paris in mid-November, the utter failure of the October 24 resolution was clear. Besides notifying the Council that she was rejecting the resolution, Japan in the meantime had announced that the necessity of subduing "bandits" prevented withdrawal of her troops to the railway zones. She also pressed new demands on China. Contrary to the Council's hopes, even American support of the resolution made no difference in Japan's policy.[1] Japan's contempt for the resolution on which Morrison had placed such

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1. Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 132-34. See Japan's reply to the resolution in Conditions, pp. 36-38.

enthusiastic but short-lived hope aroused his indignation. From this point on, his condemnation of Japan grew stronger.

Deeply disappointed by Japan's conduct, Morrison concluded that she had broken the solemn pledge of the Kellogg pact. Japan, along with the other signatories, had renounced war for the solution of international disputes or for the advancement of national policy. "Yet," Morrison charged,

> in the face of that solemn pledge . . . Japan has adopted and is now using in all its brutality and terror, the instrument of war which she solemnly renounced. The use of war as an instrument of national policy has never been more indisputably exemplified than on the plains of Manchuria today.[1]

The editor of the Christian Advocate also contended that recent encounters between Chinese and Japanese troops had "all the aspects of war except the name." At the same time Clarke of the Presbyterian Advance conceded the existence of a sort of guerrilla warfare short of outright war between the two nations. But neither Joy nor Clarke brought the Kellogg pact into his discussion. On the other side of the question the Churchman reported that the Episcopalian bishop of the Missionary Diocese of Kyoto in a sermon in Philadelphia had asked other nations to "trust in the righteousness of the Japanese cause."[2]

Although Morrison saw no righteousness in the Japanese

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1. Christian Century, Nov. 18, 1931, pp. 1446-48.

2. Christian Advocate, Nov. 26, 1931, p. 1442; Presbyterian Advance, Nov. 26, 1931, p. 4; Churchman, Nov. 21, 1931, p. 22.

cause led by militarists who had dishonored their nation, he found reason for hope in the Japanese people. His editorial of November 18 continued:

> As her people awake to a realization of what her military caste, out from under all civil control, have done to the nation's standing, we believe that a mighty reaction of anger and repudiation is bound to follow. But, in the meantime, the tragedy is taking place. Japan, proud Japan, is branding herself with the stigma of dishonor.

To Morrison it was almost incredible that Japan would not "come to her senses" in time to erase "the blot of perfidy on her national character."[1]

In his emphasis on the power of Japanese public opinion Morrison was returning to an old theme of the peace movement--an idea that for years had gripped his mind. In the battle for the Treaty for the Renunciation of War in the 1920's he had argued longer and louder than most others that the moral force of public opinion-was the ultimate sanction of the pact and the only one necessary for its effective application. Now as he sought a force that could restrain Japanese expansionism, he naturally turned to the power for which he had argued so strongly only a few years earlier. This was the pact's strongest challenge. What hope was there if not its most powerful sanction?

Hoping for a "mighty reaction" by the Japanese people, Morrison never explained what kind of action he expected. He might have expected less--and have been less disappointed--had

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1. Christian Century, Nov. 18, 1931, pp. 1446-48.

he considered several other factors. Japan was not a real democracy in which the will of the people could operate effectively, for control of the government lay with the special interests dominating the two major political parties. The Minseito party represented industrial and commercial interests, while the Seiyukai party was responsive to agricultural, colonial and military groups. Both parties, as well as the majority of Japan's people, favored an expansionist policy in Manchuria. Simultaneously the press and other propaganda organs were stimulating an uncritical, nationalist spirit.[1] Perhaps serious study of the actual political situation in Japan might have prevented Morrison from trusting so deeply in the willingness and ability of the Japanese people to change their government's policies.

To Morrison another force, in addition to Japanese public opinion, seemed to promise an effective means of halting Japan. If the public opinion of the world could be brought into action, the Japanese militarists certainly would have to submit. And Morrison thought he saw a way to mobilize that opinion against Japan. The first step was an authoritative pronouncement to the world that Japan was guilty. The world had to be told that Japan's protestations of innocence were meaningless, that she had broken the peace pact. But, Morrison

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1. Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (Chicago, 1935), p. 339. Hereafter cited as Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy. Maruyama emphasizes a pathological element in the motivations of Japan's leaders in Thought and Behaviour, pp. 1-156.

argued, if the League declared Japan guilty of aggression, the Covenant would require application of drastic sanctions by League members.[1] Here Morrison faced his basic objection to the League Covenant--Article XVI. As in 1920 and 1923 he had opposed the idea of preserving peace by measures of outright force,[2] so now he condemned these provisions as the primary stumbling block in the League's path to effective action against Japanese aggression. This was the first of several attempts by Morrison to find a way for the League to act without invoking these drastic and, to him, immoral provisions. "If there were no such sanctions of force in the covenant," he declared, "the league could proclaim a judgment upon Japan as guilty of international perfidy, and let the public opinion of the world operate spontaneously." Nations were rightly afraid of military sanctions, he argued; they would never automatically invoke them by pronouncing judgment on Japan. The League therefore was paralyzed; it could not act morally because of the sanctions of Article XVI. If the League would not remove them from the Covenant, however, it could at least bow out of the dispute,

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1. Article XVI of the Covenant declared that any member resorting to war in violation of its other obligations under the Covenant would be considered at war with all other members, who would then sever "all financial, commercial or personal intercourse" with it. The Council was to recommend military action to be taken, and all members were pledged to support one another against the offender.

2. See above, p. 22.

Morrison suggested. The United States could then call a conference of the signatories to the peace pact. Free from the restrictions of the Covenant the conference could proclaim Japan guilty of violating the pact, "and the consequences would follow."[1]

Morrison's suggestion was characteristic of him; he did not go beyond the pronouncement of guilt to explain the "consequences" he anticipated. He did not specify what action he expected from the spontaneous operation of world opinion in whatever way it might be mobilized. Japan's honor would be "stained," but Morrison admitted that probably neither a boycott nor sanctions would be applied against her. Morrison believed that moral condemnation for violating the Kellogg pact would be powerful enough to "bring Japan to her senses."[2] To him the real battle was between Japan's militarists and the world's will for peace, and world opinion must win.

Several editors would have agreed with Morrison on the central importance of public opinion against war as the force by which, as Parsons put it, "national policies can be shaped, controlled and directed." Guy Shipler called for the church to take the lead in creating "a new public opinion" which would force all nations to take the peace pact seriously. He also approved proposals to focus world opinion by means of a

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1. Christian Century, Dec. 2, 1931, pp. 1510-11.
2. Ibid.

supplementary treaty providing for consultation by the signers of the pact in the event of a threatened breach of it. Although Kirby Page was convinced that the powers hesitated to restrain Japan from doing what they themselves had often done in the past, he declared that China would use the boycott, a highly effective weapon, but that "the moral sentiment of the other nations" would probably prove "a decisive factor in preventing the incorporation of Manchuria into Japan."[1]

Other editors, however, recognized that public opinion alone could not achieve the desired results. James Joy, for example, thought moral force needed supplementary economic pressure through a widespread refusal to buy Japanese goods. This reinforced moral pressure might be powerful enough to "supersede military force and defiance." His Presbyterian counterpart, James Clarke, stressed the enormous expense of the war to Japan and her losses because of the Chinese boycott. "In the face of an adverse world opinion," he concluded, Japan was surely finding it very difficult to carry on her war.[2]

In at least one respect Wilfrid Parsons demonstrated a

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1. America, Nov. 21, 1931, p. 149; Churchman, Nov. 28, 1931, p. 8; Dec. 12, 1931, p. 8; World Tomorrow, Dec. 1931, pp. 387-88. Page suggested that the League (1) assure Japan that China would be urged to protect Japanese life and property in Manchuria and in China proper and (2) demand that Japan recall her troops to the railway zones under threat of a break in diplomatic relations or, as a last resort, a selective embargo against Japanese goods.

2. Christian Advocate, Dec. 10, 1931, pp. 1523-24; Presbyterian Advance, Dec. 10, 1931, p. 5.

keener appreciation of the realities of the situation late in 1931. While endorsing efforts to mobilize world opinion by means of notes to China and Japan from all the other signers of the peace pact, America's editor pointed out, in his first editorial reference to the crisis, a serious weakness in the type of solution advocated by Morrison. He doubted that arousing world opinion would mobilize public opinion for peace in either China or Japan because they, like most other nations, were "afflicted with a disease which [was] certainly not patriotism, but a degraded form of chauvinism." This affliction nourished national self-righteousness and prevented the self-criticism and repentance necessary for reversing national policy. Characteristically, Parsons concluded with a call for governments to recognize that they were subject to ethical and moral rules.[1]

If Morrison represented the height of moral certainty about the situation, Curtis Laws was at the bottom of the scale. The Baptist editor admitted that the Manchurian business baffled him; he did not know which nation was right and which wrong. But he vigorously condemned the barbarism of war and passionately called for the only solution he could think of--"unceasing prayers" for peace. He was realistic enough, however, to deplore, as Parsons did, each nation's unwillingness

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1. America, Dec. 5, 1931, p. 197.

to confess its own wrongs because of an exaggerated sense of national honor.[1] While editorial views on the role and power of public opinion varied, the question did not seem to bother Japan's leaders.

In the latter half of November Japan expanded again in Manchuria. With the occupation of Tsitsihar on November 19 she established control over western and central Manchuria. Success in the north released troops for action in the southern part of the province. Clashes between Chinese and Japanese civilians and military units in Tientsin in northeastern China gave Japan an excuse to move these troops down the Peiping-Mukden railway into the strategic southwestern tip of Manchuria.[2]

As reinforced Japanese troops drove down the railway for Chinchow, the last major southern Manchurian city still under Chinese control, the American Secretary of State dramatically called Japan to account. Only a few days earlier, Stimson disclosed, Baron Shidehara, Japan's Foreign Minister, had assured him that such an advance would not be launched. How, then, could this attack be taking place?[3] Two days later, on November 29,

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1. Watchman-Examiner, Dec. 17, 1931, p. 1608.

2. Lytton Report, pp. 72-77. Japan, with other signers of the Boxer Protocol of 1900, including the United States, maintained a small garrison in the international settlement in Tientsin.

3. Conditions, p. 42. The relevant correspondence between the State Department and Ambassador W. Cameron Forbes in Tokyo is printed in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-41, 2 vols. (Washington, 1943), I, 50-54.

Japanese forces withdrew.

Morrison rejoiced. Stimson's "move of almost unparalleled daring" had produced a near-miracle. Japan's withdrawal satisfied the public opinion of the world, "which Mr. Stimson so daringly marshalled." It amounted to acknowledgment of the right of the world to help settle issues between Japan and China in Manchuria.[1] Such complete success for the diplomacy of public opinion would indeed have been wonderful had there in fact been such a success. But Stimson's move alone did not induce the Japanese retreat.[2] Events soon proved that the withdrawal represented neither a permanent change of policy on the part of Japan nor an acknowledgment of the world's right to intervene in Manchuria. World opinion was not really as effective as the editor of the Christian Century wished to believe. Perhaps the

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1. Christian Century, Dec. 9, 1931, p. 1547.

2. Sara R. Smith lists several factors which coincided to exert considerable influence on Foreign Minister Shidehara, whose order to retreat was this time obeyed by the army. "It was the happy combination of several well-timed actions: Aristide Briand's letter of the twenty-fifth to both parties [China and Japan] urging that commanders in the field be given express orders to refrain from further engagements; his letter of the twenty-ninth to the Japanese alone urging consideration of the proposal for neutral observers in the Chinchow area; the joint publication on the twenty-fifth of the substance of the Council's draft resolution and of the American approval of this measure; the strongly worded protest from the British Foreign Office that the advance toward Chinchow along the Peking-Mukden line endangered British interests, and Secretary Stimson's indignation expressed in his message of the twenty-seventh and in his press conference of the same day. No one of these by itself would have produced the desired result; together they had sufficient weight to make Shidehara act as he had never acted before. For once the timing of all concerned was good, planned or not, and the results were evidence of what concerted action might have accomplished at other times." Manchurian Crisis, p. 190.

other editors realized this fact; perhaps, on the other hand, they simply did not react as quickly and vigorously to each development as Morrison did. In either event, none ventured a specific comment on Stimson's note, and only America reported it in its news columns.[1] While Morrison applauded Stimson's daring, the League prepared to act.

Japan herself had, surprisingly, proposed that the Council establish a neutral commission to investigate conditions in Manchuria. The other members of the Council rejoiced at this apparent softening of Japan's attitude, and on December 10 the proposal passed unanimously. Japanese diplomats had not, however, conceded as much as some observers supposed. Japan's reservation that the commission could not concern itself with either her own military actions or future peace negotiations assured her freedom to carry on her policies without interference from this purely investigative body. More ominous was the fall, on the following day, of the moderate Minseito cabinet. Its successor, a cabinet of the Seiyukai party, openly favored the militarists.[2]

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1. America, Dec. 12, 1931, pp. 221-22.

2. Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 172-202. Takeuchi points out that the Minseito party of Baron Shidehara favored a "friendship" or moderate policy toward Manchuria; but the Seiyukai party of Inukai Ki advocated a "positive" or vigorous policy. Both parties favored extension and protection of Japan's traditional interests in Manchuria; the only difference lay in methods, not in goals. The Seiyukai party replaced the Minseito cabinet on Dec. 13, 1931. War and Diplomacy, pp. 337, 339, 369.

American editorial descriptions of the resolution of December 10 ranged the gamut of interpretation--from a sparkling triumph for the League to a resounding defeat. Many newspapers called the resolution a failure. Others, like the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, thought "it might have been worse," while it was a "definite achievement" to the Philadelphia Inquirer and "an impressive victory" to the Indianapolis Star. The Japanese press also hailed the resolution as a victory--not for the League but for Japanese diplomacy.[1]

Morrison hastened to defend the League. Japan, he declared, had "backed down"; she had made a "promise" to retire to the railway zones and had accepted the resolution's call to end hostilities. Most important of all, she herself had proposed the investigating commission. Surely she was becoming more reasonable. To Morrison the resolution indicated a failure, not of the League, but of the military sanctions of the Covenant. Because only China wanted the League to use military measures, the League had had to abandon its attempt to force Japan to make a peaceful settlement. Diplomatic efforts, however, would eventually succeed because they relied not on military force but on the peaceful provisions of the Kellogg pact and the Covenant. Military procedures would never work; only

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1. Literary Digest, Dec. 26, 1931, p. 6. See also Tupper and McReynolds, Public Opinion, pp. 303-12. Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, p. 361.

pacific methods could bring peace.[1] Morrison consistently supported every effort to substitute peaceful measures for sanctions which even remotely hinted of war.

In his enthusiasm for the League's diplomacy of peace Morrison overlooked several important factors. Japan had made no "promise" to withdraw her troops; she had merely recognized that the Council called her to do so. She had also provided herself a convenient loophole by reserving the right to protect Japanese lives and property from "bandits"--and she did not define "bandits"; she could apply the label at her own discretion.[2] The Council's resolutions of September 30 and October 24 had also called for cessation of hostilities and evacuation of troops. Why should Japan obey this resolution any more than the others she had disregarded so easily? In addition, the resolution considerably weakened the investigating commission's authority by reserving from its concern negotiations between the two parties or "military arrangements" of either party. The commission, therefore, could only investigate the past; it could not take part in events which might occur while it was in the Far East. Japan had in fact gained freedom of action during the months required for the investigation, for the League probably

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1. Christian Century, Dec. 23, 1931, pp. 1616-18.

2. For the Japanese reservation see Conditions, p. 45, or Willoughby, Controversy, p. 169.

would not act before receiving a report from the commission.[1] Finally, the Japanese government which had dared take this slight step of accommodation had been replaced by one firmly dominated by the militarists. The ineffectiveness of the resolution was to become clear at the end of the year.

Other editors took more moderate views of the League's efforts and the prospects for their success. The Christian Advocate's news columns reported that the renewed fighting around Chinchow and the accession to power of "the most militaristic faction in Nipponese politics" had "shattered" early hopes for peace. Joy regretted that the League could do nothing more than investigate, "short of drastic application of military or economic sanctions, for which its members [were] apparently not ready, and which would be futile any way without the collaboration of the United States. Any other action would only damage the League's prestige," for the Japanese seemed determined to carry out their plans. Similarly, America simply reported the resolution as the Council's "final step" to bring peace.[2]

Diametrically opposed to Morrison's commendation of the

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1. Willoughby suggests that Japan's desire for time to consolidate her position was one of the most likely reasons for her proposal of an investigative commission. Controversy, pp. 195-200, especially p. 197.

2. Christian Advocate, Dec. 17, 1931, p. 1555; Dec. 24, p. 1578; Dec. 31, p. 1610; CVII (Jan. 7, 1932), 2; America, Dec. 19, 1931, p. 246.

League was Kirby Page's accusation of impotence for allowing the Japanese militarists to triumph over the Covenant, the Kellogg pact, and the Washington treaties. Page nevertheless believed the Chinese would win. In their favor were three factors: first, growing Chinese nationalism expressed in the boycott against Japanese goods; second, the League's "reserve weapons" for protecting China--moral and legal judgment against Japan under Article XV, diplomatic isolation, and an international embargo against Japanese silk and certain other products --; third, the rise of internationalist and pacifist movements in Japan, stimulated by effects of the Chinese boycott and by the moral condemnation of the world. Page had already suggested the second factor but doubted that the League would use these weapons.[1] On the other side of the picture, the journal also contained articles denying that the Japanese people were militaristic and blaming the western powers for teaching Japan the use of force.[2] Without condemning the League so harshly, Guy Shipler rejoiced at reports of the drastic effects of China's boycott on Japanese exports[3] and called on statesmen to learn

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1. World Tomorrow, Dec. 1931, pp. 387-88. See above, p. 101, note 1.

2. World Tomorrow, XV (Jan. 1932), 5-6; Frank H. Hedges, "Are the Japanese Militaristic?" pp. 8-10; Earl Cranston, "Setting the Pace for Japan," pp. 10-14.

3. A decrease of 60% since the outbreak of fighting. New York Times, Dec. 17, 1931, p. 6.

that "commerce is the real ruler of the universe." Application of a boycott by other nations, he averred, "would beat gunpowder all hollow in producing peaceful results."[1]

The Christian Herald's editors tried to see the Manchurian situation in a larger context but proposed no solutions. For news interpreter Stanley High the real question was not whether Japan's objectives were right or wrong but whether she would use force or arbitration to settle her dispute with China. The collapse of peace efforts would have a disastrous result--"the new diplomacy of consultation rather than intrigue would be too discredited to survive." High, therefore, supported Hoover in his strictly peaceful efforts to avert war in the Far East--a war which would inevitably involve the United States. Editor-in-chief Dan Poling thought the conflict would "in the end point a remorseless finger at the brutality and futility of guns and gas" because the Chinese boycott would prove "more powerful than all the weapons of preparedness." Against calls for increased armaments Poling argued the economic loss and social waste of preparedness and the superiority of the "massed public passions of the world" over fleets and armies. He thought the Manchurian dispute would prove his point.[2]

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1. Churchman, Dec. 26, 1931, p. 7.

2. Christian Herald, LV (Jan. 1932), 30, 32-33. Poling also published a cable from Chiang Kai-shek to the Christian Herald, dated Nov. 1, 1931, condemning militarism, shameless diplomacy, and brute force and calling on American church people to join with Christians everywhere to "establish a reign of understanding, appreciation, harmony, and love." The cable did not mention Japan, but the implication was obvious. The editors did not comment on the cable. Ibid., p. 12.

Some editors took an even longer-range view of the conflict. In a long editorial in the Missionary Review Delavan Pierson hoped that "the clearer wisdom and the pressure brought on Japan by America and the League of Nations [would] effect a peaceful settlement" of the "practical state of war" in Manchuria. He found hope in the contrast between the current situation, in which the Kellogg pact, the League, and the Washington treaties "all [caused] America and Europe to have something to say" to Japan's aggression, with that of twenty-five years earlier, when other nations would have watched Japan's forceful acquisition of Manchuria "perhaps disapprovingly, but without protest." Even more encouraging to him, however, were signs of Christian influence in both disputing countries--resolutions for reconciliation by Christians in both lands, daily prayer groups in the home of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and strong anti-military movements in Japan. Emphasizing his own special interests, he declared that in the long run "the only permanent foundation for world peace is the spread of Christian goodwill and sympathy until it controls public opinion in every country. The foreign missionary societies are still the most effective agency to bring this about."[1] Pierson looked beyond immediate efforts to adjust tensions through diplomacy to permanent elimination of conflict from the international scene by means of the rule of an enlightened and neighborly public opinion in every land. Similar views appeared in the other missionary journal, the Missionary

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1. Missionary Review, LV (Jan. 1932), 6-7.

Voice. E. H. Rawlings also drew encouragement from the fact that Christian leaders were meeting for prayer in the home of Chiang Kai-shek and from resolutions for peace and brotherhood adopted by various Christian groups in both China and Japan.[1]

In several other journals the conflict appeared as a challenge not only to the League and to the peace machinery but also to the church. Clarke in the Presbyterian Advance wondered why the world seemed to be expecting more Christian action from China and Japan than the so-called Christian nations had ever displayed. He called for the church to work harder to spread the Christian spirit and principles in the world. A contributing editor of the Christian Advocate also pointed out the church's responsibility to share with the Orient its faith and ideals, the only effective force for unifying a disordered world. Wilfrid Parsons took a slightly different approach, blaming governments for rejecting Christianity and their moral obligations. The time had arrived, he declared, for Christians "to dictate to our alleged rulers a policy of no war, . . . [to] demand that those who dictate the policies of the state shall be governed by eternal laws of justice and charity."[2]

As 1931 drew to a close, justice and charity seemed to

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1. Missionary Voice, XXII (Feb. 1932), 58-59, 74, 100.

2. Presbyterian Advance, Dec. 24-31, 1931, pp. 4-5; Christian Advocate, Dec. 31, 1931, p. 1617; America, Jan. 2, 1932, p. 302.

be excluded from Japan's plans for China; Japanese troops again were marching toward Chinchow. Within a few days they occupied that city with ease and then pushed into the border town of Shanhaikwan, which commanded a narrow pass between the Great Wall and the sea. Through this gap passed the Peiping-Mukden railway and the road into north China. The Japanese, of course, claimed that these moves were intended solely to put an end to "bandit activity" in southern Manchuria; but few observers believed them.[1]

Japan's new aggression so outraged Morrison that he now urged stronger measures against the "outlaw nation," the real "bandit." Still rejecting military measures, he demanded economic sanctions in cooperation with China's boycott, which had already proved to be effective. Strong financial pressure would certainly harden the opposition of Japan's industrialists and financiers to the militarists.[2] Morrison was in the minority with his call for financial sanctions. He might have considered the results of a recent Literary Digest poll of leading American

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1. Lytton Report, pp. 77-78; Ferrell, Diplomacy, pp. 151-52; Armin Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931-33 (Chicago, 1963), pp. 81-83; Smith, Manchurian Crisis, pp. 229-30.

2. Morrison argued that military sanctions had "no reality" because they could be applied (1) only against small, weak nations, against whom other, less violent sanctions would be effective, and (2) only in line with the interests of the major powers, not for moral reasons. Japan, he claimed, had based her action on these facts. Christian Century, XLIX (Jan. 13, 1932), 50-51.

newspapers on the question of American participation in a League-sponsored boycott of Japan. Although some support appeared, the majority opposed such involvement; and many editors stated that boycotts were the League's business but no concern of the United States.[1] But Morrison had never measured the validity of an idea by its popularity, especially if it happened to be his own idea.

Economic sanctions found even less support among the Christian journals under study here. Besides Morrison and Page only Shipler in the Churchman advocated such measures. An article in America conceded that a boycott would probably break down Japan's strength but doubted that it would ever be applied because of the American reluctance to get so deeply involved and because of the importance of Japanese trade to the world. While not advocating economic sanctions, a writer in the World Tomorrow felt that one of the major weaknesses of Japan's militaristic leaders was their inability to understand the economic orientation of the modern world. Failing to realize the inadequacy of military force for controlling Chinese markets and raw materials, these leaders were guiding Japan down a suicidal path.[2] Perhaps, if left to themselves Japan's leaders might bring about their own downfall; but the editor of the Christian Century, for one, was no longer inclined to sit back and wait patiently for that unlikely event.

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1. Literary Digest, Dec. 5, 1931, pp. 3-4.

2. Churchman, Dec. 26, 1931, p. 7; Gerhard Hirschfeld, "Japan Means It," America, Nov. 28, 1931, pp. 177-79; Benjamin H. Williams, "Whom the Gods Would Destroy," World Tomorrow, Feb. 1932, pp. 51-53.

Climaxing his outburst against Japan, Morrison demanded more vigorous action to turn world opinion against the aggressor. He wanted China to bring Japan before the World Court for violating the Kellogg-Briand pact. This legal move "would build up such a solid wall of adverse public opinion as would make it impossible for Japan's militarists to persist in their defiance." He urged that all nations refuse to recognize Japan's title to her territorial acquisitions; this united action would strengthen international law, and the effect would be "immense":

> A title thus disputed by all the rest of the world would be a title not worth having; the expenditure of a single yen or a single life to obtain such a title would be folly, and even the most militaristic of governments would be forced to recognize this.[1]

In his advocacy of economic sanctions and his confidence in public opinion Morrison ignored or failed to perceive two pertinent facts. One perhaps was unknown to him, but the other should have been obvious. Perhaps failure to understand the operation of Japanese politics was excusable in an American editor; at any rate Morrison paid no attention to the recent changes in Japan's government. The conservative, militarist Seiyukai party, enthusiastically supported by the people, had just replaced the party of the industrial and financial interests which had opposed the militarists. If any group in Japan could have given effective opposition to the military, it would have been the Minseito party, whose power had proved inadequate.

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1. Christian Century, Jan. 13, 1932, p. 51.

Increasing Japan's economic difficulties was, therefore, likely to lead her to react with more aggressive nationalistic policies.[1] On the other hand, Morrison should certainly have known that Japan could not be brought before the World Court without her own consent, a highly improbable event in this case. Moreover, there was almost no possibility that the United States would apply economic sanctions against Japan. Morrison did strike one important note in his long editorial: his request for nonrecognition of Japan's title to Manchuria accorded with Secretary Stimson's own call for the same action.[2]

After the change of government in Japan and the fall of Chinchow Stimson decided on a firmer policy. On January 7, 1932, he sent to China and Japan a strongly worded note. Stimson recognized that Chinese authority had been eliminated from Manchuria but expressed confidence that the League's commission would help solve the Sino-Japanese difficulties. In the third and last sentence of his brief note the Secretary warned:

> But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government

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1. Shortly before the fall of the Minseito cabinet George Sokolsky had also maintained that continuation of the Chinese boycott would eventually lead the civilians in the Japanese government to exert power and to open negotiations to end it; the longer it continued, the more power China would have at the bargaining table. New York Times, Nov. 22, 1931, p. 3. Yoshihashi points out, however, that the two primary factors in the collapse of the moderate cabinet were its financial problems and its opposition to the militarists. Conspiracy, pp. 219-29.

2. The author has found no evidence indicating any influence by Morrison on Stimson. According to the Secretary's account, the process of formulation of the nonrecognition policy began as early as Nov. 9, 1931. Far Eastern Crisis, p. 93.

> deems it to be its duty to notify both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it can not admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.[1]

The nonrecognition policy, later labeled the Stimson Doctrine, set forth in this note meant simply that the United States refused to regard certain actions as legally acceptable. Changes in the international status quo, however firmly established they might become, were not necessarily legal; the method by which they were achieved also had to be legal. Further, no agreement between two governments which denied or jeopardized the treaty rights of a third was legally valid. Finally, no change of any kind in the international status quo would be recognized as valid if it were accomplished by use of war or threats of war because the signatories of the Pact of Paris had foresworn such measures.

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1. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 96-97. Almost every study of the Manchurian crisis or of American diplomacy in the 1930's contains Stimson's note. An official source is Conditions, pp. 53-54. Stimson's own account of the note and the circumstances surrounding it is in Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 87-109. Both Ferrell, Diplomacy, pp. 151-69, and Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 81-105, devote a whole chapter to it.

The nonrecognition doctrine was not entirely new in the history of American foreign policy. There were precedents dating as far back as 1889, when Secretary of State James G. Blaine had proposed to the first conference of American nations that no state should recognize territorial transfers except after arbitral decisions. A more direct precedent was Secretary William Jennings Bryan's note to Japan objecting to the Twenty-one Demands which Japan pressed upon China in 1915; the language of Stimson's note, in fact, closely followed Bryan's.[1] What excited the note's supporters in 1932 was the Secretary's linking of the old diplomatic weapon of recognition, which had usually been applied to internal changes of government rather than to territorial changes, to the relatively new Pact for the Renunciation of War.

Stimson's note coincided exactly with Morrison's conception of the way international law had been transformed by the Kellogg pact. He acclaimed it with the same enthusiasm with which he had greeted the signing of the pact:

> As though written in letters of fire by an invisible hand across the face of Secretary Stimson's latest note to Japan and China there stands out this fact: The peace pact is law! It is not, as a cynical and war-sniffing press has declared, a mere pious sentiment. It is not, as commentators itching for methods of "enforcement" have charged, an empty form of words. It is law! Established international law. Established by the solemn adherence

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1. For a more detailed analysis of precedents, see Ferrell, Diplomacy, pp. 153-55, and Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, p. 93.

> of practically all the nations of earth. And Mr. Stimson's note is the way which the United States takes to call Japan's attention to this fact, and to the intention of the United States to insist that all rights under the law be observed.

Two important effects flowed from this glorious action, Morrison exulted. First, no one could now mistake the true nature of Japan's action in Manchuria. The note clearly demonstrated that she was guilty of violating the peace pact. Second, a precedent of incalculable importance had been set: "titles of whatever sort gained under such conditions are illegal and can not be recognized."[1]

The majority of the nation's press commended Stimson's note, but few editors surpassed Morrison in rejoicing. The range of reactions was wide. Many papers fully approved the note as the decisive act needed to clear up the Manchurian situation. The Louisville Times, for example, praised Stimson for "talking turkey." On the other hand, criticism was not absent. The Philadelphia Record spoke whimsically of "Don Quixote Stimson and the Japanese Windmill," and the Louisville Courier-Journal accused Stimson of "locking the stable door after the horse had been stolen." Some papers recommended and others feared further action in the form of an economic boycott or severance of diplomatic relations, while a few refused to condemn Japan.[2]

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1. Christian Century, Jan. 20, 1932, pp. 77-78.
2. Literary Digest, CXII (Jan. 23, 1932), 5-6.

The other editors studied hardly noticed Stimson's epochal note. Only the Christian Advocate and America reported it in their news columns, and even they offered no extensive editorial comment. James Joy expected the note to have no effect on the current situation, but it did assure Japan "that we [would] never agree to any permanent extension of Japanese control over the region." Wilfrid Parsons summarized this "important note" briefly, observed that it "created a sensation," and claimed that it gave Japan "a serious jolt," but did not explain any of these phrases.[1] The other editors did not even mention the note.

At a crucial moment Stimson's announcement of the nonrecognition policy confirmed and gave official sanction to Morrison's deepest hopes for the society of nations. Stimson's note seemed to give new life and power to the Pact of Paris; it bolstered Morrison's confidence in both the pact and the State Department. Morrison evidently took the note much more seriously than did other Christian editors as well as the two governments to which it was addressed. This remarkable precedent, he believed, would exert a profound influence on future relations between strong and weak nations.[2]

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1. Christian Advocate, CVII (Jan. 21, 1932), 50; America, Jan. 16, 1932, p. 345; Jan. 23, 1932, pp. 371-72.

2. Quincy Wright, a prominent scholar in international law, expressed similar hopes in his declaration that "no diplomatic note of recent or even more distant years is likely to go down in history as of greater significance in the development of international law" than the note of January 7. It could "mark important progress" in the realization of three important propositions: (1) that occupation of territory as such gives no title

How disgusting, then, was Japan's impudent reply, ably described by Robert H. Ferrell: "Its veneer of elegant irony thinly covered a base of solid insolence." Japan's Foreign Office claimed that Stimson's note was "support" for her efforts to apply the peace pact and maintain the open door policy in light of the peculiar conditions in Manchuria.[1] To Morrison such sophistry about her treaty obligations meant only that "when it pleases Japan to disregard those obligations, that is exactly what Japan will do." He moralistically pronounced that "treaty-honoring nations" must henceforth regard Japan as "unworthy of trust."[2]

As in the case of Stimson's note itself, only the Christian Advocate and America reported the Japanese reply. Neither editor commented on it at all, both being content with brief summaries.[3] The other editors were also silent about the reply.

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to it; (2) that treaties violating the rights of third states are void; (3) that treaties made under the influence of non-pacific methods are void. If made effective, these principles would banish war as a means of advancing the legal positions of states and would revolutionize international law. A state using violence, if not recognized, "would remain an outlaw." "The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932," American Journal of International Law, XXVI (April 1932), 342-48.

1. Ferrell, Diplomacy, p. 160; Conditions, pp. 55-56.

2. Christian Century, Jan. 27, 1932, p. 109.

3. Christian Advocate, Jan. 28, 1932, p. 82; America, Jan. 30, 1932, pp. 393-94.

In the four months after the explosion at Mukden Morrison developed a forthright stand on the Manchurian situation, a position firmly based on the conviction that the provisions of international law expressed in the Kellogg peace pact applied to Japan's actions. For her violation of these legal principles Japan stood morally condemned by the public opinion of the world, and the world should make her feel the force of its reproach in the form of moral censure and possibly economic sanctions. Morrison heartily supported Stimson's first major effort to mobilize American and world opinion behind the peace pact by applying the moral force of the nonrecognition doctrine. Whether Japan would heed such moral measures remained to be seen.

In contrast, with the possible exception of the World Tomorrow, none of the other journals under study had developed a systematic approach either in explanation or in proposed solutions. Kirby Page of the World Tomorrow, disgusted with the League's impotence, advocated vigorous, progressively more drastic action to force Japan to return Manchuria to China--a demand for troop withdrawal supported by the threat and then the severance of diplomatic relations followed by a selective embargo on Japanese goods. While there was substantial agreement that Japan was in the wrong, only Shipler in the Churchman also called for such specific measures as an economic boycott against the offender. The other editors either prayed for peace (Laws in the Watchman-Examiner) or challenged the church to spread and

to practice its doctrines of peace and justice. Most of them mentioned public opinion as a force to be mobilized against Japan, and some commended American cooperation with the League of Nations in this effort. But none emphasized the direct relevance of the Kellogg pact or ardently supported Stimson's nonrecognition note as Morrison did. Perhaps only more dramatic violence would impress upon them the seriousness of the crisis and inspire them to call for more stringent measures.

Chapter IV

SHANGHAI: INDIGNATION AND DISCOURAGEMENT

By the beginning of 1932 Japan's expansionist program in Manchuria seemed almost complete despite the chorus of condemnation raised against her. The League was slowly starting its investigation, while moralists in the peace movement were unreconciled to Japanese policy and very sympathetic toward China. Yet it seemed that little constructive action was possible before the League's commission made its report. Some observers, like Morrison, hoped that the recently-proclaimed nonrecognition policy would serve not only as a basis for judgment on Japan but also as a deterrent to future agression.

If Japan's seizure of remote and unfamiliar areas of Manchuria had aroused the indignation of the world, similar action in a well-known area probably would produce an even more outraged reaction. Shanghai was the most famous city in China. Headquarters of most foreign businesses and missionary organizations in China, a center for import and export trade, a growing manufacturing city, the home of the largest number of foreigners in any city of China, Shanghai was the most westernized area of

China. Moreover, the large Japanese population was finding the hostility of the Chinese more irritating each day; the city was ripe for trouble.

Shanghai was the center of the growing movement to boycott Japanese goods, and it had witnessed several violent clashes between Chinese and Japanese residents since the Mukden incident. Japanese businessmen, many of whom were facing ruin, clamored for the same kind of protection their countrymen had received in Manchuria. Admiral Shiozawa Koichi, the Japanese naval commander in Shanghai, demanded action by local authorities. After considerable hesitation the mayor agreed to close the local boycott societies, but he delayed too long before accepting the admiral's ultimatum. Shiozawa had already decided that armed Japanese action was necessary.[1]

At 11:00 p.m. on the evening of January 28, 1932, Japanese marines attempted to move into Chapei, the Chinese district of Shanghai, to protect the six thousand Japanese residents there. Expecting no more resistance than the army had encountered

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1. For the fighting, negotiations and settlement at Shanghai see, among others, League of Nations, Report of the Committee of Enquiry Set Up at Shanghai under Article 15, Paragraph 1, of the Covenant, Lg. Pub. No. A [Extr.] 3, 1932, VII (Geneva, 1932); Lytton Report, pp. 84-86; Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 109-52; Ferrell, Diplomacy, pp. 170-78; Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 112-51; Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 373-80; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 309-62; and Paul O. Elmquist, "The Sino-Japanese Undeclared War of 1932 at Shanghai," Harvard Regional Studies Seminar, Papers on China, V (Cambridge, 1951), 39-74.

in Manchuria, they were amazed when Chinese troops stood their ground. Admiral Shiozawa, dismayed by the unexpected resistance, resorted to more terrifying measures. Determined to emulate the army's quick victory in Manchuria, he decided on a course that proved as shocking to the world as it was destructive to the Chinese--he ordered his planes to bomb Chapei. As the horrified world watched through the eyes of countless newspaper correspondents, fire bombs gutted Chapei killing hundreds of Chinese and sending thousands fleeing into the International Settlement. The Chinese Nineteenth Route Army, however, held firm; and the Japanese eventually had to send in three divisions to triumph after a month of the fiercest fighting the world had seen since 1918.[1]

Although the hostilities at Shanghai at first seemed a further stage in the plan of conquest begun at Mukden, the incident was essentially an independent action by Shiozawa to protect Japanese lives and interests, to stop the boycott, and to

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1. The 19th Route Army, unlike the disorganized troops of Chang Hsueh-liang in Manchuria, was intensely anti-Japanese and also fervently loyal to Wang Ching-wei, a leader of the anti-Chiang Kai-shek faction of the Nationalist party. Wang, the real ruler of Shanghai, was at that time head of the nominal government at Nanking. Ferrell, Diplomacy, pp. 176-78. Wang strongly opposed Chiang's lenient policy toward Japan; and his troops, again unlike Chang's in Manchuria, were veterans of the Northern Expedition of unification in 1926-27. They had received the nationalistic political indoctrination which had contributed so largely to the success of that campaign and were, therefore, bitterly opposed to Japan's attacks in Shanghai. Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army (New York, [c.1940]), pp. 14-15, 17-18. See also Elmquist, "Sino-Japanese Undeclared War," pp. 46-47, 49-52, and F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949 (Princeton, 1956), p. 113.

gain prestige for the navy like that won by the army in Manchuria. Shiozawa did not, however, please his superiors. The incident irritated military leaders in Tokyo, who tried to quiet the whole affair as soon as they had won enough of a victory to save face. They cooperated with a special League truce committee composed of consular representatives of the great powers in Shanghai. Fighting ended early in March, and military leaders of both sides signed a truce on May 5.[1]

The Shanghai fighting had several important effects. The unanticipated strength of the Chinese resistance required such a severe, unplanned drain on Japan's resources that even her militarists willingly accepted assistance from the League and the western powers in arranging negotiations. Equally important, Japan's attacks on defenseless Chinese civilians, especially by aerial bombing, aroused world-wide indignation and outrage far surpassing the reaction to her milder Manchurian action against Chinese troops.

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The press in London and Paris, while objecting to Japan's brutal methods, partially excused her on grounds that

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1. Lytton Report, pp. 85-86; Elmquist, "Sino-Japanese Undeclared War," pp. 58-65; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 360-62.

the Chinese boycott had provoked the Japanese. In the United States, however, newspapers almost unanimously condemned Japan for her "insane imperialism," "brutality," and "savagery." Many papers expressed a "high note of alarm" about the possibility of American involvement in war and called for careful diplomacy, protective armament--this especially from the Hearst papers--and assurance from the government that the nation would not be drawn into war. The isolationist Philadelphia Record, which interpreted the fighting as a struggle for control of north China, declared, "The American people don't give a hoot in a rain barrel who controls North China."[1]

The Christian Century joined the general outcry against Japan, and for expression of moral outrage few editors excelled Morrison's passionate castigation. Japan's indiscriminate bombing of defenseless and unwarned civilians, a new and horrible kind of warfare, inspired his most violent charges against "imperialistic Japan." Her beastly onslaught was bad enough in itself, but the Shanghai attack was to Morrison even more damnable as evidence of Japan's arrogant disregard for public opinion and the peace pact. "Modern history," he declared, "presents no parallel . . . to the studied contempt with which her armed actions have outraged the public opinion of the rest of the world." The worst of Japan's international sins, Morrison

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1. Literary Digest, Feb. 6, 1932, p. 9; Feb. 13, 1932, pp. 6-8. See also Tupper and McReynolds, Public Opinion, pp. 318-27.

bitterly concluded, was that "her solemn word, as a signatory of the nine-power treaty and the Kellogg pact, has been dishonored. She is an outlaw among nations; her hands reek with blood." What was to be done with such a nation?[1]

Even the brutal attack on Shanghai could not induce Morrison to approve violent measures of retaliation against Japan. These methods would only strengthen militarism everywhere. And militarism was the real offender; Japan's militarists were merely the most active ones in the world at the moment. Morrison opposed militarism regardless of its particular national markings; he therefore rejected the use of military force against Japan as an "unthinkable policy" which could lead only to greater catastrophe.[2]

In the same editorial which denounced the Japanese so harshly Morrison also recommended legal and peaceful measures which he thought would bring a settlement in Manchuria and Shanghai. A primary need was a solid legal foundation. In order to complete the legal case against Japan, the League Council should immediately take up China's appeal under Article XV of the Covenant, investigate the situation, and render judgment for the record. To demonstrate her own sincerity and add more legal

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1. Christian Century, Feb.10, 1932, pp. 182-84.

2. The following week Morrison again opposed military sanctions and advocated peaceful ones citing Stimson's note of Jan. 7 and the nonrecognition doctrine as possible alternatives to the evils of war. Ibid., Feb. 17, 1932, pp. 216-18.

weight, China should then offer to submit the whole case to the World Court.[1] Simultaneously, on the diplomatic front the United States should call a meeting of signers of the Nine-Power pact[2] and seek "immediate and general international adherence to the principles laid down by Mr. Stimson in his note of January 7." Morrison believed this application of the nonrecognition principle would deprive Japan of the foreign capital she needed to develop the seized areas. If all other measures failed, Morrison conceded, an economic boycott might be applied, but only as a last resort and as a united effort of all major powers. With Japan condemned and deprived of financial assistance by legal and diplomatic pressure, the nations could let time work against the militarists. Morrison emphasized that there should be no

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1. In the previous week's Christian Century Morrison's associate in the battle for the peace pact, Salmon O. Levinson, had discussed some legal aspects of the Manchurian dispute. He argued that Japan's violation of the Pact of Paris had not destroyed the treaty; on the contrary, the protests of the other nations had strengthened and vindicated it. China, he said, should bring Japan before the World Court in a suit for damages. He noted that such action would require Japan's consent but chose not to deal with the possibility of her refusal. This action, he believed, would give the Court an opportunity to interpret the pact officially. Feb. 3, 1932, pp. 149-50.

2. In the Nine-Power Treaty of Feb. 6, 1922, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands, all having interests in China, agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China, to let China develop her own government, to maintain equal economic opportunity for all nations in China, and to refrain from jeopardizing other nations' interests in China. It also called for communication among the signatories whenever one of them believed the treaty should be applied. United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, 2 vols. (Washington, 1938), I, 276-81.

hatred of the Japanese people. Spurred by these pressures, they would eventually overthrow the militarists who had duped them.[1]

In this long editorial Morrison not only released his wrath against Japan but drew together the various elements in his developing attitude toward the Sino-Japanese dispute. He relied on convictions and insights which he had used in the battles for peace in the previous decade. War in any form and for any purpose was evil. It was immoral because it failed to punish guilty leaders and brought suffering and death to innocent people. It was illogical because it only sowed the seeds of future wars. Since the coming of the Kellogg pact and the nonrecognition principle, war was illegal; and it was also unnecessary because now there was a better way to settle international disputes. The "instruments of peace"--the League, the World Court, and, above all, the peace pact--offered effective means for preventing war and for restraining and correcting an aggressor. Consistently rejecting military methods, Morrison relied solely on the operation of that ancient hope of the peace movement, world opinion. Public opinion, expressed in principle in the peace pact, could be informed, united, and mobilized in support of the pact by means of the nonrecognition policy. World opinion could invoke economic sanctions against a stubborn

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1. Christian Century, Feb. 10, 1932, pp. 182-84.

offender like Japan. Such drastic steps would scarcely be required, Morrison believed, because the Japanese people could be depended on to rise against the militarists and turn them out in response to world opinion and their own sense of honor and justice. Morrison was confident the system he advocated would work.

Initially none of the other editors under study offered his readers either a lengthy analysis of the fighting in Shanghai or a systematic solution to compare with Morrison's. They were in general agreement with the opinion of James Joy in the Christian Advocate that Japan's "flagrantly illegal and shockingly inhuman" acts against civilians in Shanghai had "outraged human feeling." More significantly, Japan had set back the whole cause of peace--the League, the peace pact, and the disarmament movement had lost prestige while the big navy forces in the United States had gained strength. Hinting at a boycott, Joy concluded that the only way "to reach effectively the Japanese business interests and public authorities [was] through their channels of trade."[1]

James Clarke declared that Japan's inexcusable but not unprecedented "protection" of her interests and her nationals in Shanghai had touched off "a whole brood of rumors of war and a panic of alarm which . . . had no justification in fact." Like

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1. Christian Advocate, Feb. 11, 1932, pp. 140, 147-49.

Joy, he feared that scare headlines and erroneous reports, which seemed deliberately designed to "cultivate war passions rather than peace spirit," advanced the argument of the big navy advocates. At this early stage of the conflict internal divisions within each warring nation and peace efforts by Christian and non-Christian leaders in both countries offered Clarke a slight hope for peace. His only suggestion for dealing with the problem was to avoid war hysteria.[1]

Reacting quickly to the Shanghai fighting, Guy Shipler predicted that Japan's "butchery of Chinese civilians" would unify China in a spirit of hatred. The Churchman's editor reminded his readers that even in Japan there were still some people, especially Christians, who were working against the militarists. He called for hard work by Christians of other nations, including the United States, to bring about an atmosphere conducive to peace. Meanwhile, both China's boycott and the hostility of the rest of the world must have serious consequences for Japan. Although Shipler's editorials left no doubt about his own views, he occasionally presented another side of the problem. Immediately after the fighting broke out in Shanghai, for example, he published the statement of an Episcopalian foreign mission executive defending Japan. That nation, the speaker affirmed, "[had] never violated an international

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1. Presbyterian Advance, Feb. 4, 1932, p. 4; Feb. 11, p. 4; Feb. 18, 1932, p. 4.

agreement. As to Manchuria, she wouldn't take it as a gift." Japan had pacified Manchuria by giving it effective police protection; she had simply extended into Shanghai her antibandit operations in order to prevent the financial disaster threatened by the Chinese boycott. He apparently saw no difference between bandits and consumers who refused to buy certain goods. His case was weak.[1]

America's first report of the Shanghai hostilities charged that Japan could not use the excuse of controlling "bandits" for her military operations in Shanghai. While the journal's news columns reported developments weekly, a broad analysis appeared in Parsons' editorial the following week. He regretted that Japan could find many precedents in the conduct of other powers and blamed the tragedy at Shanghai on both the Japanese admiral's desire to stop the boycott and the leniency of the great powers toward Japan. The powers, he thought, connived to keep China weak in order to safeguard their own spheres of influence in that country. From this example Parsons reasoned that the cause of all international conflict lay in "the control of governments by economic interests." Economic nationalism, which the church had often denounced, prevented public opinion from furthering justice and halting such aggression as Japan's. Typically, Parsons looked to the official

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1. Churchman, Feb. 6, 1932, pp. 8, 20-21; Feb. 20, 1932, p. 7.

pronouncements of his church for guidance on social problems and found the solutions for them in the principles enunciated by Rome.[1]

Curtis Laws of the Watchman-Examiner deplored the threat to world peace posed by Japanese militarism. Lamenting the slaughter of Chinese women and children, he also worried about the westerners, especially the Christian missionaries, living in the International Settlement. He hoped for a quick peace and called for unceasing prayer for the success of Western efforts to settle the dispute.[2]

Laws was one of the first editors to assure his readers that missionaries in Shanghai were safe. The Presbyterian Advance, the Churchman and the Missionary Voice soon published similar accounts. These reports concerned primarily the missionaries of the respective denominations served by the publications.[3] As the fighting continued, so did attempts on the part of western diplomats to obtain agreement between the warring parties.

On the day after the outbreak of fighting in Shanghai, China appealed to the League for action under Articles X and

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1. America, Feb. 6, 1932, p. 418; Feb. 13, 1932, p. 445.

2. Watchman-Examiner, Feb. 18, 1932, p. 196; Feb. 25, 1932, p. 233.

3. Ibid., Feb. 4, 1932, p. 130; Feb. 11, 1932, p. 162; Presbyterian Advance, Feb. 4, 1932, p. 20; Feb. 11, 1932, p. 21; Churchman, Feb. 27, 1932, p. 20; Missionary Voice, March 1932, p. 145; April 1932, p. 162.

XV of the Covenant.[1] At once the Council opened debate, but the discussion soon developed into an exchange of charges and counter charges between the Chinese and Japanese delegates. Frustrated in the Council, China moved on February 12 to refer the dispute to the Assembly, where she hoped to obtain more forceful and effective action.[2] Before the Assembly could meet, the neutral members of the Council made one last attempt to persuade Japan to make peace. On February 16 they addressed a joint note to Japan, thereby implying that she was responsible for the dispute. The note reminded Japan of her obligations under the Covenant and the Nine-Power treaty and appealed to her "high sense of honor" for the practice of "forbearance and restraint" in her conflict with China. Stating that territorial or

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1. Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 218, 236. Article X bound League members mutually to respect and preserve each other's territorial integrity and existing political independence against external aggression, providing for consultation by the Council in event of a violation. Article XV provided for submission to the Council of any dispute between two League members which was "likely to lead to a rupture" and which had not been submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement. The Council was to investigate the dispute, try to effect a solution and make a public report if no settlement could be reached. The Council could refer the dispute to the Assembly, which would then carry out the functions previously assigned to the Council. No action was taken under Article X because it became apparent that none of the powers able to take measures to preserve China's territorial integrity would do so. The League, therefore, handled the dispute only under Articles XI and XV. Ibid., p. 221.

2. One week later the Council approved a resolution referring the dispute to the Assembly under Article XV and calling a meeting of the Assembly for March 3. Ibid., pp. 256-62.

political changes effected contrary to Article X should not be recognized by League members as valid and effectual, the note theoretically affirmed the principle of nonrecognition.[1]

To anything which could be interpreted as strengthening the peace pact, Morrison gave enthusiastic support. Although the Council members cited Article X of the Covenant where Stimson had brought forth the peace pact, Morrison thought the note placed the major powers "squarely behind" Stimson's nonrecognition statement. It expelled Japan from the family of nations if she persisted in her present course: "Future treaties, future loans, future international fellowship of all kinds are denied her. She is morally and politically isolated, and she is economically isolated as well." The next decision rested with Tokyo; Japan's economic insecurity would not long permit her to face "the marshalled public opinion of the world" unscathed.[2]

In his enthusiasm Morrison overestimated the strength of the note. It was not a statement of policy binding on the members of the Council or on the League itself; it merely called Japan to do what the representatives thought should be done. There was no assurance that the nations represented on the Council would in the future deny Japan treaties, loans, or fellowship. Whether the "marshalled public opinion of the world"

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1. Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 238-40.

2. Christian Century, Feb. 24, 1932, pp. 243-44.

could affect Japan's actions remained to be demonstrated.

None of the other editors saw in the powers' joint note of February 16 the benefits which seemed so clear to Morrison. Only one even mentioned it--America's news columns reported that the note probably would not change Japan's attitude. Like Morrison, however, Guy Shipler of the Churchman in one of his few editorials on the Far Eastern situation asserted that public opinion, "the ultimate court of appeal," was growing more powerful in response to Japan's tragic course. Shipler believed "It would be wise for Japan to make friends with the public opinion of the world." But the editor neither spelled out his reasons for this confidence nor indicated what effect he expected public opinion to have on Japan.[1] In the meantime residents of Shanghai had no reason for such optimism.

Japanese guns in Shanghai continued to pound at the Chinese lines and "at the world's will to peace." Morrison heard the rising cry for effective action and proclaimed his own faith. "Something has been done," he cried. The decisive factor which made possible a simple solution to the whole complex problem was the doctrine of nonrecognition. The note of February 16 had reinforced Stimson's position and united the League and the United States in moral opposition to Japan's aggressive acquisitions, he believed. Isolated by the

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1. America, Feb. 27, 1932, p. 492; Churchman, Mar. 5, 1932, p. 8.

nonrecognition policy and thereby deprived of vitally needed foreign funds,

> Japan, misled by her militarists, must be left to fall into the economic pit which she [had] digged for herself. For out of that [would] come a new freedom and a better destiny for Japan's own people, together with a giant stride toward the establishment of world peace on a foundation of moral power.[1]

For Morrison the desired, glorious result was as certain as the remedy was simple. Left to herself, Japan would surely come to her senses.

At no other time did Morrison more clearly state his faith in the power of legal and moral pronouncements based on the peace pact. These declarations would serve both as mobilizers of public opinion and as ultimately effective sanctions. Morrison was sure that something decisive had been done; but it was not "necessarily so."

James Clarke, for one, believed that much more remained to be done. He urged a drastic change--creation of an international police force which would be able to control situations like the one at Shanghai and would be far less dangerous than the terrible risk of large scale warfare. Clarke did not explain how this force should be created and directed; but he had no doubt that it was needed. Equally convinced that "the necessity for immediate and drastic action by the League or neutral powers [was] becoming daily more evident," James Joy, however, formulated no specific solution. Worriedly he predicted

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1. Christian Century, Mar. 2, 1932, pp. 279-80. Morrison's emphasis.

that "the League must either intervene or admit its inability to handle a real threat of war, with all that that means in loss of prestige."[1]

The World Tomorrow offered Kirby Page's gloomy response to Japan's new aggression. Repeating a previous suggestion, Page urged concerted action by the great powers to institute against Japan "a diplomatic boycott"--severance of diplomatic relations--followed if necessary by an economic embargo. He doubted that such concerted action was possible because the European powers clung to their own national interests even though civilization itself was threatened. "Perhaps," the socialist editor suggested,

> our present organization of society, leading as it inevitably does to nationalistic imperialism, is simply incapable of surviving in a technological civilization which demands a degree of mutuality which the nations are unable to attain. Whatever may be the outcome, it is obvious that optimism in the face of such a situation has become a vice. If we are to avoid catastrophe at all it will be only because we recognize its imminence.

On the use of force to discipline Japan Page agreed with Morrison--such action was unthinkable. Specifically Page disapproved suggestions, like Clarke's, for an international police force. The non-military sanctions which he had already suggested "would have compelled Japan to yield" if they had been applied; an international armed police force "would be neither effective

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1. Presbyterian Advance, Feb. 25, 1932, pp. 4-5; Christian Advocate, Feb. 25, 1932, p. 194.

nor ethical--nor necessary." Page clearly held to his basic socialist and pacifist tenets for purposes of both analysis and solution.[1] Japan, however, seemed unmindful of lofty ideals.

Japan turned aside the note of February 16 even more bluntly than she had rejected previous resolutions from the Council. The appeal, she declared on February 24, should have been addressed to "the attacking party," China, not to her. The Japanese government maintained, however, that it would welcome western efforts to "induce the Chinese to refrain from aggressive acts." It hoped the powers would succeed in "bringing about a pacific attitude on the part of China."[2]

II

While the Japanese were rejecting the League's latest effort to restrain them, on the other side of the world the American government was trying to make its position clear. On the same day, February 24, 1932, Secretary Stimson issued a definitive statement of the policy of the United States. Hoping to end the protracted series of ineffective notes by making the American attitude absolutely clear, Stimson tried to avoid Japanese rejection of his declaration by the simple device of not

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1. World Tomorrow, March 1932, pp. 68-69, 71.
2. Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 240-44.

addressing it to them. Instead he wrote an open letter to William E. Borah, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He began with an historical introduction commenting at some length upon John Hay's "Open Door" notes at the turn of the century; carefully he explained the treaty system built up in the 1920's to preserve peace. The Secretary then came to the main point of his statement--that the Washington treaties of 1922 regarding naval limitation and non-fortification of Pacific islands and the Nine-Power Treaty of the same date respecting "the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China" were interdependent. The treaties stood or fell together, the Secretary strongly implied. Japan's violation of one would free the United States from the obligations of the others. The threat to build a larger navy if Japan did not back down was clear. It was obvious to Stimson that the current crisis would not have arisen if the treaties, particularly the Nine-Power Treaty, had been faithfully observed. He then pointed out that the Kellogg-Briand peace pact of 1928 had reinforced these treaties, and he called on other nations to support the nonrecognition doctrine set forth in his note of January 7. Such action would

> effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and . . .[would] eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.[1]

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1. The letter to Borah is printed in full in Dept. of State, Press Release, No.126, Feb. 27, 1932; and Foreign Relations, Japan, I, 83-87; with commentary and discussion in Stimson,

The majority of American newspapers reacted favorably to the Borah letter. Many emphasized the implied threat of action in the Pacific, while others stressed Stimson's call for support of nonrecognition. Critical comment ranged from the St. Paul Daily News' dissatisfaction that the letter was only "a slap on the wrist" to the Philadelphia Record's "we don't want war" reply to what it considered a statement of intention to fight. China's press was elated, Japan's outraged, while Paris papers withheld comment and London's reaction was mixed.[1]

In his analysis of the letter to Borah, Morrison again stressed the legal and moral value of the nonrecognition doctrine as the key to a peaceful solution. Morrison minimized the implied threat that the United States would enlarge her Pacific fleet and fortify her Pacific possessions if Japan's aggression continued. He found Stimson's call for other powers to adopt his nonrecognition policy more significant. After quoting that passage from the letter, Morrison vehemently exclaimed:

> Portentous words! And greatly needing utterance at this juncture when certain parts of the neutral world are acting as though the major issue in China

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Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 152-76; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948), pp. 243-57; Ferrell, Diplomacy, pp. 178-92; and Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 248-54. See also Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston, 1960), pp. 389-98; Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft (New Brunswick, N. J., 1954), pp. 97-102; and Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 140-44.

1. Literary Digest, March 12, 1932, p. 12. See also Tupper and McReynolds, Public Opinion, pp. 339-43.

> were the stopping of the fighting near Shanghai. For, important as that is, it is by no means so important, from the standpoint of future world peace, as the question whether Japan is to be allowed to have broken her pledges under the Kellogg pact with impunity. That is the primary issue before the nations--and that issue the Stimson letter sets squarely in front of the nations of Europe, especially England and France.

If the other powers would join the United States to cut off Japan's financial resources, Morrison heartily believed, Japan would have to retreat from her untenable position and fighting would end.[1] Though the letter seemed important to Stimson, Morrison, and some others at the time, it nevertheless had little if any real effect on the situation.[2]

Among the editors in this study only Stanley High applauded the letter to Borah as enthusiastically as Morrison.

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1. Christian Century, March 9, 1932, pp. 310-11.

2. Stimson stated that he intended the letter to be (1) an encouragement to China, (2) an explanation of policy to the American public, (3) a suggestion of possible action to the League, (4) a reminder to Britain of her co-responsibility for the open door policy and the Nine-Power Treaty, (5) a reminder to Japan of the interdependence of the Washington treaties of 1922. Far Eastern Crisis, p. 175. Ferrell shows convincingly that probably none of the unnamed addressees really took it seriously. Diplomacy, p. 186. Current saw it as a step toward the eventual use of economic sanctions by Stimson. Secretary Stimson, pp. 101-02. Bundy asserted it was a clear statement of American policy and of thorough disapproval of Japan. On Active Service, pp. 256-57. Morison merely cited the initial praise and criticism of the letter. Turmoil and Tradition, pp. 396-97. Japanese officials probably ignored it; Takeuchi did not even mention it in his detailed study of Japanese diplomacy of the time. War and Diplomacy, pp. 337-421. Rappaport, on the other hand, attributed to the letter considerable influence on Tokyo's decision to accept the League's truce auspices in Shanghai; but he cited no evidence beyond the fact that one event followed the other. Stimson and Japan, pp. 143-44.

He expected the nonrecognition policy based on the Nine-Power treaty to make it impossible for Japan "to get international sanction" for her acquisition:

> Manchuria, until it returns to Chinese sovereignty, will in other words, be outlaw territory. This policy, in the end, is likely to conclude the activities of the world's international land-grabbers. For even the world's militarists are less likely to seize the property of their neighbors if they are aware that they can never secure clear title to what they have seized.[1]

The legal power of nonrecognition seemed as real to High as it did to Morrison. High evidently assumed that in international relations there existed a sense of community authority, comparable to that within a nation or a state, by which acquisitions might receive legal status. Applying to nations the ethical and legal standards which should guide individuals, the editor seemed to perceive no basic differences between a sovereign state and an individual who was subject to the limitations and sanctions of an organized community. Japan's leaders did not think the same way, nor did the other editors display a similar confidence in the effectiveness of Stimson's declaration.

America reported the contents of the letter to Borah without taking special notice of it. The Christian Advocate said the letter contributed to Japan's growing awareness of the opposition of public opinion to her awkward position in Shanghai. In contrast, one jarring note burst forth from the Presbyterian

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1. Christian Herald, May 1932, p. 29.

Advance. As in the case of the war reports from Shanghai a month earlier,[1] Clarke feared that the "big navy advocates" would make the most of Stimson's implied threat of disregarding naval limitations to push for "aggressive naval construction," which would seriously threaten the cause of peace. The editor repeated his earlier call for an international police force but was willing to settle for an economic boycott if the League and the United States would cooperate. He did not mention the nonrecognition policy.[2]

James Joy of the Christian Advocate vigorously opposed a boycott of Japan. The propaganda required to make it successful would stir up hatred and prejudice and "inflame the war spirit," perhaps bringing the nations "to the brink of a precipice." Taking a larger view, Joy saw one "commendable result" of the tragic war--it forced people to think hard about peace, to re-examine old ideas in the light of cold facts. Perhaps such idealists as High and Morrison might have benefitted if they had considered Joy's warning that the struggle compelled

> nations and individuals to face the realism of fact, when they would so much rather escape into the realm of idealism. All conceptions of World Peace must undergo revision in the presence of the fact that within the family of nations there is one, at least, which is not bound by the treaties.[3]

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1. See above, pp. 132-33.

2. America, Mar. 5, 1932, p. 514; Christian Advocate, Mar. 3, 1932, p. 226; Mar. 10, 1932, p. 250; Presbyterian Advance, XLV (Mar. 3, 1932), 4-5; Mar. 10, 1932, p. 4.

3. Christian Advocate, Mar. 10, 1932, p. 254; Mar. 3, 1932, pp. 230-31.

Guy Shipler was evidently thinking in the same vein. He deplored the League's failure to prevent the Shanghai tragedy, which was "wanton aggression made under the pretext of straightening out disorder." Reluctantly but realistically he concluded that "the disheartening fact [was] more and more evident that nations are loath to be moved by justice when their aggressive instincts are aroused. The high and the noble yield to force or expediency as the case may be."[1]

More optimistic, if perhaps less realistic, was Delavan Pierson, who thought that the loss of friends and trade would discourage Japan from disregarding much longer the rights and opinions of other nations. He stressed other forces at work for peace--Christian missionaries in China and Japan and the prayers of Christians everywhere. More practically, he also hoped the League would form an international commission to settle the Shanghai problem.[2] In Geneva the League was preparing to act in its own way.

More significant than the letter to Borah was a resolution passed unanimously[3] by the League Assembly on March 11. The Assembly, called in response to China's appeal, created

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1. Churchman, Mar. 12, 1932, p. 8.

2. Missionary Review, March 1932, pp. 131-32.

3. Japan abstained and offered her own interpretation of the resolution. Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 301-13.

a special Committee of Nineteen--a committee which did not include Chinese and Japanese representatives--to watch the situation while the Assembly was not in session. The Assembly declared that it was "incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which [might] be brought about by means contrary to" the Covenant or the Pact of Paris.[1] The League agreed with the American position on the peace pact and the principle of nonrecognition, but its stand on that principle was weaker than Stimson's outright refusal to recognize any forced change in the status of Manchuria.

Morrison, a strong supporter of Stimson, naturally was overjoyed when the League followed the Secretary's lead. Under the optimistic title "Peace Wins" he joyously greeted the resolution of March 11 as "the most momentous advance toward a working process to insure world peace since the ratification of the Kellogg pact." The resolution sustained Morrison's faith that good could be brought out of evil, for it meant that Japan's "savagery [would] not go unpunished now, nor be allowed to tempt another nation's avarice in the future."[2] Morrison failed to explain the nature of the punishment which Japan's "savagery" would receive or how it would be administered. He was too

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1. Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 274-303.

2. Christian Century, March 23, 1932, pp. 374-75.

enraptured by the enhanced prospects for peace to be bothered with such minor details.

The Assembly's resolution was for Morrison the latest of a series of lasting gains for world peace. The United States was now "solidly with the League" and with Great Britain in common action for peace. Facing this combination, other nations would hesitate before going to war. Now at last the newly demonstrated power of the small nations in the Assembly had forced the League to abandon "sanctions of force" and to apply "sanctions of peace." Having finally realized that violent sanctions were unworkable and having turned to peaceful ones, the League had discovered a solid foundation for peace, "a platform for united adherence and action"--Stimson's nonrecognition formula.[1] This united support for nonrecognition and the peace pact lifted Morrison's spirits.

From the perspective of thirty-five years Morrison's description of the world-transforming effect of this "united" endorsement of nonrecognition is truly amazing. "How could one man be so wrong about so much?" one is tempted to ask. How could Morrison really have been so sure that the goals he desired had been achieved? A paraphrase of this portion of his editorial will not do; we must let him speak for himself:

> It is amazing, when this outcome is surveyed against the background of history, that any such unanimous action should have been achieved under such conditions and in so short a space of time.

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1. Christian Century, March 23, 1932, pp. 374-75.

> When was the pact of Paris ratified? In July, 1929. Thirty-one months later the nations of the world draw from that instrument the principle of a juridical bar against an offending nation by which they all avow themselves ready to stand until the offender shall have been brought to its senses! Thirty-one months to deflect and convert the whole stream of historical tradition and international action! And this despite the fact that the Stimson formula binds these nations which have endorsed it to an absolute break with many of their own policies which have seemed, in past years, fundamental to their power. The action of the assembly in affirming Mr. Stimson's formula as the law of nations, shows that with the adoption of the source of this formula--the Kellogg pact--international law was born again.[1]

Morrison's enthusiasm did not, however, entirely separate him from reality. He realized that Japan's national pride, the power of her militarists, and the reluctance of some nations to abide by the resolution would make achievement of a permanent solution difficult. Even so, he could not long suppress his exuberance. Discounting the obstacles, he declared, "the vital point has been gained. The nations have united to deal with this crisis without recourse to war!" The editorial closed triumphantly, almost apocalyptically, with a vision of Japan brought "to her senses without incurring any of the dangers or involving any of the injustices which other courses of action that have been suggested involved." Out of the current strife would rise a viable structure for world peace.[2]

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1. Christian Century, March 23, 1932, pp. 374-75.

2. Ibid.

Reading into the resolution the most optimistic implications, Morrison became convinced that it heralded a new kind of international unity in support of Stimson's nonrecognition formula for implementing the peace pact. A statement that nonrecognition of illegally obtained gains was "incumbent" upon the nations seemed to him a binding commitment to fundamental policy changes--even at the cost of forsaking traditional national interests. The resolution actually bound no nation to any specific action. In practice it had no appreciable effect on the situation it was designed to meet. Japan paid little more attention to the League's resolution than she had given to Stimson's bluff in the letter to Borah.

The resolution of March 11 aroused little more interest in most of the journals under study than it did in Japan. Only Clarke in the Presbyterian Advance discussed it editorially--and briefly. Clarke rejoiced that the Assembly had followed the American lead in basing its action on the peace pact and that the resolution materially advanced the cause of order and justice in international law. The news columns of the Christian Advocate and America also reported the resolution with a minimum of comment. America merely called it "considerably stronger than anything the League had yet put forth" and summarized it briefly. The Methodist publication, however, displayed more enthusiasm:

> This is considered a very important development, putting real pressure behind the Pact of Paris. Refusal of the world to recognize the validity of any results of action contrary to it will practically nullify the advantages of such action

> and preserve the peace far more effectively than more drastic sanctions which are not likely to be invoked.[1]

One may question whether Joy was taking his own advice and looking at the nonrecognition policy "in the light of cold facts" or was escaping "into the realm of idealism."[2] At least one other editor thought more drastic action was necessary.

In a series of editorials covering almost three pages in the World Tomorrow Kirby Page observed that, despite Japan's desire to withdraw gracefully from Shanghai, she would not voluntarily leave Manchuria. Neither would China willingly submit to the loss of that territory. Permitting the Japanese to remain in control, therefore, would drive China to militarism, destroy both China and Japan economically and socially, shatter the peace machinery, kill the disarmament conference, and enhance the possibilities of another war. Only coercive action could prevent such drastic consequences. Stimson's notes and the Assembly's resolution of March 11 provided the moral condemnation necessary for further steps--"a diplomatic boycott" followed if necessary by an economic embargo--measures which Page had already suggested. Concerned that economic sanctions might mean starvation of innocent victims, Page concluded that refusal to buy silk from Japan or to sell cotton and other raw

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1. Presbyterian Advance, Mar. 24, 1932, p. 5; America, Mar. 19, 1932, p. 561; Christian Advocate, Mar. 24, 1932, p. 306.

2. See above, p. 146.

materials to her would bring her government to its knees with a minimum of suffering for the common people. Something had to be done; acquiescence in the seizure of Manchuria would "insure hatred, warfare and desolation."[1]

Pessimistic views also appeared in the editorial comments in the Churchman and the Watchman-Examiner. Disregarding the March 11 resolution, the Episcopalian paper described the situation in the Far East as "menacing" but recommended no solution. The Baptist journal saw "no improvement" although "the nations of the world [had] done their best to bring about peace." Laws explained the reasons for his continuing interest in the problem--first, he hated war and dreaded to think of the havoc that this one was producing. Second, he feared that the hatreds engendered by war would seriously hamper missionary work for the next half century.[2] But, like Shipler, he could think of no way to bring about the peace he desired.

Delavan Pierson also found cause for concern in the probable effects of both acquiescence in Japan's aggression and continued fighting in the Far East. In the former case China would probably turn militarist, perhaps even communist, in resentment against the League and the United States. A long war would further weaken the missionary enterprise in China by destroying

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1. World Tomorrow, April 1932, pp. 99-101.

2. Churchman, Mar. 19, 1932, p. 8; Watchman-Examiner, Mar. 24, 1932, p. 361.

property, endangering personnel, and disrupting services. For all these ills the missionary-minded editor prescribed large doses of the Christian spirit of justice and good will, and prayer and hard work by Christians everywhere.[1] Whether such measures would avail to halt Japan was doubtful; Japan had her own plans regarding China and her own ideas of the proper way to guarantee peace.

III

The fighting in Shanghai lasted only a short time. Japanese forces executed a flanking maneuver which forced the Nineteenth Route Army to withdraw from the city. The Japanese decided not to pursue the retreating Chinese, and fighting ceased in early March. Representatives of the Japanese and Chinese governments conferred sporadically during March and April under the auspices of a special committee consisting of the consular representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. Reports of the progress of these negotiations were confusing, sometimes indicating imminent agreement, at other times predicting termination of the talks.[2]

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1. Missionary Review, April 1932, pp. 195-98.

2. The New York Times reported the nearness of agreement on March 20, 1932, p. 5, and March 22, pp. 1, 14, and the breakdown of negotiations on March 23, pp. 1, 12, and March 25, p. 1. For summaries of the negotiations see Lytton Report, pp. 84-86, and Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1932 (London, 1933), pp. 502-11. Texts of the notes exchanged are found in China Year Book, 1932, pp. 674-76.

Morrison's optimism over the League's resolution of March 11 carried over into his initial analyses of the Shanghai truce negotiations. He still hoped the Japanese people would repudiate the militarists and force a change in policy toward China. Rumors of an agreement to restore conditions as they were before fighting began strengthened Morrison's hope. Since the Chinese had already agreed to take action against the boycott before the attack, the fighting seemed completely senseless. Morrison wondered "how long it [would] be, despite a censored press, before the Japanese public [awakened] to the folly and uselessness of the whole Shanghai adventure."[1] He implied that this awakening would come soon.

The Presbyterian and northern Methodist editors also noted with pleasure the prospects for a truce in Shanghai. Clarke recognized that difficulties remained in the way of agreement, but he believed that the war would not be resumed. Amplifying his previous suggestions for an international police force, Clarke called for the nations to surrender some of their national sovereignty to international courts which would enforce the Kellogg pact. Japan's "insurgence," he declared, had demonstrated the imperative need for a method of dealing effectively with a violator of treaties. The Christian Advocate's James Joy briefly reported progress in peace negotiations in Shanghai as

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1. Christian Century, March 30, 1932, p. 403.

"the most hopeful news since the trouble began."[1] Clarke and Joy were cautiously optimistic about truce negotiations in Shanghai; the Christian Century's editor far outstripped them in capacity for hope.

Morrison seemed to have a touch of genius in his search for hopeful signs. In apparently insignificant events he could discover potentialities for good overlooked by practically everyone else. For example, he saw a clear possibility of drastic changes within Japan. Reports of opposition to military expenses in the Diet and of clashes within the Imperial cabinet, he thought, indicated increasing dissatisfaction with the militarists among Japanese leaders. When the masses also learned the true cost of the military's adventures in China in terms of money and lives, a popular reaction would surely bring about needed reforms.[2] But reform in Japan was not as likely as Morrison hoped; Japanese nationalism inspired by a militaristic press was stronger than he realized. Meanwhile Morrison found a threat to peace in his own nation. Businessmen were attacking the nonrecognition policy.

Morrison learned that in the United States certain business leaders were trying to persuade Stimson to back down from his nonrecognition policy so that they might enter the growing

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1. Presbyterian Advance, Mar. 31, 1932, pp. 4, 8-9; Christian Advocate, Mar. 31, 1932, p. 338.

2. Christian Century, March 30, 1932, p. 403.

Manchurian market. Morrison leaped to the defense, proclaiming that larger issues were at stake than mere business opportunities; as the military struggle in China and Manchuria ended, the time for heightened moral conflict approached. Morrison admitted that American businessmen had a natural interest in Manchuria, where Japanese order and industry promised to develop a profitable market.[1] But he warned that

> there must be no weakening in the attitude of the league and of the American government. The coming struggle will show the extent to which the marshaled moral opinion of the world can be used to set up an effective ethical control in international politics. It is that, under whatever disguise of fair words, that the elements now seeking to weaken the Stimson policy would cast away.[2]

To Morrison business matters were insignificant in comparison with the struggle for "ethical control in international politics." And in this struggle the policy of nonrecognition was the most effective moral weapon. Morrison felt morally compelled to oppose any attempt to immobilize or weaken this weapon for peace--whether that attempt came in his own country or halfway around the world.

The Tokyo government announced that it was considering withdrawal from the League if the international organization intervened in Japan's dispute with China under Article XV of

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1. See New York Times, March 1, 1932, p. 17; March 2, pp. 12, 18; March 4, 1932, p. 5.

2. Christian Century, April 13, 1932, p. 468.

the Covenant.[1] Morrison was certain that Japan was trying to blackmail the League into separating the issues of Manchuria and Shanghai so that she could make a deal with the League. He believed she would accept a League-sponsored settlement at Shanghai in return for the League's recognition of her Manchurian conquest. Morrison hoped the League would resist "the 'rule or ruin' policy of Japanese militarism." The militarists had met with violence every challenge to live up to their treaty obligations, he insisted. Having answered attempts to invoke the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact with the bombing of Chinchow and the destruction of Shanghai, the militarists were now replying to the invocation of the League Covenant with a threat to withdraw. This was one more item in the "sinister record" Japan was compiling in its opposition to the moral opinion of the world.[2]

Militarism was anathema to Morrison; he struck at it wherever it raised its ugly head. Unmistakable evidence that it was gaining in Japan further angered and frustrated him. On April 16 leaders of the Social Democratic party announced the formation of a Japanese national socialist party consciously modeled on Adolf Hitler's organization in Germany.[3]

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1. New York Times, March 27, 1932, p. 1; March 28, 1932, p. 6.

2. Christian Century, April 20, 1932, p. 499.

3. Toynbee, Survey, 1932, p. 424; New York Times, April 17, 1932, p. 15; Literary Digest, April 30, 1932, p. 13.

Morrison saw the appearance of the new party as another threat to world peace. The anti-democratic, chauvinistic, aggressively expansionist policies of the new fascist party shocked the editor. It was almost incredible to him that the horror and futility of war demonstrated at Shanghai should not be obvious to everyone. Yet, heretofore respected Japanese politicians were openly avowing a program which could lead only to more destruction and bloodshed. "Can it be possible," he exclaimed, "that Japan's infatuated militarists learned nothing at Shanghai?"[1]

Morrison had perhaps been led into false confidence that militarism was declining in Japan by an article he had published only a week earlier. Written by the leader of the Japanese Anti-war Federation, translated by a Japanese Christian peace worker, and apparently smuggled out of Japan, the article emphasized the militarists' mistakes and the possibilities of opposition. It came to an amazing conclusion: "The influence of the military is on the wane in Japan."[2] In Morrison's judgment this was "the most revealing and important article to come out of Japan since the beginning of the present hostilities."[3]

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1. Christian Century, April 27, 1932, p. 533.

2. Ibid., April 20, 1932, pp. 506-08.

3. Christian Century, Apr. 20, 1932, p. 506. See also in the Christian Advocate an article by a former missionary in Japan defending the Japan of quaintness, gaiety, charm, "sturdy fisherfolk," and Mt. Fujiyama. This, she said, was the true Japan which would eventually reassert itself: "The right will triumph over wrong--power will again return to warm hands. And the blood now staining Fuji's sides will be buried by the snow of real Japanese opinion." Eleanor L. Welch, "My Japan," Christian Advocate, Apr. 14, 1932, p. 397.

Naturally it was important to him; it reflected and supported his own views and hopes. Perhaps it also revealed more about the political naivete and wishful optimism of peace advocates in both Japan and the United States than it did about political conditions in Japan.

Other editors besides Morrison, however, thought militarism was doomed in Japan. An article in the Watchman-Examiner attacked the "utter madness of militarism in action" in Japan and asserted that "militarism [had] over reached itself." The world's disapproval and the failure of the China policy in the face of economic realities would induce the Japanese people to repudiate and overthrow militarism.[1] The Presbyterian editor, James Clarke, believed that in Japan's growing internal conflict business and civil factions were opposing the militarists because of the destructive effect of the fighting on the nation's wealth. Pressure for peace, he hoped, was building up in Japan. A few weeks later a regular contributor to the Presbyterian Advance declared that the tremendous expense of the war necessitated higher taxes and sowed the seeds of revolution in Japan. He was certain that "thousands of citizens in Japan [were] secretly harboring rebellious thoughts." In addition Japan had won the lasting hatred of the Chinese and had lost millions of dollars

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1. The author was editor Laws' son-in-law, a missionary in China. J. W. Decker, "Whom the Gods Would Destroy," Watchman-Examiner, Apr. 14, 1932, pp. 462-63.

of trade with the United States. And she had lost the respect of the whole world. How much better for Japan if she had not rushed into Manchuria and Shanghai![1]

Although Stanley High was aware of the strength of Japan's militarists, he too saw reason to hope that their ascendancy would not last. He confidently looked for the triumph of the pacifist movement led by Baron Shidehara, who had lost his position as foreign minister because of his pacifist views. The growing peace movement held great promise, High felt, because it included a wide range of important elements in Japanese society--business leaders, college students, women, and labor.[2] Morrison, Laws, Clarke, and High still thought the Japanese people might repudiate the militarists; the other editors said little or nothing about this hope.

Morrison might have been less optimistic if he had paid closer attention to more objective reports from Japan in the nation's secular press than to the "inside story" from the peace worker's viewpoint. As early as April 2 the Literary Digest had reported that editorials in the Japanese press and dispatches from American correspondents in Japan indicated that fascist

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1. Presbyterian Advance, Mar. 10, 1932, p. 5; Frederick Lynch, "Japan's Victory--and Self-Defeat," ibid., Apr. 21, 1932, p. 6.

2. Christian Herald, April 1932, pp. 26-27.

groups were increasing in power and influence. Amid growing distrust of the Diet and declining confidence in parliamentary government, fascists and militarists were moving closer together.[1] But how could a faithful advocate of peace like Morrison rely on the judgment of ordinary correspondents in preference to that of one who shared his own viewpoint--especially when the peace worker told him what he wanted to hear? The article from Japan had indeed built up Morrison's hopes temporarily and falsely, but news of fascist organization drove them down again. They were to decline even further before the end of spring. Not even the signing of a truce in Shanghai could restore Morrison's spirits.

After almost two months of sporadic talks Chinese and Japanese negotiators agreed on truce terms on April 27, 1932; but civilian violence in Shanghai delayed the signing of the agreement. As Japanese military, naval and diplomatic leaders in Shanghai watched a victory parade in honor of their emperor's birthday, a disgruntled Korean threw a bomb which exploded above the reviewing stand. All the Japanese officials were injured, including those who had negotiated the truce and were to sign it. On the same day a group of Chinese students broke into the home of the chief Chinese negotiator, charged him with betraying China in the truce talks, and beat him severely. Unable to meet for the scheduled signing ceremony, the negotiators might

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1. Literary Digest, Apr. 2, 1932, p. 16.

reasonably have postponed the final step. But they were convinced of the importance of the agreement and the necessity for prompt compliance with its provisions. They therefore signed it individually on May 5 as a representative of China's foreign office carried it to their respective hospital beds.[1]

The agreement did not resolve any of the basic difficulties between the two signatories in Shanghai. It was only a truce, not a full settlement. Its most important provisions called for an end of hostilities, restriction of Chinese troops to their current positions west of the city, and withdrawal of Japanese troops to their positions as of January 28.[2] The agreement virtually restored conditions as they were before fighting started. Reference to the question of the anti-Japanese boycott, in Japanese allegations the primary cause of the action, was conspicuously absent from the document.

The Japanese press, echoing government spokesmen, hailed the truce as evidence of Japan's magnanimity and hopefully prophesied the peace and prosperity of Shanghai if the Chinese would cooperate with Japan. In the United States the response

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1. New York Times, April 29, 1932, p. 1; April 30, p. 1; May 6, 1932, p. 3; Toynbee, Survey, 1932, pp. 511-12.

2. See discussion and text of the agreement in Toynbee, Survey, 1932, pp. 511-14, and Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 338-59. The text alone is in China Year Book, 1932, pp. 678-81.

was less enthusiastic despite the State Department's announcement that it considered the peace agreement "an excellent one." The Literary Digest, which usually summarized American press opinion on important issues, did not consider the truce significant enough to mention. The New York Herald Tribune neglected it in its editorial columns, while a New York Times editorial briefly concluded that "the many painful weeks [which had] been expended on the refinements of 'face-saving'" by the negotiators produced no gain for anyone.[1]

Morrison agreed that neither Japan, China, nor the League had really won in Shanghai; and he pointed out pessimistically that the agreement had not really advanced the cause of peace. China, he declared, had indeed obtained removal of Japanese troops from the Shanghai area; but the struggle had aggravated her grave problems--internal chaos, a weaker government in Nanking and a growing communist movement in central China. The boycott question, moreover, was still a live and dangerous issue. In addition to Japan's severe losses in men and material, she still faced difficult problems in Manchuria--continuing "banditry," the possibility of Russian intervention and, most important in Morrison's eyes, the financial troubles yet to come with application of the nonrecognition policy by the League and the United States. Behind all these threats to peace, naturally,

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1. New York Times, May 6, 1932, pp. 3, 18; Literary Digest, May 21, 1932, p. 13.

was Morrison's old bugaboo, Japanese militarism. The Far East, he concluded, promised only more disaster, more threats to world peace, as long as Japan maintained her military occupation of Manchuria.[1]

Taking a brighter view than the Christian Century, James Joy claimed that, although the truce was not a complete victory for the League, at least "the resolute stand of the small powers in the League Assembly had something to do with it." The truce was "unquestionably a step forward, in that an aggressor nation, for whatever reason, [had] halted short of the attainment of its object." The other Methodist editor enthusiastically credited the United States for the truce in Shanghai. E. H. Rawlings claimed that Stimson's letter to Borah was the most significant influence in achieving the agreement. Stimson's analysis of the Washington treaties and his strong statement of the nonrecognition policy "seemed to have the effect of clarifying the thought of the League, stiffening the resolution of the great powers, and bringing on perhaps more than anything else the cessation of actual warfare in China."[2]

The reactions of some other editors were more "religious" than the ones just described. Delavan Pierson, for example,

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1. Christian Century, May 18, 1932, pp. 632-33.

2. Christian Advocate, May 19, 1932, p. 522; World Outlook (Missionary Voice), June 1932, p. 267.

recognized the continuing dangers in the situation but emphasized encouraging factors: opposition of Japanese Christians and non-Christian liberals to militaristic policies, and daily prayer services held by the Chiang family in Nanking. In addition, Chinese Christians had shown new and hitherto unknown leadership abilities, missionaries had seized new opportunities to sustain Chinese morale and to share the needs and sufferings of the people, and both Chinese and missionaries had demonstrated heroic Christian spirit. To Pierson the dark picture had some bright spots.[1]

The comments of the Baptist and Roman Catholic editors under study were more pessimistic but also stressed religious concepts. For Curtis Laws "the worst thing about the war" was not the terrible destruction but the scars of hatred which it left between China and Japan. Such bitterness endangered the Christian faith of citizens of both nations and made the task of Christian missionaries even more difficult. Laws called for special prayers for Christians in the two lands and hoped that they would never again fight each other. On a happier note he reported that the Baptist-supported University of Shanghai was returning to normal operation.[2]

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1. The editorial was based on a letter from the Rev. Frank W. Price of Nanking; he had attended some of the prayer meetings led by Madame Chiang and was profoundly impressed by them. Missionary Review, June 1932, pp. 326-27.

2. Watchman-Examiner, June 30, 1932, p. 808; May 26, 1932, p. 652.

America merely reported the signing of the truce without comment, but an editorial on peace at about the time of the signing demonstrated the editor's attitude. Assessing both the world-wide sentiment for peace and the evidence of growing militarism around the world, Parsons concluded that only a return to the teachings of Christ could bring peace. Two months earlier Parsons had explained this view in more detail. He traced the world's troubles including the Far Eastern crisis to the Godlessness of governments. The revolt against Christian ideals began with the Protestant movement and resulted in the view that governments need not be bound by the laws of God. The popes had repeatedly and rightly called for obedience to the offical teachings of the church as the only guarantee of peace.[1] Such general analyses and recommendations might help to keep events in perspective, but they did not offer immediate answers to urgent difficulties.

Morrison also was more adept at pointing out problems than at specifying workable solutions. He could, however, make suggestions for the goals toward which the nations should move. Out of his near-despair at conditions in the Far East he called for the League or another group of nations to produce a plan which would grant China her rights in Manchuria, Japan the

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1. America, XLVII (May 14, 1932), 124, 127; XLVI (Mar. 12, 1932), 541.

resources she needed, Russia the security of her railroad interests, and the whole area the peace necessary for its prosperity. Without such a plan, he warned sadly, "the tangle of interests in Manchuria [might] become so inextricable as to defy all efforts at peaceful solution." He offered no concrete suggestions for achieving such desirable goals.[1]

One of the few editors who had a plan for forcing Japan to give up Manchuria, if not for achieving all the goals outlined by Morrison, was Kirby Page. His solution did not surprise the readers of the World Tomorrow, for he had already explained his views several times--moral condemnation, "a diplomatic boycott," and, as a last resort, an embargo against Japanese silk. He now defended his plan on theoretical and pragmatic grounds. This program, he believed, was more ethical than military sanctions, more effective than the extreme pacifist opposition to any form of coercion, and more realistic than "liberalism which tries to fashion political policies from ethical insights gained in individual intra-group relations." By these measures the League and the United States would be able

> to compel Japan to relinquish military and political control of Manchuria, with less suffering and more possibilities of a pacific settlement of the whole controversy than [could] be the case if no effective international restraint [were] offered, or if violent hostilities [were] resorted to.

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1. Christian Century, May 18, 1932, pp. 632-33.

In this imperfect world Page sought to avoid immoral and unethical acquiescence in evil by means which would offer a minimum of suffering and a maximum of redemption. He thought he had found an acceptable solution to the Manchurian problem, but his plan was never tested.[1]

As Morrison saw the outlook for peace in the Far East dimming, he held firmly to two basic views--Japanese militarism was the primary cause of trouble, and the nonrecognition policy was the most effective remedy. At the same time he hoped for a plan which would reconcile all the conflicting interests in Manchuria before it was too late. But mid-May was already too late for reconciliation in Manchuria. By then the question was one of power, and Japan had the power.

Japan rapidly withdrew her forces from Shanghai while her Foreign Office proclaimed her desire to restore international confidence in her good intentions.[2] Morrison was not convinced that the aggressors had changed their goals. On the contrary, he declared, troops were removed from Shanghai only to be sent to Manchuria, where they were more urgently needed.[3] He wondered

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1. World Tomorrow, June 1932, pp. 166-67; Kirby Page, "Is Coercion Ever Justifiable?" ibid., pp. 173-75.

2. New York Times, May 7, 1932, p. 4; May 12, p. 3; May 26, p. 8; May 31, 1932, p. 1; Toynbee, Survey, 1932, p. 513.

3. See Willoughby, Controversy, p. 362; New York Times, May 8, 1932, p. 3; May 11, p. 1; May 13, 1932, p. 6.

at the complacency of the Japanese public over the great loss of prestige their country had suffered by her aggression at Shanghai; "Of all the fiascos in the history of modern militarism, the Japanese adventure at Shanghai surely heads the list! Can the Japanese taxpayer be persuaded otherwise?"[1]

During the first eight months of the Sino-Japanese crisis Morrison tried to interpret the situation and to offer constructive suggestions consistent with his belief in treaties as the basis for peace. Week by week Morrison worked out his response to the major developments, often discussing the situation at great length in his editorials in the Christian Century. This ardent advocate of peace viewed the Sino-Japanese dispute primarily as a militarist challenge to the postwar system of peace and armament limitation treaties and the League's peace machinery. He therefore fully approved every diplomatic effort of the United States and the League, both individually and cooperatively, to invoke and support the League Covenant (except Article XVI), the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Pact of Paris.

Viewing Japan as the aggressor and the violator of international agreements, Morrison strongly condemned her as a moral, political, and economic outcast from international society. Her latest and most brutal aggression in Shanghai confirmed his judgment. Morrison's solution lay in the operation

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1. Christian Century, May 25, 1932, p. 659.

of the world's public opinion against Japan. World opinion, guided by the clear expression of international law in the Treaty for Renunciation of War and mobilized by such moral judgments as Stimson's nonrecognition doctrine, would isolate Japan. She would therefore be unable to obtain the financial resources needed to fight in China and to develop Manchuria. She would eventually have to repudiate her aggression and make amends to China. Consequently, use of military force was not only impossible and impractical but also unnecessary. Moral condemnation and financial isolation would secure a reversal of Japanese policy, return of Manchuria to China, and peace on earth. This attitude--legalistic, moralistic, optimistic about the power of public opinion--led to hearty approval of both the aims and the methods of American diplomacy. It was an attitude shared to a large extent by the Quaker in the White House and the Presbyterian at the head of the State Department and to a somewhat lesser degree by the American public.

Although the other journals under study roundly condemned Japan's violence in Shanghai, only two of them offered systematic analyses of the causes and suggested solutions consistent with these analyses. America and the World Tomorrow, however, differed sharply in their approaches and programs. Parsons in the Jesuit journal expressed no confidence in immediate solutions, for he saw the cause of this as well as other world problems in world-wide rejection of Christianity. Consequently the only answer was a return to Christian ideals by

individuals and governments; for the content of these ideals he looked to the authoritative pronouncements of the popes. Curiously, perhaps, in view of the somewhat abstract analyses of the editor, America was the one journal of the group which every week gave its readers a thorough summary of events in China, Japan, Geneva, and Washington. Since the World Tomorrow was a monthly, it had no opportunity for detailed news reports like America's or for detailed editorial comments on specific developments like the Christian Century's. Page repeatedly pointed to the roots of trouble in the capitalist economic system with its inherent imperialism, but he also urged immediate measures to deal with Japanese aggression without waiting for wholesale revision of the economic and social order. These procedures--moral condemnation, nonrecognition, diplomatic boycott, selective embargo--he defended on grounds of ethics and practicality. Opposing both violence (military sanctions) and extreme pacifism, he thought his suggestions would bring peace and justice with a minimum of suffering and a maximum opportunity for Japan's moral redemption.

The other journals offered no such consistency of views; they commented sporadically on various aspects of the situation usually deploring violence and destruction or expressing varying degrees of support for or confidence in efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. Solutions offered ranged from the Presbyterian Advance's call for an international police force or at least an economic boycott of Japan to the Watchman-Examiner's

appeal for Christians to pray for peace. Close to the Baptist editor's position, the Churchman urged Christians to influence public opinion, and the Missionary Review trusted in the work of missionaries and in prayers for peace. Stanley High in the Christian Herald and James Joy in the Christian Advocate also supported the Kellogg pact, the nonrecognition policy, and the efforts of the League to arrange peace terms but did so much less enthusiastically and voluminously than Morrison. The safety of western missionaries in Shanghai was a primary concern of four journals--the Churchman, the Missionary Voice, the Presbyterian Advance, and the Watchman-Examiner.

Despite the achievement of a settlement of sorts at Shanghai, Morrison and the other editors were not optimistic in regard to the Far Eastern situation in the spring of 1932. Under the impact of the shocking violence at Shanghai and Japan's continuing intransigence Morrison had moved from enthusiastic approval of Stimson's letter to Borah and the League's resolution of March 11 to a more pessimistic appraisal. The problems were looming larger, and no solutions seemed to be coming forth from responsible national and international authorities. True, the League's commission was conducting its investigation; perhaps its report would lead to a peaceful and righteous settlement. In the meantime one could only wait and hope that the summer would not bring more warfare and greater complications.

Chapter V

THE SUMMER OF DISCONTENT: MILITARISM, SPEECHES AND POLITICS

During the summer of 1932 Sino-Japanese tension, while remaining strong, did not produce violence like that of the preceding months. After their embarrassing experience at Shanghai the Japanese seemed content to rest militarily while they consolidated their political and economic position in Manchuria. Japan's leaders found themselves busy with enough domestic problems to draw some of their attention from the mainland. In Geneva the League laid aside the Far Eastern question after the resolution of March 11 and awaited the report of its investigating committee. Quietly the Lytton Commission made its inquiries in China, Japan, and Manchuria and prepared its report. In the United States the depression and the coming election held the attention of most Americans. The Secretary of State was content to stand on the Far Eastern policy he had stated in his letter to Senator Borah.

Charles Clayton Morrison had for months been wondering why the Japanese people did not react to the "fiasco" in

Shanghai and the expenses of the Manchurian conquest by repudiating their government's actions. In truth certain portions of the Japanese people were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their government's policy. Tension was building; release of some kind had to come. In mid-May 1932 a reaction to the adventures in Manchuria and Shanghai rocked Japan. But it was far different from the repudiation Morrison desired and expected.

I

Late in the afternoon of May 15 a group of young military and naval officers and officer-candidates broke into the home of Premier Inukai Ki and murdered him. The assassination of the Premier threw the nation into confusion, and the cabinet resigned. Party government in Japan ended.

Assassination as a form of political protest was not new to Japan. Inukai's murder was only the most recent of several in the first half of 1932, all committed by similar groups for similar purposes. February had seen the assassination of Finance Minister Inouye Junnosuke, March that of Baron Dan Takuma, director of the Mitsui financial and industrial enterprises. The assassins' aim was to topple the parliamentary government in favor of a military dictatorship that would relieve rural destitution in Japan--and would pursue an aggressive foreign policy, especially against China. The withdrawal from Shanghai perhaps

had been the catalytic factor in the decision to kill Inukai.[1]

The editor of the Christian Century was convinced that Japan had been "a menace to world peace" ever since her military clique took affairs into their own hands the preceding September and launched the offensive in Manchuria; and he feared there would be absolutely no restraint on her actions if "the young fascists," as he called them, gained control of the government. Extremist control held forbidding implications for the Manchurian situation; in their ruthless exploitation of Manchuria the young fascists would proceed without foreign financial assistance and in militant defiance of the rest of the world. Although Morrison did not state that this policy would destroy the effectiveness of nonrecognition, that implication was clear. Furthermore, he suggested, the militarists would probably push farther north in Manchuria and precipitate an armed clash with Russia. Fearfully Morrison viewed this "moment of breathless uncertainty" in "the ominous East"; his one suggestion seemed pitifully faint against the dark background he had painted. He urged that the United States register its opposition to further Japanese advances in Manchuria by recognizing the Soviet Union.[2] Morrison did not try

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1. New York Times, May 16, 1932, p. 1; Literary Digest, May 28, 1932, pp. 11-12. For discussions of the chain of assassinations and their results, see also Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 380-84; Toynbee, Survey, 1932, pp. 422-28; Yoshihashi, Conspiracy, pp. 73-74.

2. Christian Century, May 25, 1932, pp. 662-63.

to build up a convincing case for his demand. He simply assumed that the Japanese militarists might pay more attention to such an indirect expression of American opposition than more moderate governments had recently paid to more vigorous American statements. Probably he himself had little faith in the efficacy of this course of action. The growing power of militarism in Japan filled him with apprehension.

Inukai's assassination provoked similar, anguished cries from other Christian journals. The editors confined their remarks to attempts to explain the military clique's struggle to control Japan. None related the incident even indirectly to the nonrecognition policy or suggested means to thwart the militarists as Morrison did. Most of these comments were brief notes, hardly more than news reports with small amounts of interpretive material; only the Christian Century and the World Tomorrow discussed the conflict at length.[1] To the usual description of the struggle between the militarist and business cliques for control of Japan, Kirby Page added a characteristically socialist analysis of the effect of modern capitalism on the older feudalistic traditions. The bureaucratic-military caste was nationalistic and

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1. America, May 28, 1932, pp. 172-73; Christian Advocate, May 26, 1932, p. 546; Churchman, May 21, 1932, p. 8; Presbyterian Advance, May 26, 1932, p. 5. Although he did not comment on Inukai's assassination, Stanley High, in a news item apparently written just before the event, charged the militarist "fascist" elements with assassinating government leaders in a sinister, reactionary plot to overthrow democracy in Japan. Christian Herald, June 1932, p. 27.

honest; it received substantial popular support in its attack on the corrupt government, which was manipulated by politicians for the benefit of bankers and industrialists. The militarists, he believed, therefore, seemed to the people true patriots, bent on purging the government of capitalistic graft and restoring feudalism, "which, in terms consonant with industrial civilization, [meant] fascism with a slight touch of socialism." More important for world peace, "the combination of imperialistic ambition, created by the necessities of capitalist industry, and the romantic nationalism of the old feudalism . . . [made] Japan so frantic in the pursuit of its objectives in China." Page indicated that he had not quite abandoned hope for peace when he stated that the military was in the ascendancy "for the time being."[1]

In view of Morrison's passionate opposition to militarism, it seems strange, at least on the surface, that the appointment of a military man as Japan's new premier stirred in him a resurgence of hope. Admiral Viscount Saito Minoru, the non-party, compromise premier appointed to succeed the assassinated Inukai, was not, however, a typical military man. Because of his liberal record as Governor-General of Korea he inspired hope that he might be able to save the parliamentary system from fascist

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1. World Tomorrow, June 1932, pp. 167-68. The other journals examined did not mention Inukai's assassination.

threats.[1]

Morrison hailed Saito's appointment as "an admirable attempt to restore Japan to the line of liberal politics" but doubted the possibility of such a restoration while the Manchurian issue remained unsettled. Manchurian complications, accentuated by extremists of the right and left, would probably make a liberal policy impossible.[2] Even this faint gesture toward saner policies gave an upward turn to Morrison's hopes; in fact, whenever an optimistic interpretation of Japanese events was possible, Morrison was the man to make it.

Only two of the other editors reacted to the appointment of Admiral Saito. Like Morrison, James Joy found Saito's premiership mildly encouraging, for it was "a last attempt . . . to preserve constitutionalism." Emphasizing the compromise nature of Saito's government, Joy hoped that "if any ministerial grouping [could] keep Japan from a dictatorship, the Saito cabinet should be able to do it." While Wilfrid Parsons did not express his own views, he reported in the news section of America the more pessimistic evaluations of "diplomatic observers," who thought the political situation "potentially serious and only

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1. New York Times, May 23, 1932, p. 1, May 26, p. 9; Literary Digest, June 4, 1932, p. 12; Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 383-84. See also a news column from Tokyo by the Christian Century's regular correspondent, dated June 15, 1932, in edition of July 13, p. 893.

2. Christian Century, June 1, 1932, p. 691.

temporarily solved." This compromise seemed the last gasp of the civilian elements, which would soon have to surrender power to the militarists.[1] Morrison was more hopeful than the "diplomatic observers."

In search of hope Morrison could find encouragement in unlikely places, even in human misery. The plight of farmers and laborers in Japan, never easy, had been aggravated by the depression and the burgeoning Japanese population.[2] One report emphasized that six million farm families comprising almost half the population were in distress, receiving low prices for their crops, burdened by excessive taxation, hindered by transportation difficulties. During the summer many Japanese newspapers called for the government to take relief measures.[3] While expressing sympathy for Japanese farmers and workers in their financial difficulties, Morrison found satisfaction in the problems their government faced. Amid mounting agitation for a moratorium on payment of debts, rents, and taxes, bills for the Manchurian and Shanghai campaigns were piling up in the lap of the harried parliament. Morrison believed these problems formed "one of the greatest--perhaps the greatest--of all safeguards

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1. Christian Advocate, June 9, 1932, p. 594; America, June 4, 1932, pp. 197-98.

2. New York Times, June 15, 1932, p. 29; Toynbee, Survey, 1932, pp. 423-24; William Henry Chamberlin, Japan over Asia (Boston, 1937), pp. 338-58.

3. Literary Digest, Aug. 6, 1932, p. 10.

of peace in the orient." To Morrison Japan appeared on the verge of bankruptcy. This threat, he hoped, would enable "responsible elements" to restrain the extremist young officers from creating more international trouble.[1]

In the midst of Japan's domestic difficulties she suddenly faced a potential increase in China's international resources. The Nanking government in early June announced its intention to seek resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.[2] Morrison found this declaration both puzzling and encouraging. Even though he could not discern all its implications, he felt that it might help the cause of peace. Whatever else the declaration meant for the future, it seemed to indicate at least "an important shift in the balance of power in the far east." He hoped the possibility of closer relations between Nanking and Moscow would make Tokyo hesitate to push into Siberia or Mongolia. The prospect of Russo-Japanese tension as Russia and China moved closer together aroused in Stanley High of the Christian Herald not hope that peace was closer but fear that war involving Russia, Japan, China, and Korea was "more likely." Discouraged by the growing tension, High would not have agreed with James Clarke's brief comment in the Presbyterian Advance. Clarke declared that military conflict between the two great powers of the Orient hardly seemed possible, but he cited no

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1. Christian Century, June 22, 1932, p. 787.

2. New York Times, June 7, 1932, p. 8; June 9, p. 7; June 11, 1932, p. 13.

evidence in support of this conclusion.[1] The prospect of renewed Sino-Soviet friendship did not excite comment from the other editors. Nor did that possibility startle Japan's leaders as much as it encouraged Morrison; their mood was as expansionist as ever. Even former liberals were taking their cues from the chauvinist line.

At a welcoming dinner given by the America-Japan Society for the new American ambassador, Joseph C. Grew, Viscount Ishii Kikujiro, former foreign minister and then president of the League of Nations Association of Japan, audaciously warned the United States not to try to "dominate" Asia. Ishii cautioned the United States against attempting to prevent overpopulated Japan's "pacific and natural expansion." Ishii politely concluded with an assertion of the identity of Japanese and American policies--the open door, the territorial integrity of China and the maintenance of peace in the Far East.[2] He did not, of course, explore the different meanings attached to these words by the two

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1. Christian Century, June 22, 1932, pp. 787-88; Christian Herald, July 1932, pp. 28-29; Presbyterian Advance, June 23, 1932, p. 5. The other editors did not mention this development.

2. New York Times, June 22, 1932, p. 1; June 26, 1932, VIII, 2. Tokyo newspapers naturally approved Ishii's statement, but the Shanghai press declared that Ishii had rendered no service to peace by his speech. Literary Digest, July 9, 1932, pp. 9-10. In reply Ambassador Grew ignored Ishii's threats and stuck to his prepared speech. He called for international friendship and cooperation for peace and expressed his gratitude for the kindness with which he had been received. Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record (New York, 1944), pp. 22-27. See also Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston, 1966), pp. 175-76.

nations.

Morrison did not appreciate the diplomatic niceties of Ishii's conclusion. The hard pill on which Morrison choked was Ishii's direct challenge to the nonrecognition doctrine, "that new formulation of international law, based on the peace pact, which [had] now been accepted by the League of Nations." To Morrison Japan's expansion seemed neither "pacific" nor "natural." In his view nonrecognition was the key to preservation of peace against just such aggressive policies as Japan was pursuing. Angrily Morrison rejected Ishii's warning and asserted the primacy of the nonrecognition principle.[1]

Morrison was as much discouraged as enraged by Ishii's speech; Ishii was a widely known and respected liberal who seemed to have turned away from his former principles. If even liberals were beginning to talk like militarists, Morrison moaned, "the prospect of trouble in the far east [was] a long way from ended." The Christian Century's editor continued to find the Far Eastern tangle a disconcerting challenge to his hopes for peace in the world. The Christian Advocate's report of Ishii's speech was slightly more hopeful. The Methodist journal found the address friendly in tone despite its warning against outside interference with Japan's policies in Asia.[2]

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1. Christian Century, July 20, 1932, p. 900.
2. Ibid.; Christian Advocate, July 14, 1932, p. 738.

Of the editors under discussion only Morrison commented at length on Ishii's speech; no other but Joy even mentioned it.

II

A few weeks later Secretary Stimson came to the defense of the peace pact. On August 8 in the plush dining rooms of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York the Council on Foreign Relations, a private organization devoted to study and educational activities, was celebrating the third anniversary of the ratification of the Pact of Paris. It was appropriate that Stimson should have been the principal speaker on that occasion, for no other man had contributed as much to the "development" of the pact during the past year as the American Secretary of State.[1]

Stimson explained that the pact was founded on a revolution in public opinion since the Great War. The pact itself was evidence that the people of the world now regarded war in a new light. No longer was war to be sanctioned by international law with belligerents having rights which took precedence over those of neutrals; war had now become "illegal throughout practically the entire world."[2]

Dealing with the problem of enforcement of the treaty,

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1. New York Times, Aug. 9, 1932, p. 1, text on p. 2, and in Foreign Affairs, XI (Oct. 1932), Special Supplement, i-ix.

2. Ibid., p. iv.

the Secretary demonstrated that naive faith in the power of public opinion characteristic of the pact's most ardent supporters:

> Again, the Briand-Kellogg Pact provides for no sanctions of force. It does not require any signatory to intervene with measures of force in case the Pact is violated. Instead it rests upon the sanction of public opinion, which can be made one of the most potent sanctions in the world. Any other course, through the possibility of entangling the signatories in international politics, would have confused the broad and simple aim of the treaty and prevented the development of that public opinion upon which it most surely relies. Its efficacy depends upon the will of the people of the world to make it effective. If they desire to make it effective, it will be irresistible. Those critics who scoff at it have not accurately appraised the evolution in world opinion since the World War.

There was one way by which to mobilize this will of the people to peace as an effective sanction--international consultation. "Any effective invocation of the power of world opinion involves discussion and consultation," Stimson declared.[1] He did not, however, explain how the signatories of the pact could consult together without "entangling" themselves in the dreaded labyrinth of international politics.

Stimson cited as an example of such "consultation" the international reaction to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese controversy less than a year earlier. Perhaps Stimson had forgotten that the American diplomat who had sat with the League Council at that time never participated in a real discussion of the

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1. Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1932, Special Supplement, pp. v-vi, viii.

Kellogg pact. The Secretary implied that effective action had been planned and undertaken. Noting that there had been considerable discussion of the need for a treaty calling specifically for this kind of consultation, Stimson plainly disagreed. He contended: "the Pact necessarily carries with it the implication of consultation," and "consultation between the signatories of the Pact when faced with the threat of its violation becomes inevitable." Stimson thought highly of his nonrecognition note of January 7 and the League's approval of his doctrine on March 11, for he cited these developments as proof that effective consultation and united action were possible without specific provisions in the treaty. He asserted:

> When the entire group of civilized nations took their stand beside the position of the American Government, the situation was revealed in its true sense. Moral disapproval, when it becomes the disapproval of the whole world, takes on a significance hitherto unknown in international law. For never before has international opinion been so organized and mobilized.[1]

The Secretary's speech clearly stated the viewpoint of a considerable body of Americans. It received general approval in the American press as a landmark in American progress from isolation. Most opposition came from traditionally isolationist papers like the Hearst chain. Paris and Geneva papers also reacted favorably, while Japanese editors raged at the implication that Japan was an aggressor in Manchuria.[2]

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1. Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1932, Special Supplement, pp. v-vi, viii-ix.

2. Literary Digest, Aug. 20, 1932, p. 6; Tupper and McReynolds Public Opinion, pp. 345-47. For Japan's reaction see also New York Times, Aug. 10, 1932, p. 1.

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The Christian Advocate and America briefly reported Stimson's speech. The Methodist publication called the address an important and forthright declaration of American foreign policy. Joy agreed with Stimson's belief that the Kellogg pact was "not merely a declaration of pious hope, but a living, realistic instrument of international policy." He thought the Secretary's emphasis on mobilization of public opinion indicated the administration's hostility to more drastic sanctions. America's report was nothing more than a summary of the address. James Clarke in the Presbyterian Advance interpreted Stimson's emphasis on the binding force of the peace pact as an attempt to strengthen the forthcoming report of the League's commission of inquiry. The whole situation seemed to him to point up the immense difference between simply signing a pact to renounce war and securing observance of it in the face of opposition by one of the signatories. "To maintain a pact against war," he concluded, "we shall have to demonstrate the willingness and the capacity for maintaining the rights of nations by peaceful measures." He presented no blueprint of specific means to achieve this desirable goal.[1] Joy, Parsons, and Clarke were the only editors of this group who noticed Stimson's speech--except, of course, for Morrison, who discussed it at greater

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1. Christian Advocate, Aug. 18, 1932, p. 858; America, Aug. 20, 1932, p. 462; Presbyterian Advance, Aug. 18, 1932, p. 4.

length than all three of them together.

The editor of the Christian Century approvingly echoed Stimson's reaffirmation of "his faith in the efficacy of public opinion as a sufficient sanction" for enforcement of the peace pact. He was in complete agreement with Stimson's analysis of the evolution in world opinion since the World War. Stimson had admirably stated the case for the pact and for nonrecognition. Insisting with Stimson that the pact itself implied the obligation of consultation if war seemed likely, Morrison contended,

> The moral sentiment of mankind is the enforcing sanction, and the mobilization of this force necessarily requires consultation and discussion. The pact will not enforce itself, but the consolidated power of world opinion will enforce it, and that without striking a blow, if the nations will consult freely when peace is threatened.[1]

Neither Stimson nor Morrison described the actual operation of the "enforcing sanction" he envisaged. Stimson simply pointed to the international response to the Manchurian crisis as an example of consultation according to the pact's implications. Morrison agreed completely. The effect of that action as a deterrent to Japan's expansion was, however, not yet apparent. The Lytton Commission was still investigating while the League awaited its report. The League and the United States had taken steps toward a united application of the pact, but the

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1. Christian Century, Aug. 17, 1932, p. 995.

success of that effort was at this moment problematical at best.[1]

In the meantime Morrison was content to speak in generalities. In theory nations consulting with each other could formulate a united moral response to a threat to peace. For each particular challenge they could, theoretically, develop an appropriate means of enforcing world opinion against an aggressor. Confident of the effectiveness of "the consolidated power of world opinion," Morrison assumed that, in practice, a nation determined to expand would abandon its course just because other nations frowned upon its actions. Although opposed by world opinion, Japan was by no means certain to acquiesce in the moral judgment of other nations.

Japan's press, in fact, was furious at the "unfriendly attitude" implied in Stimson's reference to Manchuria as an incident calling for consultation under the peace pact. Japanese editors violently resented having the label "aggressor" fastened upon their country even by implication. Although the foreign office made no formal protest, unofficial reports declared that the government was at first seriously offended; but on receipt of Stimson's full text a few days later a government spokesman mildly expressed simple disagreement with his views.

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1. See also a reply to Stimson by John Basset Moore, renowned international jurist and former adviser to the State Department. Moore attacked Stimson's interpretations point by point. "An Appeal to Reason," Foreign Affairs, July 1933, pp. 547-83.

Again, only America and the Christian Advocate deemed this news worth reporting.[1] The editor of the Christian Century, however, found Japan's reaction highly significant.

To Morrison Japanese indignation simply proved the accuracy of the label of aggressor. He brushed aside Japan's objections and brusquely defended Stimson's statement. Emphasizing the moral and juridical aspects of the situation, he asserted,

> The principle of nonrecognition is sound and there is no better place than Manchuria for the application of it, even though it hurts somebody's feelings. Official designation of either party as the aggressor may well wait for the report of the commission of the league which is still investigating. But when it comes it should be so clear cut and explicit that there will be no mistaking its meaning or the weight of the moral judgment which it carries with it.[2]

While in principle deferring judgment until the League's impartial commission reported, Morrison left no doubt that he expected a ringing condemnation of the nation found guilty of violating its international pledges. He was sure that, where soldiers were maiming and killing each other, someone was using war as an instrument of national policy. A regular reader of the Christian Century could easily conclude that the editor had already decided which nation deserved the "moral judgment" of the

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1. New York Times, Aug. 10, 1932, p. 1; Literary Digest, Aug. 20, 1932, p. 6; America, Aug. 20, 1932, pp. 461-62; Christian Advocate, Aug. 18, 1932, p. 858.

2. Christian Century, Aug. 24, 1932, p. 1020.

commission--Japan. Honest investigation of the facts must, Morrison felt, lead to a "clear cut and explicit" decision condemning one party and exonerating the other. A report which could not carry an unmistakable moral judgment would be useless for establishing the correct moral and ethical basis for political action. If it were not clear which side of an issue was "right" and which side "wrong," a moral decision would be impossible; and for Morrison only a morally based decision, even on political, economic, or social matters, was acceptable. There was, at least in his own mind, no uncertainty about Japan's guilt.

III

While Morrison and others throughout the world awaited the judgment of the League's investigating commission, Japan acted. For months the Japanese government had been considering formal recognition of the independence of "Manchukuo," the new Manchurian state erected under Japanese auspices. Now, shortly before publication of the Lytton Commission's report recommending restoration of Chinese sovereignty over the area, Japan signed with the new regime a "protocol" of recognition and mutual assistance.[1] Count Uchida Yasuya, the new Foreign Minister in the

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1. For discussions of the erection and recognition of the state of Manchukuo see Toynbee, Survey, 1932, pp. 452-70; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 363-78; Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 385-92; Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 151, 164-67, 174-76; New York Times, Sept. 15, 1932, p. 10, Sept. 16, p. 8; Lytton Report, pp. 88-111, 121-26; H.G.W. Woodhead, ed., The China Year Book, 1933 (Shanghai, 1933), pp. 599-602.

Saito cabinet,[1] had already intimated the government's intention to recognize Manchukuo. In a speech to the Diet on August 25 he had declared recognition "the sole effective means of solving the Manchurian problem." Referring indirectly to the Lytton commission's report, he had also categorically rejected any "plan" to return the area to Chinese sovereignty. The agreement of September 15, 1932, provided for Japan's recognition of the new state and Manchukuo's respect for Japanese rights there. Pledging mutual assistance against threats from other nations, the two agreed that Japanese military forces would remain in Manchukuo.

Japan's press naturally hailed the action, while Chinese editors, just as naturally, castigated it and predicted no peace for Manchuria until Japanese troops withdrew. The London press, remaining noncommittal, merely commented on the dangers of the situation. Except for the business press, American newspapers almost unanimously disapproved Japan's policy as a violation of the Nine-Power treaty and continued to regard Manchukuo as Japan's puppet.[2]

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1. As president of the South Manchurian Railway Company in 1931 Uchida had enthusiastically cooperated with the Kwantung Army in its seizure of Manchuria after the Mukden incident. He was, therefore, highly acceptable to the militarists as Foreign Minister. Yoshihashi, Conspiracy, pp. 183-85.

2. Literary Digest, Sept. 10, 1932, p. 13, Oct. 1, p. 12; Tupper and McReynolds, Public Opinion, pp. 347-50.

Joining the outcry against Japan, Morrison vigorously condemned her for flaunting her military conquest in the face of Chinese opinion. More seriously, she had defied specific international warnings and had "torn up the Nine-Power Treaty, ignored the Hoover doctrine, and deliberately insulted the league by recognizing Manchuria before the Lytton report [could] be received and acted on." By this contempt for international obligations and proprieties, Morrison believed, Japan had virtually completed her moral isolation from the rest of the civilized world.[1] While it was clear to Morrison that Japan had defied the machinery of world peace, he found the long range consequences of her action more difficult to discern.

Morrison expected Japan's recognition of Manchukuo to have little effect on her two closest neighbors. China would probably continue her boycott and her diplomatic protests, while Russia seemed reasonably satisfied with the current regime in Manchuria. Between the United States and Japan, however, he foresaw increasing tension as the two nations faced a "diplomatic stalemate." By refusing to recognize Manchukuo's independence, the United States would prevent American financing of the area's development. While he saw the United States as the leader of the world's opposition to Japanese expansion, Morrison doubted the willingness of the other powers to cooperate

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1. Christian Century, Sept. 28, 1932, p. 1155.

in maintaining the nonrecognition principle. Citing unconfirmed reports of negotiations for a French loan to Japan for Manchurian development, he warned prophetically,

> If France and England will loyally support the United States in standing by the Hoover doctrine, Japan may soon have reason to revise her Manchurian policy. If they will not, she may be able to go ahead with her imperialistic course without interruption. But if that should happen the ultimate effect on the peace of Asia, and of the world, is terrible to contemplate.[1]

For Morrison unity in support of nonrecognition was essential if Japan were to be checked; but he was beginning to sense the possibility of disintegration of the nonrecognition policy on the anvil of Japanese intransigence.

Putting less faith in the nonrecognition policy, Kirby Page thought he saw economic ruin quickly overtaking Japan and overturning the militarists. Japan might avoid this almost inevitable collapse only if her people would become so convinced that the military had disgraced the nation that they would "take the military in hand." By use of military force Japan had struck at the very foundations of international cooperation; persistent demands by the international community that she live up to her obligations might have the desired effect on the Japanese people and the hoped-for consequences for the military leaders. Page did not discuss the nonrecognition policy as such in this long editorial, but he implied that it was one of the instruments for

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1. Christian Century, Sept. 28, 1932, pp. 1155-56.

applying pressure to Japan.[1] Page's editorial was written before the official announcement that Japan had recognized Manchukuo. Neither he nor the other editors besides Morrison commented editorially on this event. Both Parsons and Joy reported Uchida's speech in their news columns, and Parsons' reports covered the protocol and various reactions to it.[2]

An entirely different interpretation appeared at about the same time in a rare reference to the Sino-Japanese dispute in the World Outlook (Missionary Voice). A missionary with almost forty years' experience in Japan tried to counteract the prevailing anti-Japanese attitude. He conceded that the military clique was "primarily responsible for the present misunderstanding" but tried to explain the leaders' motives in terms of a revolt against corrupt politics and a successful effort to prevent a communist upheaval. Convinced that Japan would fight even the United States in order to hold Manchuria, he hoped that "bellicose Stimson (an army man)" would follow a more cautious policy in the future. On practical policies, however, the missionary was vague. He did not believe that either hostile criticism or hatred would avail to make Japan peaceful; only love and

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1. World Tomorrow, Sept. 14, 1932, p. 247; With this issue the journal began publication on a weekly, rather than a monthly, basis.

2. America, Sept. 3, 1932, p. 509; Sept. 17, p. 557; Sept. 24, pp. 581-82; Oct. 1, 1932, p. 604; Christian Advocate, Sept. 1, 1932, p. 906.

the gospel of Christ were sufficient for an ultimate solution. Sympathizing with his Japanese friends, the missionary found even so mild a measure as nonrecognition too harsh; but for more detached observers like Morrison and Stimson that doctrine was still the key to restoration of peace and justice.[1]

During the summer and autumn of 1932 steadfast adherence to the nonrecognition principle by even the American government was not absolutely certain, for preparations were underway for a national election and probably a change of administration. To American politics and editorial interpretations of their relation to the Sino-Japanese dispute, the story must now turn.

IV

For the first time since 1912 Republicans and Democrats were holding their conventions in the same city--Chicago. Depression conditions called for economy even in political displays, and the two parties were sharing the cost of decorations in the new Chicago Stadium. Built in 1929 and used for everything from flower shows to circuses and rodeos, the new stadium could seat thirty thousand delegates and spectators for such a performance as a political convention. Unprecedented radio facilities brought the roars of the galleries and words of the speakers

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1. J. T. Meyers, "A Missionary Speaks His Mind for Japan," World Outlook (Missionary Voice), Oct. 1932, pp. 468-70, 498-99.

into thousands of homes throughout the land; no previous convention had played to such a large audience.[1]

At the Republican convention in mid-June an observer who let himself be guided solely by the platform debates would have concluded that there was only one issue facing the nation and the party--not the threats to peace nor even the depression, but prohibition. In a long session marked by loud outbursts from fifteen thousand devoted wets in the galleries, the delegates accepted the moderate repeal plank written by the administration. They then adopted the whole platform by voice vote without debating any other planks.[2]

The Republican platform included, however, a strong endorsement of the administration's handling of the Sino-Japanese dispute. It commended the government for remaining neutral and for "taking always a firm position to avoid entanglement in the dispute" while maintaining the nation's traditional rights and interests. The plank approved the administration's efforts to promote peace and order in "harmony with the governments represented in the League of Nations."[3]

Praising their own wisdom, the Republicans claimed significant achievements for the President and the Secretary of State in the Far Eastern controversy. The platform claimed that

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1. Literary Digest, CXIII (June 11, 1932), 30-32.
2. New York Times, June 16, 1932, p. 1.
3. Ibid., p. 15.

Hoover had led the world in applying the Kellogg pact and had brought forth the nonrecognition principle to uphold the pact. The platform continued:

> This principle, associated as it is with the name of President Hoover, was later adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva as a rule for the conduct of all those governments. The principle remains today as an important contribution to international law and a significant moral and material barrier to prevent a nation obtaining the fruits of aggressive warfare. It thus opens a new pathway to peace and order.

The plank closed with approval of Congressional action to authorize the government to call or participate in an international conference in case of a threat to the peace pact.[1]

Like the Republicans, the Democrats, who met at the Stadium at the end of June, debated only the prohibition repeal plank in their platform. Drawing wild acclaim from the galleries, the delegates overwhelmingly approved a call for outright repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and immediate revision of the Volstead Act to allow the sale of beer and wine. They then accepted the rest of the brief platform as presented by the Resolutions Committee.[2]

Unlike the Republican statement, the Democratic foreign policy plank was short and general. It affirmed the party's support of a "firm" policy including "peace with all the world," arbitration as the means of settlement of international disputes,

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1. New York Times, June 16, 1932, p. 15.
2. Ibid., June 30, 1932, pp. 1, 15.

non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, adherence to the World Court with reservations, and maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine. The plank did not mention the Far Eastern controversy; but it did declare that American policy should include

> the sanctity of treaties, and the maintenance of good faith and good will in financial obligations; the Pact of Paris, abolishing war as an instrument of national policy, to be made effective by provisions for consultation and conference in case of threatened violation of treaties; and international agreement for reduction of armaments.[1]

Alert to any developments which might be interpreted favorably for peace, Morrison approved the "peace planks" in both parties' platforms. He commended both parties for basing their foreign policy on the Pact of Paris and advocating consultation under the pact in event of a threat to world peace. The Republicans, however, received special praise for going farther than the Democrats by their specific approval of both American cooperation with the League and the nonrecognition doctrine. The Republican declaration that the League's approval of nonrecognition made that precept "a rule of conduct of all those governments" seemed to Morrison a proclamation that the nonrecognition principle was now "the law of the world."[2]

Perhaps Morrison saw only what he wished to see; he

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1. New York Times, June 30, 1932, p. 15.
2. Christian Century, July 13, 1932, pp. 877-78.

certainly gave to the party platforms the most favorable interpretation possible. Neither platform indicated that the parties based their foreign policy entirely on the peace pact as he claimed. They mentioned the pact simply as one element of American policy. The Republican statement, moreover, did not really declare nonrecognition "the law of the world." Morrison probably attached more importance to the platform statements on foreign policy than they deserved in view of the absence of debate on these planks in either convention. Overshadowed by the depression and prohibition, foreign policy was not an important issue in the campaign.[1]

Alone among the editors surveyed Morrison emphasized foreign policy in discussing the election. The others either focused attention on economic matters or prohibition or disregarded the whole business. Wilfrid Parsons, for example, did not mention the foreign policy plank in his brief news reports of the conventions or in his one editorial which approved the prohibition repeal plank but criticized the economic statements in the Democratic platform. Similarly, Stanley High ignored foreign policy when he characterized the Republican convention and platform as "cautious" except for the prohibition repeal plank.[2]

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1. Herbert C. Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 3 vols. (New York, 1951-52), III, 236.

2. America, June 25, 1932, p. 267; July 9, 1932, pp. 315, 320-21; Christian Herald, Aug. 1932, p. 30.

On the other hand, Kirby Page analyzed the Republican convention at greater length and found only one commendable aspect of it: "The only clear pronouncement of the platform that is of definite value is its advocacy of an international conference in case of a violation of the Kellogg Pact." In this respect at least, he was on the same track as Morrison. Page had nothing but cynical scorn for the Republicans' other actions. The rest of the platform was politically bankrupt and fraudulent, a model of "buncombe, evasion, duplicity and insincerity." As for the candidate, the party had to renominate him although everyone knew he had lost the country's confidence; worse still, his supporters tried to portray him as a combination of Abraham Lincoln and St. Francis of Assisi.[1] Clearly, the Republicans would receive no assistance from Page despite his approval of their statement on consultation under the peace pact. The Democrats fared even worse in the World Tomorrow; Page did not even deign to discuss their convention.

Both candidates came under Morrison's criticism on the question of peace, which was almost an obsession with him. He was particularly sensitive to the candidates' positions on the Kellogg pact and the nonrecognition doctrine. Not even the President escaped his criticism. Accepting renomination Hoover spoke of this country's determination not to recognize "title

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1. World Tomorrow, July 1932, p. 196.

to possession of territory" gained contrary to the Kellogg pact.[1]

Indignantly Morrison accused Hoover of emasculating the nonrecognition doctrine by unnecessarily narrowing its original, broader application to "any situation, treaty or agreement" violating international obligations. He called for immediate clarification of the President's statement so that foreign nations and the American people might know exactly where the nation stood on this vital issue. Speculating on the reasons for Hoover's "weakening" of the doctrine, Morrison conceded that Japan's obvious determination perhaps necessitated temporary relaxation of American pressure. Nevertheless, he could not conceal his suspicion that there were sinister motives behind the statement. The administration, he feared, might be bowing to pressure from "the great foreign colonial powers" or reflecting the "coolness" of banking interests toward prevention of trade with Manchuria under the original doctrine.[2] Morrison was obviously disturbed and worried by Hoover's apparent weakening of one of the strongest weapons in the arsenal of peace.

Morrison soon received reassurance from a "high source" in Washington and recovered his customary optimism. Mr. Hoover, the source assured Morrison, had intended to make no change in the nonrecognition doctrine but had merely made a "shorthand

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1. New York Times, Aug. 12, 1932, pp. 1, 4.
2. Christian Century, Aug. 31, 1932, pp. 1047-49.

reference" to the principle without going into detailed discussion. Morrison not only rejoiced that Hoover had not really altered his position but even thought that he himself had contributed to the cause of peace. By asking for a clarification and now by publishing it, he felt that he was emphasizing the agreement of Hoover and Stimson on the "entire text and intention" of the doctrine. He hoped that this clarification would "help to sharpen the point of the doctrine in Japanese public opinion and in the understanding of the American people as well." The extent of Morrison's contribution in this respect is doubtful. The Japanese press had hailed Hoover's statement as a relaxation of nonrecognition; but the author has found no evidence that either the Japanese or the American public noticed the Christian Century's editorial.[1] None of the other editors studied mentioned Hoover's reference to the peace pact, the Japanese reaction, or Morrison's clarification. Perhaps the incident was more important as another example of Morrison's strong faith in the power of public opinion to influence national policy and international relations, of his ardent devotion to the nonrecognition principle, and of his marvelous ability to make a big thing out of a very small one.

With his doubt about Hoover's adherence to nonrecognition

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1. Christian Century, Sept. 28, 1932, p. 1157; New York Times, Aug. 16, 1932, p. 5. Rappaport interprets Hoover's speech similarly but fails to mention the later qualification published by Morrison. Stimson and Japan, p. 173.

removed, Morrison undertook to evaluate the foreign policies of the two presidential candidates. The touchstone by which he tested their records in foreign relations was, of course, the cause of world peace. On this basis Morrison fervently commended the President's "intelligence and increasing courage." Morrison singled out for special praise "three outstanding achievements," each "pregnant with future possibilities"--and all emerging from the diplomacy of the Sino-Japanese controversy. Hoover's sending a representative to sit with the League council for discussion of the Kellogg pact had solved the problem of American cooperation with the League. Similarly, Stimson's declaration that the Kellogg pact implied consultation had assured the world that the United States would consult "whenever peace [was] endangered anywhere in the world." Most important of all, the new doctrine of nonrecognition called for "great new responsibilities on the part of every nation which honorably [regarded] its signature to the peace pact," and promised the development of "cooperative measures in dealing with any violation of international law."[1] In his emphasis on nonrecognition Morrison overlooked recent experience--the doctrine's negligible effect on a nation which refused to view its signature to the peace pact as "honorably" as Morrison thought it should.

Notwithstanding Morrison's approval of Hoover's contributions to the cause of peace, he could not support the President

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1. Christian Century, Sept. 28, 1932, pp. 1158-59.

unequivocally. Hoover's leadership had not been "sufficiently courageous" in the economic aspects of foreign policy--allied debts, the tariff, international money problems, the world economic conference. But Hoover's achievements in support of peace in the Far East outweighed his omissions in other areas and inspired Morrison's faith that his second term would produce more positive results. "Once released from the pullings and haulings of petty politics to which a President is more subject in his first term than in his second," Morrison prophesied, "Mr. Hoover's step will be more firm and his statesmanship more constructive than either his platform or his own words now indicate."[1] Perhaps Morrison's faith was justified only if the proper criterion for evaluation of foreign policy is the ringing sound of its principles rather than its effects in the affairs of nations. None of the "three great achievements" which he praised so lavishly and so optimistically produced beneficial results for either the United States or the world. Morrison's endorsement of Hoover's peace record clearly sprang from considerations of principle and of anticipated, rather than achieved, results.

Morrison found in Franklin Roosevelt's record on foreign policy little that he could approve. He pronounced the Democratic candidate's few statements on the tariff question "unsound" without analyzing them for his readers. While Assistant

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1. Christian Century, Sept. 28, 1932, pp. 1158-59.

Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt had advocated a "big navy," and had played an important role in sending the Marines to Haiti--two more strikes against him in Morrison's eyes. Morrison could approve Roosevelt's support of the League as a candidate on a pro-Wilson platform in 1920, but he could not condone the candidate's sudden reversal in 1931 under isolationist pressure. More important and more damning from Morrison's viewpoint was Roosevelt's nominating speech for Alfred Smith in 1928; not only had he expressed disapproval of disarmament, he had also ridiculed the Kellogg peace pact.[1]

The nominating speech alone would probably have disqualified Roosevelt in Morrison's view, but the Governor's current associations seemed even more ominous. Most dangerous of all considerations, Morrison contended, was the "deal" which obtained the nomination for him at the recent convention. By this "deal," Roosevelt had placed himself "under enormous obligations to the most sinister figure in American public life--William Randolph Hearst." To Morrison Hearst represented "everything in international relations which peace-minded citizens oppose." Because of Hearst's support, above all else, Roosevelt's record on foreign policy failed the touchstone of peace. If the Democratic candidate were to become President, Morrison had no doubt that "the Hearst shadow [would] be cast

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 5, 1932, pp. 1192-94.

over his entire foreign policy. It is a black shadow."[1] On that sinister note Morrison concluded his comparison of the presidential candidates' foreign policies. He could not endorse Hearst's choice. For the sake of peace he supported the administration whose efforts for peace in the Far East he had been approving for a year.

While Morrison stressed foreign policy as the most important criterion for evaluating parties and candidates, few editors seemed to agree with him. The Christian Herald, the World Outlook (Missionary Voice) and the Christian Advocate held that the only important issue in the election was prohibition--to repeal or not to repeal. Dan Poling of the Christian Herald, long a leader of the dry forces, promised a no-quarter battle for the Eighteenth Amendment; for the election was crucial turning point in the long struggle against the liquor traffic. He endorsed neither party or candidate but urged his readers to discover the dry candidates and campaign for them. E. H. Rawlings castigated both major parties and candidates for advocating repeal but leaned toward the Republicans because they endorsed a longer and fairer process of change than did the Democrats. The other Methodist publication, the Christian Advocate, probably gave more space to the campaign than did any other journal examined. Enlisted in the prohibition army to the end, James Joy almost every week pointed out the importance of this great moral

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 5, 1932, pp. 1192-94.

issue and urged his readers to support the candidates who appeared to offer the most promise for the cause. Although the Christian Advocate did not endorse any candidate by name, it portrayed the Republicans as less dangerous in regard to "this greatest moral cause of the age."[1] Like the other editors, Joy did not mention foreign policy as an important issue.

Kirby Page and the World Tomorrow could not agree with prohibitionists like Poling, Rawlings, and Joy that liquor was the most vital political and moral issue in 1932. Page thought obsession with liquor was unrealistic, for economic and international issues were paramount and "should determine the 'moral' vote of the country." Seeing only negligible differences between the two major parties and their candidates, Page supported the Socialist party and its candidate, Norman Thomas, a former editor of the World Tomorrow. Page was realistic enough to know that Thomas had no chance of being elected but hoped that he would poll several million votes as a step toward strengthening the party. Of the two major candidates he preferred Hoover over Roosevelt, who, he charged, had helped scuttle the League of Nations and opposed debt cancellation as the price of William Randolph Hearst's support. On at least one point Page agreed

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1. Christian Herald, July 1932, p. 26; Nov. 1932, p. 22; World Outlook (Missionary Voice), Aug. 1932, pp. 370-71; Oct. 1932, p. 463; Christian Advocate, Aug. 25, 1932, pp. 890-91; see also p. 885; June 23, pp. 654-55; July 14, pp. 747-48; July 28, 1932, pp. 793-94.

with Morrison: "The emergence of Hearst as a dominant influence upon the platform and candidate is like the apparition of an evil spirit out of the past."[1]

While Page could agree with Morrison that Hoover was preferable to Roosevelt on grounds of foreign policy, he thought the Christian Century's editor naive and obtuse in one of his reasons for supporting the Republican candidate. Morrison had praised Hoover's "spiritual nature," which he expected would shine forth with a new light when the president could throw off "the inhibitions due to practical politics" at the start of his second term.[2] Page was dismayed. As one of the prophetic leaders of the church Morrison should have been able to "distinguish between personal character and political character," Page thought. Page was more concerned with Hoover's past performance as evidence of his social concern than with his pious words or his Quaker background. Hoover's spirituality, if it existed, had not helped him understand the basic ethical problems of modern society; in fact, Page declared, his policies tended to aggravate current ills rather than to alleviate them. Morrison seemed to Page unable to see the actual situation because of his over-emphasis on ideals. Such lack of insight into political

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1. World Tomorrow, July 1932, p. 195; Aug. 1932, pp. 222-23; Sept. 14, 1932, pp. 244-45; Nov. 2, 1932, p. 411.

2. Christian Century, Oct. 26, 1932, p. 1296.

realities from a leader like Morrison discouraged the Socialist editor.[1] Morrison did not reply to Page's criticism.

Morrison and Page were the only editors included in this survey who supported a specific candidate in 1932; and both chose Hoover on the basis of his foreign policy.[2] Neither the Missionary Review nor the Churchman mentioned the campaign, while America reported the news but did not take a stand for a party or a candidate.

As the Sino-Japanese controversy dragged through the summer of 1932 without major outbreaks of violence, the world awaited the report of the League's investigating commission. Among the Christian journals examined in this study, editorial interest in the Far Eastern conflict diminished sharply as violence subsided. Neither assassination, a military acquisition of political power, nor defiant recognition of Manchukuo stimulated these editors to react strongly. Even the World Tomorrow, which demonstrated more concern with the struggle than any of the others besides the Christian Century, did not continue to advocate the formula for solution which its editor had devised earlier. Two journals, America and the Christian Advocate, consistently reported news events related to the conflict; but even

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1. World Tomorrow, Nov. 9,1932, pp. 438-39.

2. In Miller's broader survey he also found only these two Protestant journals endorsing a candidate in 1932. Miller, American Protestantism, pp. 119-21.

they seldom voiced an opinion or suggested a solution during this period. The depth of Morrison's involvement in the question of peace in the Orient stands out in sharp contrast to the lack of interest on the part of his fellow editors. In his reaction to internal problems in Japan and political developments in the United States, Morrison took his stand on fundamental principles for which he had long fought. His faith in the power of public opinion moved him to continue to support and defend the Kellogg peace pact and the nonrecognition doctrine as the ultimate answers to the problems created by Japan's militarists. He stoutly applauded Secretary Stimson's assertion that the peace pact implied consultation among the signatories in case of a threat to peace. Consistent with his support of the administration's moralistic policy since the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities a year earlier, Morrison endorsed Hoover's foreign policy as a prospective president and distrusted Roosevelt's probable actions in that office. Foreign policy was so important to him that he supported Hoover for re-election on that basis. Morrison still hoped the cause of peace in the Far East was not dead and that the Kellogg-Briand pact, implemented by nonrecognition with the effective support of world opinion, would yet prove a compelling instrument for peace. Much would depend on the Lytton commission's report and its reception by the powers involved in the dispute.

Chapter VI

LEAGUE ACTION AT LAST: MORAL VICTORY

Although interest in the Sino-Japanese struggle subsided during the relatively quiet summer of 1932, neither Christian editors nor the world could forget the ominous situation. The moral problem of unpunished aggression remained a barb in the consciences of persons who saw international peace and international obligations as ethical questions. The depression was the dominant secular problem (except for prohibition repeal in the minds of ardent wets and drys) while the controversial seeds sown at Paris in 1918-19 finally brought forth in Germany a bitter fruit which threatened to spread the poison of violence and militarism in the very heart of the civilized world. Perhaps, people hoped, vigorous handling of aggression in the Orient would forestall similar outbreaks elsewhere. The world, therefore, waited expectantly as the slow-moving machinery of the League of Nations began to grind out that organization's response to the Japanese challenge. If the League failed to produce a just punishment for aggression or an effective deterrent to continued violence in the Far East, the inadequacy of the peace

machinery itself would be apparent. Failure was not yet obvious in October, and advocates of peace like Charles Clayton Morrison enthusiastically greeted the long-awaited report of the League's commission investigating the Manchurian dispute.

I

The League Council's resolution of December 10, 1931, had authorized a commission to investigate and report to the Council "any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them, upon which peace depends."[1] The five-member commission, consisting of representatives from France, Italy, Germany, the United States, and Great Britain, was popularly known as the Lytton Commission after its chairman, the Earl of Lytton. The commission conducted investigations in Japan, China, and Manchuria from late February to early September of 1932. Its report, published in Geneva on October 2, 1932,[2] became both the basis for the League's subsequent actions on the dispute and a point of friction between the League and Japan.

The major points of the Commission's findings and

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1. Willoughby, Controversy, p. 178; Lytton Report, p. 6.

2. New York Times, Oct. 3, 1932, p. 1; Toynbee, Survey, 1932, p. 585.

recommendations may be briefly summarized.[1] Although chaotic conditions in Manchuria and China had given Japan legitimate grievances, China and Japan had not exhausted the peaceful means available for settling their dispute before resorting to force. The commission found that neither the Japanese action at Mukden in September 1931 nor the subjugation of Manchuria were acts of "legitimate self-defense." Such atrocities as the bombing of civilians in Chinchow could "not be justified" on any grounds. The new state of "Manchukuo" was not the spontaneous creation of the Manchurian people, as the Japanese claimed, but a product of Japanese leadership and coercion. The region remained under Japanese domination, and the new government still lacked support by the majority of the people.[2]

The commission found neither the Japanese nor the Chinese proposals for settlement acceptable. Adoption of the Japanese solution, recognition of "Manchukuo," would violate the "fundamental principle of existing international organizations." On the other hand, restoration of the status quo ante, which the Chinese demanded, would only restore the inflammatory conditions and irreconcilable policies which had precipitated

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1. For a more extensive summary see Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 379-408; Elizabeth Green, "The Lytton Report," Pacific Affairs, V (Nov. 1932), 973-78; Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 208-17.

2. Lytton Report, pp. 66, 71, 97, 106, 111.

the conflict in the beginning.[1] The commission recommended that under the auspices of a neutral League commission China and Japan create in Manchuria an autonomous, demilitarized regime under Chinese sovereignty. This government should recognize and guarantee Japanese rights and interests of a financial and economic nature but not of a military or political character.[2]

Shortly before publication of the Lytton report Japan had received a six weeks' delay in consideration of the report to allow time for translation and study in Tokyo and for the arrival in Geneva of a special representative to present Japan's case.[3] Accordingly, the Council first met to consider the report on November 21, 1932. After a week of conflicting observations and rebuttals by the Chinese and Japanese representatives the Council realized the impossibility of agreement at that time and on November 28 referred to report to the League

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1. Lytton Report, p. 128. The Report summarized the situation in terms drily condemning Japan: "Without declaration of war, a large area of what was indisputably Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan and has, in consequence of this operation, been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China. The steps by which this was accomplished are claimed by Japan to have been consistent with the obligations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, all of which were designed to prevent action of this kind." P. 127.

2. Ibid., pp. 128-38.

3. New York Times, Sept. 16, 1932, p. 9; Sept. 25, 1932, p. 1; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 379-83.

Assembly.[1] Again, in the Assembly as in the Council, the Japanese and Chinese delegates succeeded only in reinforcing the feeling of obdurate irreconcilability. The Assembly on December 9 referred the report to the Committee of Nineteen established under the resolution of March 11 and instructed the committee to study the report and prepare proposals for settlement.[2] The Assembly then adjourned, not to meet again until February 21, 1933, when the Committee of Nineteen would present the results of its deliberations.[3]

Reactions to the Lytton report varied according to the nations' own particular interests. Japanese editors naturally rejected it, finding it full of errors and misstatements; to them the question had already been settled by "the fact of Manchukuo" before the "utopian" report appeared. Chinese newspapers, just as naturally, expressed disappointment that the report had failed to brand Japan outright as an aggressor and to declare her wholly responsible for the Manchurian situation. French editors, identifying their own colonial interests with Japan's, supported Japan's assertion that China's political anarchy and her boycott of Japanese goods lay at the root of

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1. New York Times, Nov. 22, 1932, p. 1; Nov. 29, 1932, p. 4; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 414-31.

2. New York Times, Dec. 7, 1932, p. 1; Dec. 10, 1932, p. 1; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 438-63; Toynbee, Survey, 1932, p. 497.

3. Willoughby, Controversy, p. 464.

the trouble. In England newspaper opinion was divided. The colonially oriented London Daily Mail, for example, favored Japan, observing that "Japan's presence in Manchuria [was] as natural and salutary as Great Britain's presence in India and Egypt." Others, like the Times of London, found the report "wise and fair."[1]

In the United States editorial opinion generally approved the report for its fairness and its careful study of the situation. The Boston Daily Globe saw it as an effective solution:

> If the rest of the world will but stand firmly and imperturbably on its [the report's] principles, letting time take its course, Japan's domestic financial and social disaster (which is growing) and her failure to pacify Manchuria will do the rest.
>
> If Geneva pursues a course of solidarity and restraint, and if Mr. Stimson, his contentions vindicated, does the same in unison with the League, the joy-ride of the militarists at Tokyo will end.

To a few editors, however, the report appeared useless. The New York Daily News compared it to the League's "telling the ocean just how far it may roll up the shore" and asked the question which many of the report's supporters seemed not to consider seriously--"Who is going to throw Japan out [of Manchuria]?"[2]

The Christian Century joined the general American

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1. Literary Digest, Oct. 15, 1932, pp. 15-16.

2. Ibid., Oct. 22, 1932, p. 7; Tupper and McReynolds, Public Opinion, p. 352.

approval of the Lytton report, commending its restraint of language, careful collection of evidence, authenticity, and fairness. To Morrison it confirmed his own judgment that by her immoral and illegal actions Japan had brought upon herself the world's opposition and must take the consequences. Appealing to world opinion, his favorite sanction against militarism, he declared,

> The public opinion of the world, once it has become aware of the contents of this report, is certain to conclude that, in the light of her treaty obligations Japan's recent course in Manchuria hasn't a moral leg to stand on. Her war office has plunged her into a course of cynical reversion to the worst type of imperialist aggression, against which the nations of the world have been working determinedly to erect both legal and moral barriers. At the bar of public opinion, the Lytton Report condemns Japan. And there can be no appeal from that verdict.[1]

But Morrison was not naive enough to think that the report in itself could solve the problems facing the League and China. He analyzed these problems and suggested morally acceptable ways of coping with them.

One of the most important problems in Morrison's opinion was the conflict within the League itself between the small nations and the great powers. The smaller states, he felt, were desperately and rightly concerned that the world not permit Japan to escape punishment and thus establish a dangerous precedent. Yet it was the great powers, not the small ones, who would have to carry out the disciplinary measures which the League

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 12, 1932, pp. 1232-33.

might prescribe. Morrison believed the small nations would finally force the League to act despite Japan's delaying tactics.[1]

But what could the League do? This was the largest and most difficult question for Morrison as for the delegates at Geneva. In the midst of the depression none of the large powers seemed either able or willing to take military action or even economic measures to punish Japan. Moral sanctions seemed the only kind available. The League Covenant, however, seemed to Morrison to cripple all attempts to apply moral sanctions without entangling the League and the world in war. As he had done almost a year earlier,[2] Morrison puzzled over the provision in Article XVI that a nation found to have resorted to war under Articles XII, XIII, or XV should be "ipso facto deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby [undertook] immediately to subject it" to a financial, commercial and personal boycott. The members were further committed to take armed action if the Council should call for it. Designed to discourage resort to war by League members, these provisions could be effective only if the other members were willing and able to go to war upon the Council's recommendation. Morrison was convinced that the large powers were unwilling to take or support such action, and for a

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 12, 1932, pp. 1232-33.

2. See above, pp. 99-100.

long time he had held that using war to prevent war or to punish an aggressor was the ultimate in international folly and immorality.[1]

A declaration by the League that Japan was an aggressor would require positive action such as breaking diplomatic relations or even applying an embargo or a blockade. Therefore the statemen's immediate problem was

> finding some way of evading the sanctions of the League Covenant while at the same time unmistakably placing on Japan the stigma which her recent policy [merited] and, if it were possible, setting under motion forces which [should] ultimately make her ready to deal with the Manchurian issue on some such basis of negotiation as the Lytton commission [suggested].

Although Morrison had previously called for the League to remove itself from the dispute and leave the matter to a consultation of the signers of the peace pact, he now thought the League capable of handling the situation itself. He offered a two-fold solution. The Council and the Assembly should immediately modify Article XVI so as to remove all sanctions of force from the Covenant. Free from such sanctions, the League could then declare that Japan had violated both the Covenant and the Kellogg pact. Application of the nonrecognition doctrine would quickly choke off her sources of international financing both for internal needs and for development of Manchuria. Soon, Morrison believed, Japan's financial difficulties

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 12, 1932, pp. 1232-33.

would force her to negotiate with China and the League under the terms suggested by the Lytton commission.[1] In the meantime, what could Japan do if the League were to adopt Morrison's suggestions?

Japan might, Morrison admitted, carry out her threat to withdraw from the League, but there were reasons for her to hesitate before acting so rashly. Withdrawal, he pointed out, was a difficult, two-year process;[2] during this period Japan would remain subject to the League's regulations and bound by her commitments under the Covenant. Morrison seemed oblivious to the possibility that Japan might simply go her own way regardless of the League's rules and that the League might prove unable to force her to carry out her obligations. He suggested further that withdrawal would also "end the legality of her possession" of her Pacific mandates, which she retained, he believed, only as an agent of the League. Again Morrison neglected important questions. Who would remove Japan from her mandated islands if she should leave the League? Having ignored previous questions of the legality of her actions, could she be expected suddenly to become susceptible to legal arguments? Finally, if Japan should withdraw, Morrison suggested, the League might even benefit in the long run by not trying to keep within its membership "a nation that is openly defiant of its spirit, its

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 12, 1932, pp. 1232-33.
2. As stipulated in Article I of the Covenant.

regulations and its obligations."[1]

In this second attempt to deal with the problems raised by Article XVI as applied to the Sino-Japanese dispute, Morrison developed a new plan. A year earlier he had simply called for the League to "bow out" of the controversy in order to make possible an international consultation under the Kellogg pact at the invitation of the United States. By October 1932 he was beginning to realize that the United States would probably do nothing more than she had already done, for he gave to the League the leading role in his new scheme. The League, acting alone, should remove the offending provisions and then affirm Japan's guilt. Stimson's note of January 7, 1932, provided Morrison the key element which his earlier plan lacked--a peaceful, effective, and morally acceptable sanction--nonrecognition with its accompanying financial effects.

Morrison obviously was deeply concerned with the crisis even though he oversimplified both the issues and the solutions. Within the limitations of his own values and preconceptions he attempted to present a logical and practical plan for dealing with a complex, difficult problem, a problem which the world thirty-five years later still has not solved--a collective deterrent to military aggression. At least he saw the seriousness of the dilemma facing the nations assembled in Geneva; for he concluded:

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 12, 1932, pp. 1232-33.

> The Lytton report brings the nations to a great test and a great opportunity. It is a test of the reality of their determination to substitute methods of peaceful settlement for the ancient resort to force; law for war. It is an opportunity to show that a nation--even a heavily armed nation--cannot defy this purpose without being stigmatized before the bar of world opinion and subjected to penalties, both moral and material, which will eventually show even the people of the offending state, the folly of their way.[1]

Morrison held fast to his habitual optimism; his confidence in the ultimate victory of law over war remained unshaken. Surprisingly enough, the League's solution to the problem, worked out over a period of several months, was similar to Morrison's--and equally inadequate.

Among the other editors the most enthusiastic supporter of the Lytton report was Kirby Page of the World Tomorrow. He applauded this "vigorous condemnation" of Japanese imperialism and expected the League and the United States to affirm the commission's judgment on Japan and to "continue to use moral, diplomatic and financial pressure until restitution [had] been made in Manchuria." Page saw terrible consequences arising from a failure to compel Japan to relinquish political and military control of Manchuria: "Not only would another Alsace-Lorraine be created, but the machinery of peace would be dealt a deadly blow, and disarmament indefinitely postponed."[2] Like Morrison, Page approved the report and appreciated its importance; but he did not discuss specific actions by the League and reactions by

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 12, 1932, pp. 1232-33.
2. World Tomorrow, Oct. 12, 1932, pp. 339-40.

Japan as the editor of the Christian Century did. Demonstrating both the variety of view within the socialist camp and the intellectual freedom of the World Tomorrow, Page printed a stinging criticism of the report and the League. H. N. Brailsford, regular British correspondent for the journal, charged that the report subtly hid its false premises--first, that the other nations felt a genuine and impartial friendship for China and Japan, and second, that between China and Japan a spirit of mutual good will, peace and friendship prevailed. Since events had already proven that these propositions were false, a settlement by mutual consent based on them was obviously impossible. And the League would not use force to settle the controversy. He concluded, therefore, "The League in its wisdom will do nothing. In that case a further inference follows. The League, under its present management, is a superfluity." This was the only editorial condemnation of the Lytton report discovered in the publications under survey. Page himself did not comment on Brailsford's remarks, but he continued to sustain the report and the League.[1]

Other editors commended the report and hoped that it would lead to peaceful settlement. Briefer than the extended

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1. World Tomorrow, Oct. 26, 1932, pp. 393-94. In a letter to the editor Raymond Leslie Buell, author of numerous books and pamphlets on history and international affairs, argued against Brailsford that the report was important because (1) it was the first determined effort to solve the problem and (2) it gave a new and vital emphasis to the peace machinery. Ibid., Nov. 2, 1932, p. 430.

analyses in the Christian Century and the World Tomorrow, these editorials and news reports at least indicated that the editors were aware of major developments. Shipler in the Churchman, Joy in the Christian Advocate and Clarke in the Presbyterian Advance noted the report's fairness and its condemnation of Japan. Clarke added that the only course open to the League and the United States was to denounce Japan's Manchurian policy and refuse to recognize the puppet state.[1] Two editors emphasized the crucial nature of the Sino-Japanese situation for the League. Parsons in America prayed that the League would successfully resist the strain placed upon it and predicted that Japan would "soon recognize that she [had] nothing to gain and all to lose by flouting the Lytton Report." In the Christian Herald Stanley High praised the Lytton commission for bluntly facing the issue of Japanese responsibility and thereby preventing the collapse of the Kellogg treaty and "the whole peace structure." He wondered how much further Japan would dare to go in defying world opinion, but he did not discuss what the world should do if that defiance continued. Pierson, editor of the Missionary Review, stressed the report's condemnation of Japanese militarists and vaguely hoped that Japan would "yet be guided by wisdom rather than by pride and that some way [might] be found to preserve her interests in a way compatible with justice to the

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1. Churchman, Oct. 8, 1932, p. 7; Christian Advocate, Oct. 13, 1932, p. 1074; Presbyterian Advance, Oct. 13, 1932, p. 4.

Chinese and to the welfare of Manchuria." He did not suggest a means to achieve this goal.[1]

Most of these Christian periodicals commented favorably on the Lytton report when it first appeared, endorsing its judgment of Japan as a highly moral achievement and hoping it would facilitate a just and peaceful settlement. Only the World Tomorrow, however, came close to analyzing the situation as intensively as the Christian Century. Two journals, World Outlook (Missionary Voice) and the Watchman-Examiner, failed to mention the report.

Japan reacted swiftly and indignantly to the Lytton report. Its official "Observations" to the League Council disagreed sharply with almost all the commission's findings of fact and every one of its recommendations for settlement.[2] In Tokyo newspaper editors insisted that the report demonstrated that the League should be dissolved; otherwise, one editor declared, it should "abstain from the Chino-Japanese disputes as far as possible" if it wanted to save itself.[3]

Morrison's editorials displayed his antipathy to the Japanese viewpoint. He accused Japan of hypocrisy and added:

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1. America, Oct. 15, 1932, p. 29; Christian Herald, Dec. 1932, p. 30; Missionary Review, Dec. 1932, pp. 628-29.

2. New York Times, Oct. 3, 1932, p. 1; Oct. 5, p. 10; Oct. 6, 1932, p. 4; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 408-13.

3. Tokyo Miyako, quoted in Literary Digest, Nov. 12, 1932, p. 11.

> A refusal now so much as to consider the recommendations made by the commission is evidence of the intention of the military clique in Japan to push through their imperialistic purposes in Manchuria without regard to the facts in the situation or the opinion of the rest of the world.

He labeled as "similar cynicism" another Japanese argument--that action on the report should be suspended until the current situation in Manchuria had time to work itself out. This suggestion failed to consider either China's opinion or the "sanctity of international agreements," Japan having disregarded the former and desecrated the latter.[1] Morrison still hoped that wise leaders in Japan would see the lack of reality in the militaristic attitude and the folly of continuing opposition to world opinion. The editor maintained that the League had to do something, but he knew that nothing effective could be done for more than a month while the report was under study.

II

As the date on which the Council was to take up the Lytton report approached, Morrison painted a dark picture of the possibility that Japan would refuse to negotiate. If Japan rejected the League's demands, he reasoned, the League would have to pass an official judgment on her violation of her international

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1. Christian Century, Oct. 19, 1932, pp. 1261-62. None of the other editors under study commented on initial Japanese reactions to the report.

obligations. Furthermore, it would have to prescribe a penalty if it found her guilty. The punishment the League might decide upon would lead to as yet unpredictable but certainly serious consequences for the East and for the rest of the world.[1]

Morrison could not accept, however, the possibility that the League might do nothing. From the viewpoint of the small nations, the Lytton report was a test of the League's "sincerity and worth. If the League dodges now," Morrison declared, "these smaller nations believe that it will dodge at any future time when their security or interests may be at stake."[2] The League seemed caught between two undesirable alternatives. On the one hand, it might do nothing, thereby confirming the skepticism of the smaller states about its willingness to protect them from the larger powers. Or it might declare Japan guilty of aggression, thereby risking war because of the military and economic sanctions required by Article XVI of the Covenant.[3]

Once again Morrison tried to find a way around Article XVI. Abandoning his recent call for amendment of the offending article, he proposed a side-step; for "the only safe way of acting [was] outside the limits of the league covenant." The League should use any available "legalistic hocus-pocus" which

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1. Christian Century, Nov. 23, 1932, p. 1427.
2. Ibid., pp. 1427-28.
3. Ibid., Nov. 30, 1932, pp. 1464-65.

would save face for it while releasing it from the obligations of Article XVI. Then the League could fulfill its "moral duty" of positive action against Japan by invoking the Kellogg pact--the only adequate ground for international action in the dispute. Under the pact, according to Secretary Stimson's speech on August 8, "automatic international consultation" could take place. The nations united in consultation could then apply the nonrecognition doctrine, which would have a "positive and inhibitive" effect by depriving Japan of desperately-needed outside capital and Chinese markets. After the emergency had been resolved--presumably by Japan's acquiescence in the Lytton report's recommendations--the League could then proceed calmly to amend the Covenant to replace sanctions of force with the peace pact's "principle of consultation and conference." Then, Morrison predicted, the hoped-for new era of law and peace would be established.[1]

In this third scheme[2] for an international condemnation of Japan without recourse to war Morrison seemed to have exhausted his ideas of means to evade Article XVI. He vaguely left the details of the "legalistic hocus-pocus" to the League's officials. This plan entailed more cooperation between the League and the United States than his earlier scheme for the League alone to declare Japan guilty of violating the peace

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1. Christian Century, Nov. 30, 1932, pp. 1464-65.

2. See above, pp. 99-100, 219-22.

pact. Both plans relied on the nonrecognition policy as the essential feature of effective deterrent action.

The beautiful simplicity of his plan, the certainty of its success, and the centrality and efficacy of his beloved doctrine of nonrecognition were crystal clear to Morrison:

> By applying this doctrine of nonrecognition the consultants will, in one series of acts, give approval to the findings of the Lytton commission, give effect to the desire of the League to act without becoming involved in war, and leave Japan in a position where-estopped from developing Manchuria by the impossibility of securing loans and debarred from the vital Chinese market by the resentment and boycott of the Chinese--she will most quickly recognize the self-defeating nature of her course.[1]

Was so complex a problem really amenable to so simple a solution? Morrison certainly hoped and believed that it was.

Consistent with his oldest and strongest criticism of the League as a peace-keeping institution--rejection of Article XVI's coercive provisions--,[2] Morrison advocated only measures which he could accept on moral and ethical grounds. Only peaceful means could achieve the goal of peace. The Kellogg pact, implemented by consultation and nonrecognition, offered the most promising formula for restoration of justice and peace in the Far East. Morrison was confident that the peace machinery would still work if it were properly used.

Kirby Page also disapproved the armed sanctions in the Covenant, preferring the non-violent measures of moral,

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1. Christian Century, Nov. 30, 1932, p. 1465.

2. See above, p. 22.

diplomatic, and financial pressure which he had consistently advocated. Like Morrison, he expected more effective action from the Assembly than from the Council, which was "dominated by imperialist powers whose garments [were] soiled and who [were] extremely reluctant to set precedents which might limit their own future aggressions." Although he admitted the danger of sustained pressure on Japan because of the recklessness of her militarist leaders and the chauvinism of her people, he feared that procrastination and timidity on the part of the League would bring even more terrible results. The League must not acquiesce in this aggression.[1]

Apparently the other editors did not consider Article XVI a serious obstacle to the League; none of them mentioned it. Joy of the Christian Advocate conceded that the Assembly might not wish either to pronounce that Japan had violated her obligations or to act on that condemnation, but he did not spell out the reason for such reluctance. He suggested a very mild alternative for the Assembly: "to recommend the Lytton Report to the two parties, but set no time limit on its acceptance, hoping that within two or three years the economic condition of Japan will have convinced that country that it is to her own best interest to follow those recommendations." While Clarke of the Presbyterian Advance recognized that the League must either produce a constructive solution to the Manchurian

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1. World Tomorrow, Nov. 30, 1932, pp. 507-08.

problem or justify "skepticism as to its continued usefulness," he offered no suggestion. He thought, with Morrison, that the League's decision would depend upon whether the leading nations considered the peace pact "anything more than an eloquent gesture."[1] None of the other editors discussed Japan's rejection of the Lytton report or the alternatives facing the League at this time. America and the Christian Advocate reported major developments in their news columns.

After several days' debate the League Assembly on December 9 passed the Lytton report and the whole Manchurian problem to its special Committee of Nineteen; then it adjourned. Morrison argued that the Assembly had not dodged its responsibility but had made real progress toward a solution. He pointed out that the Assembly had refused to act on a resolution which would have pronounced Japan guilty of violating the Covenant and would thereby have invoked Article XVI and its sanctions. The editor, of course, would have been appalled had that resolution passed. He believed that leaving specific proposals to the Committee of Nineteen had enhanced the possibility of agreement.[2] Morrison was delighted that the League was acting as he himself had advocated, and he commended the Assembly for wisely

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1. Christian Advocate, Dec. 1, 1932, p. 1282; Presbyterian Advance, Dec. 1, 1932, p. 4.

2. Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 438-63.

discovering "a way to evade article 16 while moving steadily toward action on the Lytton report and the American non-recognition proposal." Surprisingly, none of the other editors commented on the Assembly's action, which Morrison found both wise and promising. As usual, America and the Christian Advocate reported the event without comment.[1]

III

While the Committee of Nineteen was still conferring in Geneva, Secretary Stimson discussed foreign policy with the President-elect at Hyde Park. In mid-January the secretary announced, apparently as result of his discussion with Roosevelt, that the United States would continue to follow the nonrecognition policy formulated by the retiring administration. In response to reporters' questions the next day Roosevelt refused to take so positive a stand, contenting himself with a general, noncommital comment of only three sentences:

> Any statement relating to any particular foreign situation must, of course, come from the Secretary of State of the United States. I am, however, wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest.[2]

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1. Christian Century, Dec. 21, 1932, p. 1565; America, Dec. 31, 1932, p. 296; Christian Advocate, Dec. 22, 1932, p. 1378.

2. New York Times, Jan. 10, 1933, p. 1; Jan. 17, p. 1; Jan. 18, 1933, p. 1; Ferrell, Diplomacy, pp. 231-42; Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 196-97.

The American press generally interpreted Roosevelt's statement as support for nonrecognition and consultation under the peace pact, but not all papers approved the stand. Criticism came from papers which had opposed the same policies under Hoover; other editors acclaimed the doctrine, Roosevelt's courage, or the statement's effect in strengthening the League. The Chinese press approved the American stand, while the Japanese hoped Roosevelt would be more cautious than Stimson.[1]

Morrison joyfully hailed both the immediate importance and the long range influence of the new president's "patriotic" and "wise" action. Immediately, he claimed, the announcement revitalized the League and rescued it from "complete surrender" to Japan. The Committee of Nineteen, formerly supine, "almost abject," quickly declared that it would report within a short time rather than pigeonhole the Lytton report.[2] Whether the secretary's statement really stimulated the committee's decision was, of course, a matter of conjecture; but the editor confidently believed it had.

In the long run Stimson's announcement seemed to Morrison to harden the whole world against Japanese aggression. If the League strongly condemned Japan, the credit should go to "the American policy, plainly defined, consistently pursued, [which had] so rallied the opinion of the peoples of Europe and

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1. Literary Digest, Jan. 28, 1933, p. 7.
2. Christian Century, Feb. 1, 1933, p. 142.

of the smaller member-states of the league, as to force their hesitant leaders into some line of action." It was clear to him that the strong, purposeful policy of the United States struck responsive chords in the hearts of people everywhere, creating a new moral alliance of the world's people and the American government against the self-seeking, timid diplomats of the old order. Morrison's fears about Roosevelt's foreign policy disappeared when the president-elect championed the editor's favorite principle of international relations.[1]

Morrison applauded his country's moral leadership. Stimson's announcement was "equivalent to notice that Mr. Roosevelt [realized] that the United States [had], with the promulgation of the peace pact, laid the basis for a new international order, based on a new international law," which relied on "the action of world opinion." In this connection, Morrison insisted, the Stimson-Roosevelt stand meant that under either a Republican or a Democratic administration

> the Kellogg pact is the unalterable basis of American participation in world affairs. The Stimson doctrine, which Mr. Roosevelt will maintain, is nothing but a corollary of the peace pact. It is an inevitable deduction from the pact. Its affirmation and maintenance by the United States is evidence of the position of moral and legal authority which the pact holds in the control of American foreign relations.[2]

Morrison could scarcely have expressed more clearly his unqualified approval of American policy; for him, policy based

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1. Christian Century, Feb. 1, 1933, pp. 142-43.

2. Ibid.

on the Kellogg pact and the nonrecognition doctrine was the ultimate in international wisdom and morality.

Did the secretary and the incoming president really accomplish all this in their brief statements? Were the implications as extensive as Morrison thought?[1] Morrison may have spoken so positively because he sincerely believed the "new order" a reality; or he may have hoped to make it real by convincing others to regard it so. There was, at least, no doubt where the editor stood although he magnified the significance of these events.

Other journals joined the applause for the President-elect's decision to follow the nonrecognition policy. An editorial in the Christian Advocate called Roosevelt's statement "a very significant ray of light" which brought a decided change in the Far Eastern outlook. This support for nonrecognition was even more significant in the long run as an indication of progress in the effort to develop peaceful means of settling international disputes. Although Methodist editor James Joy was not as exuberant as Morrison, he gave unqualified approval to

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1. Although Stimson recorded in his diary his deep satisfaction with Roosevelt's statement as strong support for his Far Eastern policy, Ferrell, Diplomacy, pp. 242-44, judges that the meeting and statements issuing from it were "of slight historical import." Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, p. 440, agrees; but Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 196-98, maintains without citing evidence that the League committee was strengthened by the statements. See also Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 292-93. Willoughby does not mention the incident in his record of the League's actions.

Roosevelt's stand.[1]

Kirby Page's praise for Stimson's "momentous announcement" was also more restrained than Morrison's. He hoped that with its backbone stiffened by Roosevelt and Stimson the League might yet stand up effectively against Japan's aggression. Similarly, Stanley High declared that American perseverance in the nonrecognition policy had strengthened the League's willingness to adopt the Lytton report. Japan might find herself forced out of the League and into "international outlawry," but she would eventually learn her lesson. America also reported that the American statements had strengthened the League.[2] The other journals did not discuss these events.

Anticipating the report of the Committee of Nineteen, Morrison on February 22, 1933, again argued that the nonrecognition doctrine was the key to solution of the Far Eastern problem. He predicted, rightly it turned out, that the committee would follow the Lytton report in condemning Japan and that Japan would then break with the League.[3] The editor advised China under these circumstances to avoid invoking the sanctions of Article XVI with their "tragic consequences" and to rely on

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1. Christian Advocate, Feb. 2, 1933, p. 101.

2. World Tomorrow, Jan. 25, 1933, pp. 75-76; see also Feb. 1, 1933, p. 99; Christian Herald, March 1933, p. 26; America, Jan. 28, 1933, p. 396.

3. New York Times, Feb. 5, 1933, p. 16; Feb. 7, p. 1; Feb. 12, p. 1; Feb. 13, 1933, p. 1.

financial pressure instead of on military resistance. He believed that if the nations would adopt the nonrecognition policy without reservations, "the consequent contraction of credit resources [would] have much more success in undermining the Japanese position in Manchuria--and even in north China, should a campaign develop there--than any Chinese resort to declared war could have." The United States should cooperate with the League in the Far East, he declared, only if the League acted within the limits of the peace pact and the nonrecognition principle.[1]

Page also anticipated the report of the Committee of Nineteen, but he far outstripped Morrison in enthusiastic predictions of the results. If the Assembly would condemn Japan as a violator of the Covenant, the Kellogg pact, and the Nine-Power treaty, Japan's downfall was assured:

> In this event the permanent domination of Manchuria by Japan is rendered extremely improbable. With the League and the United States allied in opposing this virtual annexation of Chinese territory, it is utterly inconceivable that the militarists of Japan can succeed with their policy of aggression. Even if the League does not invoke sanctions, a combination of moral, political, and economic factors will soon compel a reversal of Japan's policy. That Japanese militarists will declare war upon the whole world is entirely unlikely, and there is doubt that they will even give notice of Japan's withdrawal from the League.
>
> This victory of the small powers at Geneva over the imperialists of Great Britain and France possesses epoch-making significance, and will enormously

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1. Christian Century, Feb. 22, 1933, p. 244.

> increase the prestige and influence of the League. It is far better to run the risk of having Japan withdraw from the League than to have the Covenant rendered impotent by the flagrant aggression of a great power.[1]

Perhaps Page simply saw what he wanted to see; perhaps as a Christian, a socialist, and a pacifist he could not conceive that such brutal, capitalist-imperialist, and militarist actions as Japan's could possibly succeed in a world where a just God ruled.

The editor of the Presbyterian Advance was much more cautious than Page in evaluating possible effects of the League's condemning Japan. Despite the danger of such action the League surely could not admit by remaining silent that the treaty outlawing war was a mere scrap of paper. Upholding the treaty seemed no more dangerous to Clarke than letting it be renounced by Japan's uncondemned aggression. In fact, he concluded, "the only practical thing appears to be to stand by the treaty and to face with patience and courage the problems which may become acute as a result of such action."[2] Clarke's concern here seemed to be for the practical rather than the moral argument although he probably would have said that in this case each consideration led to the same action--support for the outlawry treaty and condemnation of Japan.

On February 17 the Committee of Nineteen submitted to

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1. World Tomorrow, Feb. 15, 1933, p. 148.
2. Presbyterian Advance, Feb. 23, 1933, p. 5.

the League its long-awaited report. To no one's surprise the committee urged acceptance of the Lytton commission's recommendations.[1] In the American press there was widespread approval of the report, often on moral grounds. The Richmond, Virginia, News Leader, for instance, spoke in terms that could have come from the Christian Century when it said, "The American position will no longer be one of isolation, but will be sustained by the moral sense of mankind. Japan will either have to find some basis of compromise or will have to challenge the verdict of the world."[2]

Morrison praised the committee for repudiating Japan's attempts to justify her actions but also for refusing to declare Japan guilty of violating the Covenant. The committee had wisely and adroitly evaded the destructive sanctions of Article XVI while conscientiously registering the opinion of the world that Japan had "done wrong." Morrison applauded not only the report but also the unprecedented broadcast of its complete text from the League's radio station in Geneva. The broadcast was "a turning point in world history"; mankind had

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1. Attempts at conciliation foundered on Japan's absolute rejection of any provision denying or even questioning the independence of Manchukuo. The committee, in accord with the Lytton report, would not accept Manchukuo as an independent state. New York Times, Feb. 15, 1933, p. 3; Feb. 18, p. 1 (text of report, pp. 8-9); Feb. 19, p. 29; Feb. 20, 1933, p. 1; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 464-84.

2. Literary Digest, Feb. 18, 1933, p. 7.

taken a great stride out of the "dark days" of secret diplomacy into the light of a new day of well-informed and therefore united public opinion.[1] Despite the impasse between the League and Japan Morrison's editorials continued to present this optimistic view of the situation.

Expecting the Assembly to adopt the report of the Committee of Nineteen, Kirby Page remained as optimistic as Morrison about the deterrent effect of this action although the prospect of Japan's imminent economic collapse saddened him. Japan's financial troubles, aggravated by the strong stand of the League and the United States and the growing resistance of the Chinese people, were setting the stage for the downfall of the nation--"one of the great tragedies of history." Page felt sympathy for the people of Japan in their forthcoming tribulations, but he was convinced that their militarist leaders had brought disaster upon their own heads. The tragic situation was evidence of inexorable justice in action. A week later Page summarized the committee's report and rejoiced that it had brought a new epoch in international relations by challenging two ancient prerogatives of nationalism--the right of a nation to decide for itself what means of self-defense to use and the practice of armed intervention in foreign territory to protect national interests. As for the Japanese militarists, they seemed determined "to commit hari-kari as a great power." Having sown militarism,

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1. Christian Century, March 1, 1933, pp. 275-76.

Japan would reap chaos and ruin. His prophecy of disaster for Japan rested on the often-expressed conviction that her financial structure was about to collapse.[1]

The Assembly on February 24, 1933, overwhelmingly adopted the report of the Committee of Nineteen. At once the Japanese delegates stalked out in angry protest. The following day Stimson cabled the League his support.[2] The American press largely approved the Assembly's condemnation of Japan; but isolationists urged the United States not to become involved in the Far East as rumors of Japanese military and naval preparations spread. A few observers also predicted that within a short time Japan would collapse financially. In England press reactions varied with some papers urging an arms embargo against Japan. Japanese papers belligerently declared their country prepared to defend itself and its possessions.[3]

Morrison was happy; the League was handling the Sino-Japanese affair just as he had hoped it would. He applauded the Assembly's vote against Japan and consigned the aggressor to the "outer darkness." In Morrison's judgment

> The verdict unanimously rendered by the league assembly, on the basis of the exhaustive studies of the Lytton

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1. World Tomorrow, Feb. 22, 1933, p. 171; March 1, 1933, p. 200.

2. New York Times, Feb. 25, 1933, pp. 1-3, 14; Feb. 26, 1933, p. 1; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 484-504.

3. Literary Digest, March 4, 1933, pp. 11-12.

> commission and the careful review by the committee of nineteen, is that Japan, since September 18, 1931, has had no legal case. The verdict which has been reached by the public opinion of mankind, on the basis of the contrast between the appeal to reason made by the Japanese delegation at Geneva and the appeal to force made by the Japanese army, is that Japan, by professing one thing and doing another, has no moral case. An isolation is thus created without precedent in modern history. Japan has walked out--not only out of a meeting of the league assembly, but out of the company of nations and of peoples.

Japan's withdrawal from the halls of international consultation brought neither dismay nor regret to Morrison; at this moment sharp moral judgment was preferable to procrastinating discussion and search for a compromise. The League's verdict brought vital gains not only for peace in the orient but also for the organization itself:

> The League has saved its soul. By saving its soul it has saved its life. Had the league failed to act on the Manchurian issue it would have died, quickly, of cancer. Had the league pretended to act, but in reality sidestepped, it would have died, slowly, of anemia. But having acted with courage and conviction, the league gains immediately in self-respect and in the estimation of all the nations. Its prestige is higher, its importance greater today than at any previous time in its stormy history.

With its self-respect and prestige restored the League could settle back into "an attitude of watchful waiting, now that the policy of member states [had] been brought completely into accord with the Stimson doctrine." Again Morrison audaciously assumed that a statement by the League was absolutely binding on its members, that the Assembly could determine the policies of the states whose representatives sat together in Geneva. As

for China, she should be content to refrain from military action against Japan now that the League had "legally certified" her case. The "day of bankruptcy [was] drawing swiftly near" in Japan and would soon bring a financial collapse which would convince the Japanese people of the folly of the militaristic path. Truly, Morrison exulted, the moral and legal judgment by the League seemed to promise a quick and ethical solution to the difficult problems in the Far East.[1]

The World Tomorrow wholeheartedly approved the Assembly's action and joined the Christian Century in counseling China to refrain from playing Japan's destructive militaristic game:

> If China will rely exclusively upon world pressure against Japan, along moral, diplomatic, and economic lines, the latter will have no chance whatever of retaining her hold upon Manchuria or other portions of Chinese territory. . . . The exploding bombs and flying shells of the Japanese army will prove to be as effective a method of securing permanent possession of the territories now being invaded as would be an endeavor to blast away the rocks of Gibraltar by firing dried peas from an air rifle. In an interdependent world of highly industrialized nations military power must yield to inexorable economic and political pressure.[2]

Page's optimism about the efficacy of peaceful sanctions equalled Morrison's.

Guy Shipler in the Churchman described the League's condemnation of Japan as "a mighty stride in the right direction." After briefly summarizing the report, Shipler pointed out that

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1. Christian Century, March 8, 1933, pp. 320-31.
2. World Tomorrow, March 8, 1933, p. 223.

the League's action should quiet the contentions of some Americans who had lived in China, including a few missionaries, that Japan had been justified in cleaning up China and Manchuria and providing sound and stable government there. Such an attitude revealed "how far away many otherwise estimable people are from bringing the standards of individual morality to bear on group conduct."[1] Shipler did not, however, examine or even seem to be aware of a deeper question: whether individual standards should be so easily applied to groups, particularly nations. That is one of the questions raised by a study of the views of moralistic observers in regard to the crisis in the Far East.

On February 24 the Assembly of the League adopted, in addition to the report of the Committee of Nineteen, a resolution forming a special committee to assist the Assembly and the member states in carrying out the provisions of the report. The United States was invited to cooperate in the work of this advisory group. Early in March Secretary of State Cordell Hull announced that the minister to Switzerland, Hugh R. Wilson, would sit with the committee and participate in its discussions. Of course he could not vote and would have no power to bind his government to any action of the committee.[2]

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1. Churchman, March 1, 1933, p. 9.

2. New York Times, Feb. 25, 1933, p. 3; March 14, p. 1; March 15, 1933, pp. 1, 12, 16; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 501-02, 520-21. For a brief summary of the committee's work in discovering ways to prevent participation by Manchukuo in various international conventions, meetings, etc., and its report to the League, see ibid., pp. 521-28.

Morrison thought the Secretary's cooperation with the League was "exactly the course" which the situation required. In his eyes the move possessed two major advantages:

> Affirmatively, it shows the world that the United States stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the League in condemning the treaty-breaking course which Japan has followed. Negatively, it secures this country against becoming involved in any resort to the sanctions of force which the league covenant authorizes. It is a policy calculated to produce a maximum of moral pressure with a minimum of danger from the old illusion of 'enforcing' peace.[1]

Perhaps Morrison was simply naive in expecting such a weak policy to bear such splendid fruit; perhaps the alternative of forceful international action was simply too horrible for him to consider it seriously.

Kirby Page also thought the willingness of the United States to cooperate with the League was enormously significant. It demonstrated that the entire world was solidly aligned against Japan's aggressive policy. Surely Japan could not long resist such universal condemnation. Stanley High in the Christian Herald commended the League on its notable moral victory for peace and for the world. Branded as an outlaw, Japan would be forced eventually to make amends for her aggression and to plead humbly for restoration to world citizenship. The League had saved itself and the whole peace machinery by its courageous action. High could hardly restrain his enthusiasm over this

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1. Christian Century, March 22, 1933, p. 379.

moral triumph.[1]

Japan took the final step in her conflict with the League when her delegate, Matsuoka Yosuke, on March 27, 1933, formally delivered to the League the announcement of her intention to withdraw. The note reaffirmed the righteousness of Japan's self-defense and expressed her determination to retain her Pacific island mandates. The American press calmly viewed the League's condemnation and Japan's withdrawal, approving the Assembly's action but apparently willing for the United States alone to go no farther in punishing Japan. Many editors felt that Japan had only herself to blame for her isolation because the other nations had no choice but to uphold the peace machinery.[2]

Japan's resignation elicited from Morrison the first favorable mention of that nation after months of condemnation. Japan, he thought, was at last demonstrating "realistic thinking." At least, he moralized, the peace machinery would benefit from the ending of her hypocrisy:

> So long as Japan was unwilling to modify a policy which had involved tearing up obligations solemnly

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1. World Tomorrow, March 8, 1933, p. 223; Christian Herald, April 1933, p. 26.

2. New York Times, March 12, 1933, p. 18; March 27, p. 1; March 28, 1933, pp. 1, 10, 18; Toynbee, Survey, 1933, p. 594; Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 413-21; Willoughby, Controversy, pp. 595-603; Tupper and McReynolds, Public Opinion, pp. 357-59.

> assumed both under the covenant of the league and the multilateral Kellogg pact and nine-power treaty, it was a constant drain on the vitality of those instruments for her to remain in a position in which she was, supposedly, honoring them. It is far better for the future of world peace to have Japan acknowledge in this fashion that she does not feel at home among covenant-keeping nations.

Morrison hoped that in her isolation Japan might realize the interdependence of nations and the "illusory character" of her imperial gains. The Japanese, who had for months followed an immoral and imprudent policy, might yet be persuaded to change their destructive course, if not by argument, perhaps by reflection on their own isolation.[1]

Morrison was steadfastly optimistic even after Geneva's failure at conciliation and Tokyo's drastic reaction to the League's judgment on her actions and her excuses. At least the aggravating tension of months of inaction was over; a certain sense of relief, of catharsis, pervaded his response to the latest developments in Geneva. Happily he observed the nations' reliance on the cherished Kellogg peace pact and the nonrecognition doctrine, both of which depended on the moral force of world opinion. Everything had been done legally and morally, and military sanctions had been avoided; surely peace would come soon.

Kirby Page was as optimistic as Morrison that the League's

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1. Christian Century, April 5, 1933, p. 444.

application of the nonrecognition policy would bring Japan to her knees. Armed force was not only immoral but unnecessary; Japan's financial troubles would suffice to stop her aggression. By the spring of 1933 Page was rivalling Morrison not only in optimism but also in the volume of his discussion of the Sino-Japanese dispute. At the same time, the other editors under study were losing interest in the Far East. A few of them commented approvingly on the League's adoption of the report of the Committee of Nineteen. To those who spoke out about the controversy such vigorous action seemed likely to produce peace soon. Even the League's final condemnation of Japan, however, evoked no response from some editors--Delavan Pierson (Missionary Review), E. H. Rawlings (World Outlook), James Joy (Christian Advocate) and Curtis Laws (Watchman-Examiner). The other editors approved the Lytton report and the League's handling of the dispute but were neither so outspoken nor so continually concerned as Morrison and Page.

The story of the Sino-Japanese controversy of 1931-1933 does not end with the League's condemnation of Japan's aggression in Manchuria. The Japanese were not content with that province on the edge of China. While the Committee of Nineteen was seeking a settlement of the Manchurian problem and the League Assembly was condemning Japan, Japanese armies were seizing other parts of China.

Chapter VII

JAPANESE EXPANSION IN NORTH CHINA

The adoption of the report of the Committee of Nineteen was the League's definitive response to Japan's seizure of Manchuria. It had little effect on Japan's policies, however, for she did not relinquish her hold on that province. Japan did not sit back and wait for the League to pass judgment on her, nor did she cease her expansionist activity after the League condemned her. In fact she used Manchuria as a base for extension of her control westward toward Inner Mongolia and southward into parts of north China.

Christian editors did not remain indifferent to renewed Japanese expansion. They were concerned not only with moral pronouncements from Geneva and Washington but also with aggressive activities in China. Although some editors were losing interest in the Sino-Japanese conflict by the end of 1932, most of them reacted to new outbreaks of violence. Indeed, Japan's defiant action in China intensified the moral and ethical issues stirred up by her adventures in Manchuria and Shanghai. The events described in this chapter round out the story of the

Sino-Japanese controversy of 1931-1933. It should be kept in mind that these events overlapped the diplomatic moves recorded in the previous chapter.

I

Mid-winter of 1932-33 saw sporadic military action in China's northern border area. January and early February brought no decisive battles or large scale campaigns, but several skirmishes seemed foretastes of more extensive operations in the near future. As the League's Committee of Nineteen worked quietly in Geneva for diplomatic agreement between the disputants, gunfire greeted the new year in China. Japanese troops prepared for expansion westward from Manchuria toward Inner Mongolia, and occasional clashes during this period augured no good for prospects of diplomatic settlement. At the southern tip of Manchuria the Japanese foot shoved into the door at Shanhaikwan threatened the north China Plain.

Jehol Province, north of the Great Wall and west of Manchuria, peopled largely by Mongols with closer ties to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia than to China proper, attracted the Japanese for several reasons. It was a refuge and base of operations for Chinese forces which, after fleeing Manchuria, harassed Japanese supply lines and attacked Japanese outposts. Strategically, Jehol commanded the mountain passes leading southward to Peiping, Tientsin, and the north China plain. If the Japanese controled

the province, they could prevent Chinese flanking attacks on their forces moving south and westward across the plain from Shanhaikwan at the southern tip of Manchuria. Possession of Jehol would, moreover, give the Japanese easy access to Inner Mongolia and the back door to central China through Shansi province while severing communications between the Chinese government and the Soviet Union through Kalgan. Although lacking natural wealth, Jehol produced poppies--and their principal derivative, opium, which the Japanese were to use extensively as a source of revenue and as a weapon to break down Chinese society in the parts of China which later came under their control.[1] Japan's militarists looked avariciously toward Jehol and prepared to grab it.

Even before the new year began, rumors of imminent Japanese military operations disturbed the west. Under the ominous title "Japan Again Rattles the Saber" the Christian Century sadly and bitterly commented on a description of Japan's alleged plans to take over all north China and Jehol, to occupy a large part of China, and to restore the ancient Manchu throne at Peiping under the puppet ruler of Manchukuo, Henry Pu-yi. To Morrison such a program seemed fraught with danger and misery for the world; it promised "conflict surpassing in bitterness and extent any of the past year," not excepting the terror of

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1. G. E. Hubbard, "The Far East: The Course of the Sino-Japanese Hostilities," in Arnold J. Toynbee, ed., Survey of International Affairs, 1933 (London, 1934), pp. 478-84; Lattimore, Manchuria, pp. 27-29.

Shanghai. Ruefully Morrison concluded: "Experience has sadly proved that it is not beyond the capacity of Japan's militarists deliberately to precipitate such a catastrophe."[1] No other journal under study discussed the threatened Japanese expansion at this time. As if to emphasize Morrison's point, the Japanese army soon proved its recklessness and indifference to world peace.

In January 1932 the Japanese pushed to the edge of the Great Wall where it met the sea at Shanhaikwan, but they refrained from crossing the boundary itself. For nearly a year an uneasy tension prevailed in the area until, in December, several minor clashes and incidents presaged more extensive Japanese action. Claiming, as in Mukden and Shanghai, to be defending themselves against an unprovoked Chinese attack, Japanese troops drove the Chinese out of Shanhaikwan and gained a firm foothold within China proper. Seizure of the narrow strip between the mountains and the sea unplugged the funnel through which Japanese forces could pour out of Manchuria onto the north China plain toward Peiping and Tientsin, but the army did not immediately take advantage of this opportunity. According to Japanese spokesmen the battle was only an isolated incident provoked by the Chinese in an effort to obtain support from the

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1. Hallett Abend, China correspondent, in New York Times, Dec. 16, 1932, p. 1. Christian Century, Dec. 28, 1932, p. 1597.

League and the western powers. The Chinese believed, however, that Japan had taken a step toward seizure of Jehol and that she intended to apply pressure to Peiping and Tientsin.[1]

To the editor of the Christian Century Japanese acquisition of Shanhaikwan with its easy access to north China seemed a new threat to stability in the orient. "Certainly," he declared sadly, "the whole far eastern situation seems on the verge of being again toppled into chaos by the belligerence of the Japanese militarists." At least two other editors shared Morrison's sadness. James Clarke of the Presbyterian Advance was not surprised that Japan had taken Shanhaikwan, but he was less pessimistic than Morrison. Although prolonged struggle seemed inevitable, he doubted Japan's ability to hold on to her recent acquisitions when China should eventually use her "tremendous manpower." If America's interpretation of the capture of Shanhaikwan were correct, there certainly would be no immediate peace. The Jesuit journal's news column reported the seizure as a "stepping-stone" in a plan to unite Manchuria, Jehol, Inner Mongolia and parts of north China under Japanese domination.[2] To make matters worse, the Committee of Nineteen

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1. See New York Times, Dec. 9, 1932, p. 4; Dec. 26, p. 1; Dec. 31, 1932, p. 5; Jan. 3, 1933, pp. 1, 8. See also China Year Book, 1933, pp. 651-54. Literary Digest, Jan. 14, 1933, pp. 12-13.

2. Christian Century, Jan. 11, 1933, pp. 43-44; Presbyterian Advance, Jan. 12, 1933, p. 5; America, Jan. 14, 1933, p. 347.

was sitting on the Lytton Report, apparently paralyzed by Japan's blustering threats.

As the Japanese settled down quietly in Shanhaikwan, Morrison deplored the "sadly significant" silence at Geneva following the "pigeon-holing" of the Lytton report. If the League tried to keep Japan in the organization by refusing to decide against her, it would abandon the world's small powers to the merciless, unjust, and illegal whims of the great powers. More seriously, he feared, the League would suffer an inner contradiction that would virtually destroy it from within. It would have "maintained its form and destroyed its life," Morrison moralized. Withdrawal of a major power like Japan would, of course, weaken the League. If, however, the league were to be kept "outwardly imposing while inwardly it [compounded] with crime, its days as a servant of genuine international justice and good faith [were] numbered."[1] Perhaps as important as the condemnation of Japan which the editor advocated was the concept of the League implied in his statement. The function of the League in his eyes was not to bring nations together to discuss clashes of national interests and to effect adjustments and compromises consistent with national power relationships. Instead, the international body should shape and enforce international morality and principles of justice conceived in legal terms. Its function was moral and legal, not political. This conception

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1. Christian Century, Jan. 18, 1933, p. 77.

of the League's proper function played an important role in Morrison's analysis of the controversy and his proposals for settlement.

Kirby Page, even more indignant than Morrison over Japan's "new act of flagrant aggression" at Shanhaikwan, demanded that after "fifteen months of drifting in a dangerous current" the League stand firm. "More than ever," he declared, "world public opinion should insist that the conclusions of the Lytton Report be accepted, and that the procedure which it has laid down be diligently pursued." Failure of the League to act would "be utterly fatal to the peace of the Far East and [would] wreck the structure of pacific machinery for settling international controversies." Here Page vigorously expressed a widespread attitude regarding the Sino-Japanese dispute--fear for the institutions designed for keeping peace.[1] On this point, at least, Morrison, the liberal Christian, and Page, the pacifist-socialist Christian, were in accord. Neither Page nor Morrison showed how world public opinion could force the League --and Japan--to carry out the Lytton report's recommendations.

After capturing Shanhaikwan, Japanese forces rested briefly; soon they were battling Chinese troops for the mountain passes between Manchuria and Jehol. Japan was determined to make effective her claim that Jehol belonged to Manchukuo. The Japanese press, echoing its government, claimed its army had

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1. World Tomorrow, Jan. 18, 1933, p. 56.

again acted in self-defense "to prevent the Chinese from entering Jehol and violating the territory of Manchukuo." Nationalist Chinese editors deplored the League's inability to help China and called for their country to defend herself against Japanese efforts to take over Jehol and apply pressure to Peiping and Tientsin.[1]

American reaction was mixed, as usual. Some papers, like the New York Daily Mirror, saw Chinese unity growing in reaction to the Japanese threat. Others, including the Boston Post and the Chicago Daily News, pointed to the high cost of Japan's military adventures and wondered how long the nation could support them. On the other hand, the Boston Herald and a few other papers noted Japan's increased foreign trade and the popular domestic support for her current policy as indications that she would not soon collapse.[2]

As the Japanese armies marched into Jehol, the World Tomorrow cried out that Japan had gone too far. Her militarists had "overstepped the final bounds of ruthlessness" and were alienating even the easy-going governments of the great powers. Page therefore hoped very soon to see "not a surrender to expediency, but an assertion of international noncompromise with wrong in the councils at Geneva." Despite his moralistic fervor Page could not restrain a cynical laugh at Japan's

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1. New York Times, Jan. 20, 1933, p. 1; Jan. 25, p. 6; Jan. 28, p. 5; Jan. 29, p. 4; Jan. 30, p. 6; Jan. 31, p. 6; Feb. 1, 1933, p. 11; Literary Digest, Jan. 21, 1933, p. 11.

2. Ibid., Feb. 4, 1933, pp. 5-6.

pronouncements of her noble motives for expansion in Manchuria. He challenged his readers to read with a straight face a statement that Japan was giving Manchuria "precious principles of self-development, progress and spirituality," that she was inspiring and educating Manchuria "in high, humanitarian and spiritual principles." Then came the barb; pointing unmistakably at white imperialism, he asked, "What people, of all dwellers on this globe, have most frequently covered over their slimy greed with the intoxicating froth of romanticism?" Even while denouncing Japan, Page forcefully maintained that she was following a pattern already well-outlined by her now self-righteous critics.[1]

Stanley High of the Christian Herald also jumped on Japan with both feet for "running amok" in her attack on Jehol. Her militarists, he charged, did not realize that the Kellogg pact and the Nine-Power treaty had ended the imperialistic period of world history and had introduced a new era in which the old policies would not be tolerated. Denying this change in the international situation, Japan was "a menace to the world's peace." Surely, she would suffer for her aggression and would eventually learn that militarism leads only to disaster. America briefly reported the invasion of Jehol. The other journals ignored it.

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1. World Tomorrow, Jan. 25, 1933, pp. 75-76, 78.

2. Christian Herald, LVI (March 1933), 26; America, Jan. 21, 1933, p. 371.

Meanwhile, in Tokyo the cabinet was considering withdrawing from the League as soon as the Committee of Nineteen reported[1] although a few of Japan's leaders were trying to find a way to remain in the League even in the face of growing popular agitation for withdrawal.[2] In the Diet several members of both major parties dared oppose the militarists on two vital issues--the military budget and the intransigent policy at Geneva. The dissension was, however, not as strong as observers like Morrison wanted to believe; two days after their speeches two delegates who had deprecated the clash between the War and Foreign Offices over diplomacy "denied any intention of criticizing the foreign policy of the government." Morrison thought the debates in the Diet indicated "less unity behind the facade of Japan's appearance to the outer world than [had] been generally believed.[3] Morrison was looking hard for cracks in Japan's unity; it should not be surprising that some appeared wider than they really were.

Disregarding the retractions by the Japanese politicians, Morrison was certain that the Japanese were very much afraid

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1. New York Times, Jan. 26, 1933, p. 3; Jan. 28, p. 5; Jan. 29, p. 14; Jan. 31, 1933, p. 6.

2. New York Times, Jan. 22, 1933, p. 16; Feb. 2, 1933, p. 1. See also Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 408, 411, 412. For the increasing public clamor prior to the committee's report see ibid., pp. 415-16.

3. New York Times, Jan. 28, 1933, p. 5; Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 409-11; Christian Century, Feb. 8, 1933, p. 180.

the League would apply the nonrecognition doctrine, shutting off their international financial resources. They should be willing to accept almost any other League decision. An embargo on goods did not frighten Japan's statesmen who knew that none of the great powers was willing to go that far in opposing her acquisitions in China. On the other hand, Morrison asserted, a financial boycott--"an embargo on credit"--posed the real threat to Japan. Seeking to enhance the importance of the nonrecognition doctrine, Morrison overemphasized and perhaps misinterpreted a few small indications of dissent in Japan. In reality the opposition to withdrawal was weak, and fear of the nonrecognition policy was not a prominent argument against withdrawal in Japan.[1] That Morrison really believed the liberal elements within Japan able and willing to rise and reverse Japanese policy is apparent from his many statements to that effect already noted. Sincere belief, however, no matter how righteous or how fervent, does not make a mistaken conception either true or effective.

Attitudes expressed about this time in the Missionary Review stressed another aspect of moralists' hopes for internal changes within Japan. Pierson saw a strong spiritual influence making itself felt in Japan despite the aggressive militaristic faction. He fervently hoped that this peaceful but courageous

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1. Christian Century, Feb. 15, 1933, p. 212; Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 409-16.

spirit would triumph so that Japan might lead Asia not to destruction but to peace and prosperity. Regarding China, a series of editorials and articles described remarkable growth in the Christian churches and the spread of the Christian spirit in the midst of that country's terrors. To the missionary-oriented editor, revivals, spiritual awakenings, and the assumption by Chinese Christians of leadership in their own church were vastly more significant than the international disputes, famines, boycotts, banditry, and revolution which were making the headlines.[1]

While Morrison and a few others continued to view the Sino-Japanese dispute with a degree of optimism, winter weather brought a temporary lull on the military fronts in north China. At the same time the League's Committee of Nineteen was preparing its report. Many observers hoped the report would bring peace to the troubled Far East and to the depressed world.

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Japan's military men, however, were not ready for peace in the Far East; and they, not diplomats in Geneva, exercised effective power there. As the diplomats struggled unsuccessfully to arrange a settlement, conflicts of a more violent nature

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1. Missionary Review, LVI (Feb. 1933), 67-69; March, pp. 125-26; April 1933, p. 173.

began to dominate the Sino-Japanese picture. The Japanese had penetrated the great Wall at Shanhaikwan in January then had permitted the situation there to cool during the League's deliberations. The calm was illusory. While the diplomats had talked in Geneva, the Japanese had built up their forces near Shanhaikwan and along the Jehol border. At the same time they were demanding that all Chinese troops withdraw from Jehol, which Manchukuo now claimed. Sporadic clashes along the border punctuated repeated Japanese warnings to the Chinese to evacuate until on February 24--the day on which the Assembly approved the report of the Committee of Nineteen--combined Japanese and Manchukuoan forces launched an offensive into Jehol. The Chinese soldiers again greatly outnumbered the Japanese, and they enjoyed the advantage of defensive positions in mountainous country; but their resistance quickly collapsed. Within less than two weeks the campaign had virtually ended. Japan held most of Jehol and dominated the mountain passes leading to Peiping.[1]

Japan's renewed military activity did not excite the American press; few editors considered it important enough for comment. A few papers, the New York Times among them, suggested

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1. New York Times, Feb. 3, 1933, p. 1; Feb. 6, p. 7; Feb. 19, p. 1; Feb. 22, p. 1; Feb. 23, p. 1; Feb. 24, p. 1; March 4, p. 1; March 6, pp. 1, 8; March 7, 1933, p. 13. See also China Year Book, 1933, pp. 654-55; H.G.W. Woodhead, ed., The China Year Book, 1934 (Shanghai, 1934), p. 357; Toynbee, Survey, 1933, p. 580.

that the stronger threat from Japan might benefit China by stimulating efforts for unification. Except for this possibility, there seemed no change in the basic situation.[1]

The Christian Century almost applauded this latest feat of Japanese military prowess--but not because Morrison had changed his attitude toward Japan. On the contrary, he hoped China would learn from her defeat the futility of resisting Japan by military means. Since China's surprising resistance at Shanghai she had dreamed she could successfully repel a Japanese invasion; "the debacle in Jehol," Morrison hoped, "[would] set that dream at rest." Morrison repeated his earlier contention that there was no hope for China in violent resistance, for righteous peace could be achieved only by righteous and peaceful means. His argument continued:

> If China can be persuaded not to attempt military conclusions with Japan, however great the provocation, the chances will be improved for the working out of another sort of defensive policy, based on economic and moral factors. Against such a defensive the Tokyo war office will find it far more difficult to make progress than it has been in dealing with the disorganized [Chinese] troops.[2]

Deploring violence, the editor still hoped for the eventual success of peaceful means of resistance. In the face of renewed Japanese military advances, however, such counsel could have brought little comfort to the Chinese, if, indeed, any Chinese were even aware of it.

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1. Literary Digest, March 18, 1933, p. 9.
2. Christian Century, March 15, 1933, p. 349.

The Chinese were more likely to be disturbed by provocative words from Tokyo than to be comforted by moralistic advice from Chicago. At least one editor found Japanese statements worth critical comment. James Clarke of the Presbyterian Advance cited a Japanese declaration that Japan might have to protect her nationals in Peiping and Tientsin who were endangered by the struggle in Jehol. "Aggression," the editor remarked with a trace of sarcasm,

> is a progressive thing. One aggression is very likely to create a situation among those attacked which would furnish an excuse for further aggression by those attacking. Proceeding along the line indicated, Japan would have a plausible excuse for marching through the length and breadth of China.

This was all of Clarke's comment. After this time he seems to have lost interest in the Far Eastern controversy.[1]

Intermittent fighting for the mountain passes between Jehol and north China continued throughout March and into April as the Japanese strengthened their positions there. Simultaneously they began to activate the southern half of their pincers. Japan's strategy evidently was to push the Chinese forces from the northeastern corner of China but not to press hard enough to precipitate a full-scale war. The months of April and May, therefore, saw a series of pulsating movements as the Japanese advanced toward Peiping and Tientsin, warned the Chinese troops not to resist or to reoccupy the areas from which they had been driven, and then retreated. When the Chinese

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1. Presbyterian Advance, March 2, 1933, p. 5.

followed the withdrawing Japanese, the whole process began again. By the last half of May the Japanese seemed to have convinced the Chinese of the futility of reoccupying the area, and Chinese forces began a full-scale retreat from Peiping as the military leaders initiated truce talks.[1]

At the end of April the Japanese appeared to be trying to capture Peiping and Tientsin.[2] Morrison feared they would create a very "perilous" situation by attempting to place the whole area under the rule of Manchukuo. Always optimistic, however, he found hope even in this disaster for China. Japan's expansion, he thought, might help unify central and southern China by eliminating the northern warlords with their disrupting influence. He predicted that, confronted with such unity, Japan would find her position in northern China "anything but comfortable."[3]

In one of the Missionary Review's rare references to the dispute a Methodist missionary who had spent twenty-four years (1908-32) in China also asserted that the struggle would unite

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1. The daily course of the north China fighting may be followed in the New York Times for March, April, and May of 1933. Specific references to the most important aspects of the campaign will be made in the following pages. Toynbee, Survey, 1933, p. 580, gives a brief summary. See also Oliver Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China (New York, 1964), pp. 172-74.

2. New York Times, April 18, 1933, p. 8; April 19, p. 1; April 22, p. 7; April 23, 1933, p. 6.

3. Christian Century, May 3, 1933, pp. 580-81.

the various factions trying to control China "as nothing else could do." He was not completely happy about this unity because he feared that the Chinese were also learning "that the only way they can secure justice from the rest of the world is 'to arm to the teeth.'" Frightened by the prospect of a quarter of the world's people so armed and united, the author fervently hoped the West would show China a better way than war to secure the justice she desired. But he did not suggest how the other nations could procure justice for China in the face of Japan's obduracy in aggression.[1] Such vagueness about specific remedies was typical of the comments of a significant portion of religious observers of the clash in China. Clarity as to the goal of peace often accompanied a foggy conception of means to achieve that end.

By early May Japanese troops were pushing closer to Peiping, and Japanese authorities openly declared the "necessity" of occupying most of north China.[2] Morrison could not believe that the apparent success of the Japanese militarists would endure; the cost of these gains must prove too high for Japan. Drawing together arguments which he had used before, Morrison maintained that Japan could not overcome several factors. Massive China, when united, certainly would be more than a match

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1. Chester B. Rape, "What Is New in China?" Missionary Review, April 1933, pp. 193-94.

2. New York Times, May 4, 1933, p. 9.

for little Japan. The Chinese people, moreover, had become so embittered against Japan that the intensified boycott would likely result in permanent loss to Japan of Chinese commerce with disastrous consequences to Japan's economy. The boycott, together with the "bankrupting strain on the Japanese treasury" resulting from her foolish military adventures, would surely produce a financial collapse within Japan. Eventually, the editor believed, these moral and economic forces would prove more powerful than the military methods used by Japan or those which China herself could develop.[1] Because Morrison believed in the ultimate futility of militarism, he could still view China's chances optimistically in spite of the evidence of Japan's success.

Japan's assaults worried Kirby Page, who had remained silent on the dispute since his approval of the League's adoption of the report of the Committee of Nineteen. He called for immediate evacuation of American marines and gunboats from north China before they were drawn into the combat. He thought these forces had never belonged in China, and the threat of direct involvement in the fighting made their removal an urgent necessity. At the same time he implored the League and the United States to implement the League's condemnation of Japan vigorously enough to stop the disastrously expanding struggle. Military measures, however, were not acceptable. "The crisis," he

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1. Christian Century, May 17, 1933, pp. 643-44.

declared, "demands cooperative pressure against Japan--moral, diplomatic, financial, economic (not a complete boycott or a blockade)--by the signatories to the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact." Japan must be opposed, stopped and induced to make amends--but with pressure, not with force.[1] Meanwhile in north China Japan seemed to be accomplishing her goals.

After nearly a month of sporadic negotiations Chinese and Japanese military representatives on May 31, 1933, signed a truce at the seaport town of Tangku near Tientsin. The Chinese government's acknowledgment of Japan's supremacy in north China brought a temporary halt to military clashes there. The truce created a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and a line running to the sea from a point above the Wall northwest of Peiping, leaving Peiping and Tientsin in Chinese hands. Japan promised that she would pull her forces back behind the Great Wall after Chinese troops had withdrawn south and west of the truce line. The Japanese recognized nominal Chinese sovereignty over the neutralized area in the form of Chinese police for the maintenance of order, but they clearly intended to exercise careful surveillance over the region. Japan's conquests of Manchuria and Jehol were not mentioned in this settlement, which dealt only with north China.[2]

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1. World Tomorrow, May 1933, pp. 388-89. As an economy move the World Tomorrow was published monthly from May through August of 1933. Beginning with the issue of August 31, 1933, it became a biweekly.

2. For the signing and provisions of the truce and the subsequent troop withdrawals see New York Times, June 1, 1933, pp. 1, 5; June 2, p. 8; June 6, p. 7; June 14, 1933, p. 2; China Year Book, 1934, pp. 363-64, 720; Toynbee, Survey, 1933, pp. 481-84.

Some editors in the United States hoped that the truce would bring to the fore more responsible Japanese leaders who realized the excessive costs of military adventures in China. While the Japanese press naturally hailed the truce as a step toward permanent peace in the Far East and held the Chinese responsible for the fighting because of their "challenge" to Japan, the Chinese press displayed a mixed reaction. Some Chinese editors objected to the terms of the truce, but others were glad to see the fighting ended so that China could proceed with the task of unification.[1]

Analyzing the Sino-Japanese situation after the truce agreement, Morrison contended that Japan's problems with China outweighed the gains of her twenty months of fishing in China's troubled waters. He acknowledged Japan's achievements in acquiring both territory--Manchuria, Jehol, and part of north China--and access to Inner Mongolia and the rest of north China. She had brought under her control an area three times the size of Japan itself, and much of it was good farming and timber land suitable for colonization. Important economic resources included coal, iron, and foodstuffs from Manchuria and opium from Jehol. Politically, Japan had gained a free hand in the Far East; and her "uncontested military primacy" should at least

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1. Tupper and McReynolds, Public Opinion, pp. 361-62; Literary Digest, June 10, 1933, p. 11. The Literary Digest made no report on the reaction of the American press to the truce.

help to satisfy her "national pride."[1] These were substantial gains, Morrison admitted; but he was too firmly opposed to Japan's method of obtaining them to consider them adequate compensation for the problems which accompanied them.

In Morrison's estimation Japan had acquired more troubles than assets in China. Listing them, he consolidated a number of the arguments he had been using over the passing months to show that Japan could not ultimately succeed. By stirring up the hatred of China's masses, Japan had closed the door on markets which she sorely needed; inadvertently she had also increased the danger of close ties between China and Soviet Russia, helping the growth of communism in China. Future Sino-Japanese relations were precarious because China was not stable enough to guarantee that the recently signed truce would not be broken. Morrison returned to a familiar theme when he wondered how Japan could afford the substantial increases in military expenses required to police the conquered territory and to expand the navy for protection from the hostile world around her. Further, as an outcast from the rest of the world, Japan could expect no financial help from the other nations as long as they maintained the policy of nonrecognition. But Japan's most serious loss was intangible: "Whatever Japan has gained, she has lost the confidence of the rest of the world. She has shown herself a treaty-breaker. She stands as the first nation ever to

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1. Christian Century, June 14, 1933, p. 774.

be solemnly adjudged guilty of bad faith by her sister nations." Morrison conceded that before her aggression Japan could have made a good case which might have won the world's sympathy if properly presented to the League. "As it was," he charged, "she took the law into her own hands, resorted to military invasion, and as a result she finds herself politically and morally isolated." Her isolation was, therefore, all the more tragic because unnecessary. Indeed, the whole bloody mess from Mukden to Tangku could have been avoided if the Japanese militarists had not violated international morality and justice, Morrison believed. He closed feebly with a reiteration of his often-expressed hope that Japan's people would soon realize the trouble their nation faced and the folly of her current course and would lead her in another direction.[1]

On that inconclusive but faintly hopeful note Morrison ended his analysis of the Sino-Japanese controversy of 1931-33. None of the other editors under consideration tried to wrap up the Sino-Japanese dispute in the thoughtful, systematic manner of Morrison's summary. In fact not one of them discussed the Tangku Truce or the comparatively stabilized situation which followed it. Only America reported in its news columns the truce terms and the resulting calm.[2] Some of the editors did,

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1. Christian Century, June 14, 1933, pp. 774-75.
2. America, June 10, 1933, p. 238; June 17, 1933, p. 264.

however, comment on other aspects of Far Eastern conditions in the spring and summer of 1933. It will be useful to round out the discussion in this chapter with brief references to their views.

In the early fall Kirby Page broke a long silence on Sino-Japanese affairs with an editorial describing the economic effects of Japan's expansionist policy and again anticipating her imminent collapse. The editor's pacifist, anti-imperialist attitude showed clearly: "Japanese military and naval budgets are mounting at an alarming rate, and the increased burden is still further impoverishing the masses of Japan. Thus is afforded another illustration that the glories of empire are purchased at a great price!"[1]

In a rare and passing reference to the Sino-Japanese struggle Wilfrid Parsons charged that Japan's aggression contributed to a world-wide increase in belligerency which was especially vigorous in Europe. As nationalistic Europe rearmed, Japan had helped to make restraint less possible. She had "dealt a blow that [might] yet prove deadly to the pacific powers of the League of Nations." Parsons' only suggestion was for renewed efforts by Roman Catholic peace societies; for "it is only the will to outlaw war, a will which draws its force from truly Christian principles, that can make war more remote, and some day, in God's good time, impossible." For the editor

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1. World Tomorrow, Oct. 12, 1933, p. 558.

of America the Far Eastern crisis was an example of the sin of war.[1]

To Stanley High the most important lesson for the United States from the Sino-Japanese conflict and the League's "successful" handling of it was the necessity for full American participation in the international organization. His remark deserves quotation for its wit, a rare commodity among serious-minded religious editors:

> There are three courses open to the United States. We can go isolationist; groom Mr. Hearst for the presidency and declare that mankind--excepting the 100 per cent American variety--can stew in its own juice. Or we can play our present game of mild cooperation, entering and leaving the League by the back door while admitting regretfully that it's not safe for ourselves or sound for business not to be on hand. Or, finally, we can recognize that as nations we are all in the same trouble; that we got in together and that we will have to get out together. Recognizing that, we can grow up, put on long pants and apply to the League's front door for permission to act the part of a man.[2]

High did not comment again on the Sino-Japanese conflict.

The two missionary periodicals emphasized conditions in the Christian churches and among missionaries, giving far more coverage to China than to Japan. They only occasionally mentioned effects of the conflict on religious affairs and rarely discussed other aspects of it. In news reports and articles the Missionary Review and the World Outlook (Missionary Voice)

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1. America, April 1, 1933, p. 613.
2. Christian Herald, April 1933, p. 26.

described spiritual revivals and numerical growth in the Christian churches in China and Manchuria despite, or perhaps sometimes because of, the desperate conditions caused by fighting, floods, and famines.[1] Both journals also praised the Christian leadership of China, especially that of the Soong family and Chiang Kai-shek, a member of the family by marriage. Since the Soongs were Methodists, the Methodist journal took particular delight in pointing out their admirable qualities and influence.[2] On one occasion the Christian Advocate also described conditions in Methodist churches in the war zone of north China and urged its readers to give financial support to them.[3]

After the truce of Tangku the Far East settled into a period of comparative quiet for several years as Japan absorbed her gains and China tried to recover from Japan's blows and from her own internal chaos. Meanwhile upheaval in Europe was already attracting the attention of Morrison and other editors who were concerned about international peace. In Germany and in Italy, new threats to the postwar status quo were rising. These militaristic regimes presented further challenges to the peace

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1. Missionary Review, May 1933, pp. 277-78; June, pp. 314; 332; Sept., pp. 417-19, 448-51; Oct., 1933, p. 478; World Outlook (Missionary Voice), July 1933, p. 269; Aug., 1933, pp. 280-81.

2. Missionary Review, April 1933, pp. 194-95; World Outlook, July 1933, p. 247; Sept.-Oct., 1933, pp. 315, 340-41.

3. Christian Advocate, July 20, 1933, p. 685.

machinery which Japan had already proved inadequate and to the principles of international morality which undergirded the peace structure.

The editor of the Christian Century, facing the fact of Japan's almost inexorable advance in China but refusing to acknowledge the legality or permanence of her conquests, tried desperately to see reasons for hoping that Japan would prove unable to hold her illegitimate gains. Morrison minimized Japan's strengths and China's weaknesses, preferring to accentuate the positive factors in China's favor. Because Japan's military aggression was morally wrong, he could not admit that it might endure. Moral right was on China's side; if she could abstain from immoral violence, surely peaceful methods of resistance would ultimately bring her victory. The peace machinery, he desperately maintained, would still work if it were used properly--that is, without the entangling obstruction of military force. The key to peace was the Kellogg-Briand pact, and the nonrecognition policy furnished the means to use it. The League was on the right track toward peace, for it had invoked nonrecognition as its sanction against the aggressor.

Except for Kirby Page the interest of the other editors in the Far Eastern situation declined in 1933. Even the latest, violent Japanese advances in China produced only slight response from James Joy (Christian Advocate), E. H. Rawlings (World Outlook), and James Clarke (Presbyterian Advance). Two editors

did not even mention these Japanese moves--Guy Shipler (Churchman) and Curtis Laws (Watchman-Examiner). Indeed, Laws might be called a negative leader as far as this study is concerned, for the pages of the Baptist publication did not reveal that a conflict was occurring in the Far East in the winter, spring, and summer of 1932-33. At the opposite extreme from Laws was Page. After the World Tomorrow changed from monthly to weekly publication in September 1932 and until the League's final action on the dispute, the socialist-pacifist-Christian editor rivalled Morrison in editorial output about the controversy. In opposing use of armed force, supporting the League and American cooperation with it, and exhalting the Kellogg pact and the nonrecognition policy, his views were strikingly similar to Morrison's. Generally, he was slightly less theoretical, less inclined to utter sweeping, enthusiastic generalities than the Christian Century's editor; he stressed Japan's financial tribulations as the key to her eventual downfall.

Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

The response of the American Christian press to the Sino-Japanese controversy demonstrated one of the continuing assumptions of American life--that universal principles are the foundation for the life of man in society. To a lesser extent this response also bore witness to another major tenet which has been prominent in the nation's history--that the United States exists not only to promote the peace and safety of its own citizens but also to support the cause of freedom and human dignity at home and abroad. While the specific content of these tenets as well as their relative importance in American life has varied throughout the nation's history, they still influence American thinking.

To go back no farther than the turn of the century, expansionists like Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan were in agreement with pacifists like David Starr Jordan that the moral law was a necessary foundation for international relations if nations were not to engage in a continuous jungle struggle.[1]

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1. Ralph Henry Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought, Second edition (New York, 1956), pp. 367-86.

Woodrow Wilson coupled this concept with a sense of the mission of America to inspire the great crusade to make the world safe for democracy. The idea survived in the peace movement of the postwar period. Indeed, the discussion of the use of atomic bombs against Japan in 1945, the philosophy of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and the current invoking of ethical and moral concepts in the debate about Vietnam are but a few indications that the idea of national mission linked with a concept of fundamental principles is still very much a part of the American scene.

Christian editors believed that Japanese expansion by use of military force in Manchuria and China violated basic principles of international community--sanctity of the pledged word of nations embodied in treaties and, especially in the case of Morrison and Page, the agreement not to use war as a means of settling international disputes. Most of the editors would have agreed on a more fundamental pacifist principle that violence of any kind is immoral. Allied with these basic tenets underlying the Christian response was the conviction that the United States had a moral responsibility, a national mission, to support these principles in cooperation with other civilized nations.

This emphasis on moral ideals and principles represented one of the traditional ways in which men have sought to restrain the use of power in their community life. Drawing upon the Hebrew prophets' belief in a moral God who judges nations as

well as individuals, Christian concepts of love and brotherhood, and Greek ideas of a natural law of justice in nature and in the hearts of men, this Western tradition sought, in Ralph Henry Gabriel's words, "to subjugate power and to discipline it to humane ends." A similar tradition arose in the East. The teachings of Buddha and Confucius contained ethical principles of non-violence, passive resistance, and moral responsibility aimed at constraining and limiting the use of power.[1]

As has been previously stated, this moral emphasis in international relations was particularly strong in the United States after the Great War. It was not by any means confined to Christian circles although it found some of its strongest support in the church. By the mid-thirties this so-called "idealist" school of international relations was being challenged by a "realist" school represented by such figures as Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and George F. Kennan. Emphasizing what is politically possible more than what is ideally desirable, the "realists" attempted to restrain power in another traditional way--by use of countervailing power or a balance of power. In contrast to the stress of the idealists on the moral nature of man and his capacities for goodness and virtue, the realists point to the limits of man's moral capacity and the evidence of history that man often behaves immorally.[2]

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1. Gabriel, Course of American Democratic Thought, p. 455.

2. Ernest W. Lefever, Ethics and United States Foreign Policy (Cleveland, 1957), pp. 22-24.

The Christian editors studied here occasionally displayed an awareness of the moral imperfections of man and the necessity for some constraint upon him to prevent tyranny and oppression, especially by one nation over another. Generally, however, these editors stood solidly on the idealist side along with the leaders of American foreign policy, President Hoover and Secretary of State Stimson. At the beginning of the 'thirties Japan's successful defiance of the organized measures for keeping peace by moral means no doubt contributed to the subsequent decline of the idealist viewpoint and the gradual rise of the realist school in discussion of American foreign policy. As this shift of emphasis in response to the painful facts of international conflict was beginning, Christian editors held firmly to the idealist approach and often vehemently resisted all suggestions that moral and legal measures should be supplemented or replaced by more forceful procedures in dealing with violators of the international moral code.

While there was general agreement on basic idealistic principles, some Christian editors were much more concerned about applying these precepts than others were. In fact, the most striking diversity in the reactions of these journals to the Sino-Japanese controversy appears in the volume of comment in them. The frequency and length of editorials and articles dealing with the Far Eastern crisis provides an index to the degree of concern which the editors felt. By this standard the Christian Century led the way with comments almost every week; many

of them were a full page in length. It was closely followed by the World Tomorrow. In a middle group but considerably behind these two independent publications were another independent, the Christian Herald, and four denominational journals--the Presbyterian Advance, the Christian Advocate, the Churchman, and America. With comparatively few comments the Watchman-Examiner, the World Outlook (Missionary Voice), and the Missionary Review of the World lagged far behind the leaders. Excepting the two most voluble editors, Morrison and Page, who showed sustained interest throughout the controversy, the majority tended to discuss only the major developments in the crisis. Like spectators at a fire, who shout loudly when flames erupt spectacularly or when the fire trucks arrive, they frequently seemed to lose interest when nothing extraordinary was happening. In contrast, Morrison and Page repeatedly pointed at the smoking structure of peace and urged efforts to extinguish the fire before the flames again leaped up and spread to other areas. These two editors kept the issue almost continually before their readers as they analyzed the problem and sought support for efforts to solve it peaceably. Both publications also consistently displayed a wider concern with social, economic, and political issues than other journals studied; their freedom from denominational ties and from orientation toward a special interest like missions enabled them to emphasize broader applications of religion to life.

Despite large differences in editorial concern, these

periodicals were in surprisingly close agreement. They unanimously condemned Japan for immoral aggression in defiance of solemn treaties, and most of them pointed out the sinister threat to the peace machinery. They viewed public opinion as a deterrent to Japan and urged that the moral force of the world be mobilized to halt and punish her. Supporting the League's pacification efforts, they called for American cooperation with the world organization and hailed the nonrecognition doctrine as a fruitful method of upholding the Kellogg pact and the Nine-Power treaty. While there was substantial approval of the mild policies of Hoover and Stimson, probably few of these editors would have endorsed more vigorous action by this nation. James Clarke, Guy Shipler, and Kirby Page might have approved a selective boycott of Japanese goods; but most were content to let the nations apply moral and financial pressure to Japan by means of nonrecognition. Other suggestions included Clarke's call in the Presbyterian Advance for an international police force and the more orthodox religious solution of prayer for peace which America, the Watchman-Examiner, and the two missionary journals advocated. In spite of occasional pessimistic remarks the pervading mood of these commentators was optimistic. They hopefully assured their readers that Japan's immoral actions could not go unpunished indefinitely; either external pressure of the world's moral opinion or internal financial weaknesses would surely bring Japan to her senses and to her knees. The League's condemnation of Japan and encouragement of nonrecognition seemed

a moral victory which saved both the League and the peace machinery from disintegration before the specter of Japanese militarism. The idealist, moralist attitude of the editors was unmistakable.

In addition to this general agreement several comments of individual editors are worth noting as contributions to a more realistic response to the crisis. For example, Guy Shipler held that the dispute proved that nations pursue their own interests rather than abstract principles of justice. While Shipler simply stated this fact, which ardent idealists like Morrison tended to ignore, Wilfrid Parsons in the Jesuit journal deplored another aspect of the same conviction--that governments disregard ethical principles in their immoral subservience to the forces of economic nationalism. In contrast, the two missionary publications demonstrated more interest in revivals and other spiritual advances of the Christian churches in China than in the military and diplomatic aspects of the dispute. These two joined the Baptist and the Methodist journals in reporting the safety of missionaries in Manchuria and north China.

The sporadic and somewhat isolated comments of most of the editors indicate a measure of concern with the threat to peace for religious and moral reasons; but only Morrison and Page presented systematic analyses and carefully developed recommendations which revealed sustained interest and thought. Sporadic comments, while occasionally incisive, usually seemed to be spontaneous reactions to specific developments rather than

products of a systematic application of Christian insights and principles to the whole problem. Page and Morrison, however, carefully explained the causes and the specific incidents of the crisis and suggested solutions for it. Of the two editors Kirby Page may be discussed more briefly because his socialistic Christianity probably had little influence with most preachers and laymen; he represented an extreme form of socially concerned religion. His systematic analysis, however, serves as a clear example of intense concern with the Far Eastern crisis stemming from deep Christian convictions allied with a Marxist emphasis on economic factors.

Page's position has appeared clearly in this study; a brief summary will suffice here. To Page Japan's aggression was a demonstration of the evils of imperialistic capitalism, for Japan was acting as other capitalist nations had acted and could always be expected to act. According to socialist doctrine, imperialism was inherent in the capitalist social and economic system. The ultimate solution, therefore, lay in abolition of the capitalist-imperialist society and the establishment of socialism. With workers in control of economic and political power in all nations there would be no more imperialism and no more aggression. Page saw socialism as the Christian alternative to capitalism with its immoral exploitation of workers; socialism was more equitable, more humane, more Christian. Rejecting revolutionary aspects of Marxism, however, the World Tomorrow held that the new order was to be achieved gradually and peacefully,

not by force.

In the meantime, however, Page advocated specific measures to stop Japan's aggression and restore her to international society without waiting for establishment of a new economic system. His solution, developed early in the dispute, consisted of four measures to be applied successively--moral condemnation of Japan, nonrecognition of her gains, severing of diplomatic relations, and a selective boycott of her goods. With the latter two recommendations, Page move farther toward forceful action than most of the other Christian editors were willing to go. He was both surprised and pleased that the League finally condemned Japan, for he had expected that the nations which controlled the world organization would prevent it from judging acts similar to their own imperialist acquisitions. Since the League's action agreed with the first stages of his proposed solution, he enthusiastically supported it. Thus encouraged, Page optimistically and repeatedly predicted that Japan's resulting financial difficulties would force her to abandon her imperialistic course. The League had saved itself and the peace machinery. Page was realistic enough to know that moral condemnation alone could not seriously hurt Japan, but his socialistic emphasis on economic forces perhaps led him to trust too optimistically in financial pressure. A staunch pacifist for religious reasons, Page categorically opposed on moral and religious grounds use of violent sanctions against Japan. He insisted that any measures directed against Japan's immoral aggression must themselves be morally acceptable; military force or a naval blockade were antithetical

to the goal of peace and the rehabilitation of the offender. Financial pressure and diplomatic isolation seemed to offer the best hope for achieving repentance and restitution by Japan with a minimum of suffering for her people.

Charles Clayton Morrison of the Christian Century offered a more fully developed analysis which did not rely on socialist concepts. This journal was probably more acceptable in American church circles than the World Tomorrow, and Morrison's orthodox background and liberal views no doubt commanded more respect and acceptance among both clergy and laymen than the socialist editor's radical tendencies. Morrison emerges in this study as the outstanding spokesman for application of Christian principles to the controversy and to the broader area of international affairs. He systematized and carried to their logical conclusions views which other editors expressed in piecemeal fashion. In his analysis and recommendations one finds the highest development of the ideas of the Christians in the peace movement--nonviolence, international morality, Christian internationalism--and the most determined effort to apply them to the Sino-Japanese clash.

Within the restrictions imposed by weekly printing deadlines and space limitations, Morrison tried to achieve two purposes. First, he wanted to convince his readers of the importance of the crisis for world peace and the peace machinery. Second, believing his readers influential in informing and shaping public opinion in their communities, he hoped to persuade

them to support the policy followed by the United States government because this policy corresponded closely to his own suggestions. In this process of interpretation and persuasion Morrison consistently worked within a systematic framework of basic principles and underlying assumptions.

Toward the Manchurian crisis Morrison displayed an attitude of "moralist-legalist pacifism." He epitomized the idealist approach. Like Page, Morrison unwaveringly opposed violence; he abhorred the physical, mental, and moral destructiveness of modern war. He absolutely rejected war as a means of settling international disputes; only peaceful means could achieve the goal of peace. While pacifist in aim, the editor's stand was legalistic and moralist in method. He emphasized the principles of international law as he understood them and the moral duty of every nation to observe them. The other editors held substantially the same views although they did not express them as fully nor as often as Morrison did. Morrison's views have been so amply recorded that only a brief summary of his basic principles is necessary here.

Morrison started from the belief that the Kellogg-Briand peace pact had inaugurated a new international legal order. By voluntarily limiting their own sovereignty, nations had legally and morally bound themselves to refrain from using war as an instrument of national policy. A nation violating this new order of law by waging war came under the moral judgment and condemnation of world opinion. The people of the world could

agree on proper moral action--even against their own governments--if they could know the truth. A nation which broke the law of peace should be banished from international society by the effects of the moral judgment itself and also by the refusal of other nations to recognize the legality of the spoils of aggression. In practice nonrecognition required depriving the aggressor of international sources of capital for developing her illegal acquisitions. In Japan's case Morrison believed this financial sanction would prove effective.

According to Morrison, Page, and some of the others, the offending nation would realize the error of her militaristic course as nonrecognition constricted her finances and as her people realized the cost of war in lives, money, resources, and prestige. External pressure by the community of nations with simultaneous appeal to the moral and legal instincts of the aggressor's people would produce the necessary internal changes--a change of attitude followed by a change of policy. The aim of international condemnation, therefore, was not punishment but rehabilitation of the offender into a law-abiding, morally acceptable member of the family of nations.

Morrison's legalist-pacifist response was basically optimistic; he looked for eventual realization of error by the offending state, which would return to the international community by renouncing its previous policy and making amends to its victims. In practice therefore he and other editors supported, often enthusiastically, the policy of the United States government

because it also aimed to restore peace by moral and legal, not violent, methods.[1]

Morrison's argument was logical and consistent--if one could accept his premise that the peace pact had inaugurated a new era in international law and morality. At his starting point Morrison was vulnerable. The law of nations never has been as clearly defined and universally accepted as Morrison assumed. Treaty provisions are only one of several sources of international law; juridical decisions and arbitral awards, customary practice, and the opinions of public and private authorities also influence its development. Nations, moreover, have not infrequently disregarded law in pursuit of vital national interests. Until the principle of renunciation of war could be more widely accepted in practice as well as theory, it was not a fully established provision of international law totally reversing age-old precedents of preservation, defense, and expansion of national interest. Yet this is exactly what Morrison insisted that it was.

Besides misjudging the legal significance of the peace pact, Morrison persistently approached war in general and the Sino-Japanese struggle in particular from a moral and legal

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1. See Henry L. Stimson, "The Bases of American Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XI (April 1933), pp. 383-96, and "The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development," ibid., XI (Oct. 1932), Special Supplement, pp. i-ix.

standpoint. He never seemed to understand that the problem of war could not be separated realistically from its economic, political, social, and even emotional aspects; he would deal with it only on a moral and legal plane. He therefore had no patience for arguments which took these factors into account and arrived at conclusions different from his. In this respect again he carried to an extreme a tendency of moral idealists in the peace movement.

Morrison's stand on the Manchurian crisis was based on rarely expressed but implicit religious foundations with which the other editors studied were probably in substantial agreement. The problem of war was a central concern in the religion he embraced. Since the true Christian faith encompassed all of life and not just a "religious" dimension of it, the responsible Christian must oppose this national form of denial of love for his neighbor. He must, then, support the effort to eliminate war from international life just as he strives to eradicate sin from his personal life.

Believing war the ultimate international sin, Morrison in 1927 had declared that there was an "essential identity" between the Christian gospel and the proposal to outlaw war. He had called for the Christian church to give the peace pact full support.[1] Over the years he consistently opposed war in all its forms; and when the peace pact received its most severe challenge

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1. Christian Century, XLIV (Oct. 27, 1927), 1261-64.

by a major power--Japan--, he threw himself behind it wholeheartedly. He was committed to preservation of peace by moral means as an essential element of his Christian faith. He could not abandon his commitment.

This religious foundation of Morrison's stand strongly influenced his view of international relations. Nations, he assumed, were subject to the same moral laws as individuals; as a person was responsible to God for his conduct, so was a nation. This assumption was implicit in the criticisms which each of the editors leveled at Japan. For Morrison it led to a close correspondence between his view of international relations and war on the one hand and certain basic concepts of Christianity on the other.

The law of God, his command for moral and ethical living, found a counterpart in the international legal principle condemning war. Expressed in the peace pact, this international law represented an application of God's law on the level of national morality. As God passed judgment on the individual who broke his law, so the public opinion of the world would judge and condemn the violator of the international code. Similarly, as the man who sinned found himself alienated from God and from his fellow men, the international outlaw was condemned to moral and financial isolation from the family of nations. The individual found salvation through repentance, which involved renunciation of sin and faithful obedience to God; in like manner restoration to international society through realization of error

and a change of policy was possible for the outlaw nation. As God in his forgiveness accepted the repentant sinner, so the international community would receive the outcast nation. There seems a striking correspondence between the Christian religion Morrison professed and his response to the Far Eastern crisis.

Whether it is realistic to expect nations to observe a moral code in the absence of means for enforcing it may be seriously questioned. Certainly events between September 1931 and June 1933 indicated that world opinion was not the compelling power for preserving peace that supporters of the Kellogg-Briand pact had claimed it to be. Even more basic is the question whether moral laws which were developed for individuals can be realistically applied to nations. This problem becomes particularly acute in regard to the Christian principle of love for one's neighbor, a basic concept for Morrison as for all Christians. An individual can, of course, decide to act in a loving way and to take the consequences of that action. But who can make such a decision for a nation? How can a nation decide such a question for itself? How long would a leader remain at the head of his nation if he proposed a policy which would require altruistic sacrifice by his people solely for the sake of justice or well-being for another nation? The "stumbling block" of the cross looms large in Christian morality as applied to relations among nations. Specifically, the assumption that Japan should act according to a moralistic concern for China's welfare rather than according to her own national interests was

far removed from the realities of the situation. Even the supposedly moral western nations showed no inclination to inconvenience, much less to sacrifice, themselves for China's welfare.

Another characteristic of Morrison's reaction to the Manchurian controversy also sprang from religious roots. Often the Christian Century's editorials displayed a vigorous zeal which made them seem more like sermons than analyses of international affairs. Again Morrison stands out among the editors studied, for only Page occasionally matched his passion. Morrison brought his preaching style to his "larger pulpit."

Morrison often considered events more significant than they later proved to be, and Page and some of the other editors occasionally displayed the same trait. With enthusiastic predictions of great achievement Morrison frequently applauded statements and actions which produced no important results. Such expressions might easily have led readers to question the editor's judgment. Perhaps, trying hard to convince the world that the new order in international affairs had really arrived, he overestimated the impact of moral pronouncements. Sometimes Morrison let his own oratory sweep him beyond realistic limits.

Like many ministers, Morrison probably had developed in his preaching days the habit of extracting every possible implication from a Biblical passage. Now he applied the same technique to his analysis of events and diplomatic statements. By deducing unwarranted implications from events and statements,

the editor weakened his case, detracting from the credibility of his position and probably from his influence with his readers. Whatever Morrison's conscious or unconscious reasons, his repetition of such misleading interpretations raises questions of editorial responsibility and judgment. Such interesting and important questions of motivation and personal awareness of reality are, however, outside the limits of the present study.

It is to the credit of most of the editors studied that they correctly perceived the seriousness of the Far Eastern challenge to the postwar system of peace treaties and international institutions: the League of Nations, the World Court, the Washington treaties, the Pact of Paris. Morrison constantly maintained--and the others at least mentioned--that the Far Eastern crisis was not simply an isolated incident involving only Japan and China; it endangered the peace of the whole world. Correctly, too, Morrison realized that Japan would bring about her own downfall by staying on the course set in Manchuria. Yet it was not world opinion but military might aroused by unexpected attack which eventually brought Japan to her knees.

By urgent weekly discussion Morrison kept the issues before his readers to a greater extent than the other editors. He vigorously challenged them to think about the controversy and its settlement. If he failed to advocate measures strong enough to halt the Japanese advance, he was not alone in his timidity. Diplomats and statesmen as well as his fellow editors offered no more effective solutions than did Morrison. Yet,

given the conditions of 1931-33, perhaps legalistic pronouncements and moral judgments were the most forceful actions possible. Above all other factors, the paralyzing depression in the United States and Europe made it impossible for the great powers to apply effective economic sanctions or military measures against Japan. Besides the means, the will to punish Japan was also lacking. Against economic or military interference in the Far Eastern dispute stood a public opinion produced by a variety of factors--trust in treaties for arms limitation and the outlawry of war, hope for effective action by the League and the disarmament conference, traditional attitudes of isolation and neutrality, the remoteness of Mukden and Shanghai. In Europe, moreover, a new menace was rising out of Germany's desperate condition as Adolf Hitler gained power in an openly nationalistic, militaristic, and irredentist movement. Probably none of the politically practicable steps which the great powers could have taken at that time would have stopped Japan.[1] These factors suggest that

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1. Ferrell points out that both Hoover and Chiang Kai-shek were so involved in domestic problems in September 1931 that neither was able to take effective action against Japan. So important was the depression in this respect, he declares, that the U. S. could have done nothing about the Manchurian crisis even if forewarned that it was coming. Diplomacy, pp. 128-31, 135-37. See also Leopold, Growth of American Foreign Policy, pp. 491-96. For opinion that prompt, vigorous and concerted action might have stopped Japan, see, among others, William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York, 1952), pp. 15-16, and Smith, Manchurian Crisis, passim.

the basic error of Morrison and other equally optimistic editors like Page, High, Joy, and Clarke lay not in making and supporting legalistic pronouncements and moral judgments but in expecting them to be effective. More realistically they might have recognized such declarations of principle as ineffectual last resorts to register opposition "for the record," not as solutions worthy of praise.

Christian reactions to the Far Eastern challenge to peace may be appraised, like those of Hoover, Stimson, and the League, in the light of a perceptive comment from the early, dark days of the crisis. These Christian editors were not the only ones who failed to heed the perceptive observation of political columnist Walter Lippmann in December 1931:

> the attempt to preserve peace by purely pacific gestures failed when confronted by a determined militarism. It was demonstrated that in a case of this sort, involving the interests of a great power, moral force physically disarmed is not sufficient, that against an efficient militarism, injunctions and resolutions are ineffective, and that at this stage of the world's development, the Western Powers are not prepared to take the risks of enforcing peace. The League's mistake was that it attempted to achieve by persuasion what could only have been accomplished by force.[1]

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1. At that time Lippmann did not carry his own insights to their logical conclusion. In the same column he said that financial isolation "might" still force Japan to retreat from Manchuria. "Western Objectives in the Far East," New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 1, 1931, p. 23. See also Morison, Turmoil and Tradition, p. 402, and Robert H. Ferrell, "The Mukden Incident: September 18-19, 1931," Journal of Modern History, XXVII (March 1955), 67.

Throughout the controversy Morrison clung to his hope and faith that "moral indignation and world opinion" could and would prevail over Japanese militarism. By the spring of 1933 other Christian editors either shared this hope or had lost interest in the Far Eastern controversy.

Perhaps Morrison and the other optimists might have been less hopeful and more in touch with the realities of the Sino-Japanese dispute if they had given sufficient weight to a basic Christian insight into the nature of man. Morrison's interpretation and solution relied ultimately on the unified opinion of the people of the world against war--by their own governments or by other nations. Some editors, especially Morrison and Page, even expected the Japanese people to repudiate their militarist leaders and restore Japan to her place among civilized nations. These optimists failed to take seriously the Christian doctrine that man as an individual and in society is a sinner--that he is proud, selfish, and self-deceiving. They assumed that most men, with the possible exception of militarists, wanted to do right; if convinced of the misdeeds of their leaders, they would force changes in leadership and policy. Morrison failed to realize that men also want to do what is beneficial for themselves, as nations no less than as individuals. When morality conflicts with self-interest, either real or imagined, men do not automatically choose the moral course. The Japanese, convinced that domination of Manchuria and China was essential to their national welfare, were not amenable to the

moral arguments and pressures in which Morrison trusted.

Men find morality and honor difficult to achieve as individuals, and their selfishness may more subtly and more dangerously dominate them when they act in large groups. Robert E. Osgood has shown this tendency to be especially notable and dangerous in the phenomenon of nationalism. "The sanction of patriotism," he writes, relieves a citizen's conscience in his identification of himself with his nation so that he

> can manage with a sense of complete moral consistency to combine lofty altruism toward his own nation with extreme egoism toward other nations and thereby actively support a standard of ethics in foreign relations which he would not dream of tolerating in his private dealings. It is to this explosive combination of altruism and egoism, satisfying two profound impulses in one great emotional coalescence, that modern nationalism owes its peculiar intensity.[1]

National repentance, for which Morrison and others fervently hoped, was at that time nearly impossible for the Japanese, who were caught up in a powerful surge of patriotism and nationalism. Indeed, the so-called "Christian nations" of the West have done no better. Perhaps there was a touch of this national selfishness even in Morrison's contention, shared by the other editors, that, whatever happened in the Far East or elsewhere, his own nation should under no circumstances let itself be drawn into

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1. Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago, 1953), p. 11.

the catastrophe of war.

These editors might have made a more significant contribution to understanding the Far Eastern crisis if they had tempered their optimistic reliance on the moral force of public opinion for peace with a sense of the selfishness possible for patriots--Japanese, Chinese, American, and other kinds. They might have hoped for less and understood more.

Although the editors had few doubts about their own moral principles or about the application of them to Japan's behavior, they seemed oblivious to the possibility that the leaders and the people of Japan might be guided by other ethical precepts. None of the journals mentioned that the code of Shinto might provide the Japanese with moral rationalizations for their own actions. Japan did not, however, advance this sort of argument in her defense. She did not deny her responsibility to honor the treaties for peace in China and for the renunciation of war. She steadfastly maintained that she was not violating those treaties. Japan claimed she was acting against bandits and other threats to the lives and property of her citizens in areas where there was no Chinese government strong enough to guarantee security. Japan's contentions made even less impression on moralistic observers than on the members of the League of Nations.

As contributors to the American response to the crisis in the Far East, Christian editors might be criticized for aiding the perpetuation of the optimistic, moralistic attitude toward international conflict which grew out of the disillusion-

ment following the first World War. This attitude perhaps was harmless enough during the postwar decade when peace and the peace machinery were not threatened by the great powers. But the guns of September 1931 heralded the opening of a different era; the balance of power had begun to shift rapidly as the hitherto weak nations of Japan, Italy, and Germany flexed their growing muscles and began to reach out to take what they felt was rightfully theirs. In the face of this threat moral pronouncements and half-hearted financial pressures were insufficient to preserve the peace and stability of the old order. The editors studied probably could have had little effect on the course of events even if they had more clearly perceived the cold realities and had shouted more loudly for stronger measures to stop the tide of aggression before it gathered momentum. Bound by their firm convictions that peace was moral and that violence--even to punish or forestall aggression--was immoral, they shared and encouraged a widespread hope that moral force would somehow prove strong enough to prevent a recurrence of the tragedy of 1914-18. Their views would soon meet lively challenge from more "realistic" observers of the spreading international conflict. Theirs, however, were not the only trumpets which gave forth uncertain sounds in the confusing days when peace began to break down. And at least they pointed clearly to the long-range dangers of Japan's defiance of the peace machinery and of international morality. Yet, most of them accepted as measures which would be effective the inadequate

attempts to bring about a change in Japanese policy. In so doing, they were perhaps liable to the charges of contributing to a complacency which encouraged further aggression and of crying, "Peace, peace," when there was a temporary lull but no lasting peace.

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